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Executive Summary
Achieving global access to vaccines, diagnostics, and
pharmaceuticals remains a challenge. Throughout
the developing world, intellectual property (IP) con‐
straints complicate access to critically essential medi‐
cal technologies and products. Vaccines for malaria
and pandemic strains of influenza, as well as diag‐
nostic and vaccine technologies for SARS, are not
only relevant to global public health but are particu‐
larly critical to the needs of developing countries. A
global access solution is urgently needed. This article
offers a timely case‐by‐case analysis of preliminary
patent landscape surveys and formulates options via
patent pools and other forms of creative IP man‐
agement to accelerate development and access. The
analysis of the feasibility of patent pools reveals sev‐
eral impediments to patent pools: these include anti‐

trust considerations, bargaining difficulties caused
by asymmetric interests and asymmetric rights
among IP holders (e.g. improvement vs. foundational
patents), and the difficulties of securing financial
support given the significant transaction costs asso‐
ciated with pools.
Because of the above conceptual and opera‐
tional hurdles, patent pools do not appear to be a
feasible way to accelerate development. Other
mechanisms, however, can ameliorate IP constraints.
For example, a key IP constraint related to pandemic
influenza vaccines R&D appears to have been re‐
solved when MedImmune secured the assembly of
all relevant reverse genetics IP and pledged broad
access. Clearly, the landscape is complex and multi‐
dimensional. Licensing systems are not the only is‐
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sue. Measures must also be taken to limit regulatory
hurdles and enable the swift, legal production of
pandemic influenza vaccines to meet the needs of
developing countries. This is why a comprehensive
analysis is so necessary.
From a strictly legal perspective, IP systems work
through the power to exclude. However, as this
study’s exploration and formulation of creative li‐
censing strategies reveals, it is also true that IP can be
structured and managed to work through the “power
to include.”
Principal results
Several important results emerged from this study of
patent pools. First, one key constraint is related to a
platform technology—reverse genetics—that is es‐
sential for rapidly developing influenza vaccines ef‐
fective against H5N1. One company was able to re‐
solve this constraint by assembling all the relevant IP
and becoming a single licensing authority. Creating
such a one‐stop licensing authority would accelerate
development, but it is not clear that a commercial
entity would be willing to license a bundle of IP
rights for developing country use.
Second, while the need for patent pools has been
generally assumed (along with the determination of
the possible kinds of such pools), there may be no
immediate need for them. More importantly, imple‐
menting a patent pool in any of these three areas
(pandemic influenza, malaria, and SARS) does not
appear feasible for the following reasons:
1. Anti‐trust considerations are real and may not be
easily overcome in the quickly developing field of
biotechnology.
2. Because they do not have aligned interests, it is
doubtful that key players will agree to a patent
pool. Without an industrially standardized suite of
platform technologies, a situation that is unlikely
to change in the near future, businesses compete at
every level and have no reason to share their dis‐
coveries with their competitors. The best‐known
use of patent pools is in the electronics industry,
which extracts value from IP through the finished
product (e.g., DVD players sold to consumers). In
biotechnology, however, value can be preserved
and extracted at numerous levels of development.
Moreover, the industry is made up of not only very
large corporations but also very small start‐ups.
Their interests are usually opposed, which makes
this field generally inimical to pool formation.
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3. It would be a formidable obstacle to identify a
donor willing to fund the significant cost of es‐
tablishing a patent pool, especially in an area of
limited commercial interest.
In the particular case of pandemic influenza, the ap‐
parent resolution of IP issues related to reverse genet‐
ics technology suggests that other constraints besides
IP are now more significant (e.g., finding effective
adjuvant technologies to extend antigen efficacy).
More broadly, the speed of R&D is a major constraint.
Further down the road, manufacturing capacity to
produce a pandemic influenza vaccine rapidly and in
sufficient quantities will be a crucial factor. Interna‐
tional coordination and leadership from an appropri‐
ate type of organization are urgently needed to an‐
ticipate and overcome these obstacles. Although IP
issues permeate these areas, patent pooling per se is
not expected to accelerate R&D or to leverage the
additional investments required for manufacturing.
Building appropriate partnerships might be the
best way to accelerate global access for pandemic
influenza vaccines. This would close gaps and might
also cover R&D, manufacturing, etc., but not neces‐
sarily all the areas needed. Sound technology transfer
agreements must be achieved, and it will be critically
important to attend to such matters preemptively,
since in a pandemic there will be no time for the
global community to be “tied up in legal formality.”
Malaria is an extremely difficult disease that has
eluded modern science for a long time, but recent
advances are promising. In contrast to pandemic in‐
fluenza research, which has been led by private sector
efforts funded significantly by the public sector, ma‐
laria vaccine R&D is being pursued through product
development public‐private partnerships (PDPs).
Recent investments by the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation have provided an enormous push to ac‐
celerate malaria vaccine development. The PDP that
deals with malaria, the Malaria Vaccine Initiative
(MVI) under PATH, was also consulted and is closely
engaged in the present project.
Vaccines are the world’s best hope for combating
pandemic influenza and malaria, but for SARS the
strategies are uncertain. SARS patent applications can
be organized into vaccines, diagnostics, and thera‐
peutic agents. For vaccines, the fundamental underly‐
ing technology is the DNA sequence of the SARS ge‐
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nome, which was sequenced by four different institu‐
tions, almost simultaneously. In this area, the NIH in
the U.S. led the way to a consortium for developing a
common licensing approach, with the ultimate objec‐
tive of forming a patent pool for the SARS genome.
Discussions are still underway.
In the area of diagnostics, there are two leaders
(Sanofi Pasteur and the University of Hong Kong). It
is most unlikely that their interests could be aligned,
not least because they are not operating in competing
environments. Another obstacle to pooling is that
diagnostic research is still immature (the same ap‐
plies even more strongly to therapeutic agents). It is
impossible to pool “tentative” IP or patent applica‐
tions before they are issued because no one knows
how essential the IP is, how valuable it is, or whether
it confers market power (critical for assessing anti‐
trust considerations). Further discussions about pat‐
ent pooling for SARS are not likely to lead to viable
options, with the possible exception of the work on
the SARS genome already underway.

so it is premature to analyze this area in more detail.
This applies even more to SARS. In all three areas,
therefore, R&D should proceed without considering
compulsory licensing at this time.

For H5N1, malaria, and SARS, patent pooling does
not seem to be the best approach for spurring innova‐
tion and achieving global access to vaccines and
medical technologies. So within the context of these
case studies, let us consider a few other options that
are not exhaustive but can help us delimit the possi‐
bilities:

3. Portfolio completion (or other “non‐pooling” IP
management approaches)
This option has potential for all of the three case stud‐
ies, but especially for malaria. Capacity building and
networking elements should be emphasized. The lat‐
ter is a critical precursor to licensing, since institu‐
tional and personal relationships are key drivers.
These are further described below.

1. Compulsory licensing
Given the number of licenses and the significant time
that is frequently required to issue a compulsory li‐
cense, this option might not allow a developing coun‐
try to quickly develop a vaccine. Moreover, even rais‐
ing the possibility of compulsory licensing might sig‐
nificantly deter future private‐sector investments in
vaccine R&D. A false alarm, in which an outbreak
used to justify compulsory licensing was misjudged,
would be especially harmful for just this reason.
If and when an H5N1 vaccine reaches the market,
the international pressure to produce it in large quan‐
tities and distribute it to every corner of the world
will be so huge that no major delays from IP can be
expected (or tolerated). It would be incredibly dam‐
aging for any company to hold a country ransom. For
pandemic influenza, compulsory licensing will likely
be unnecessary, although the option should always
remain on the table.
No product has yet been developed for malaria,
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2. Patent pools
In all three case studies, a patent pool seems prema‐
ture at best and irrelevant at worst. It is simply not a
feasible strategy option right now. The key reasons
for this conclusion are:
The interests of the players are not aligned,
The cost of establishing a pool (many millions of
US dollars)—much less the funds required to
maintain the pool—could not easily be funded,
Antitrust considerations are real and might re‐
quire significant legal expenses to be overcome,
No product exists that needs its IP to be pooled;
rather, the priority should be on licensing produc‐
tion and ensuring product availability.
In future, patent pools are likely to be useful in the
areas related to malaria platform technologies.

4. IP logistics
IP logistics is the basis for any in‐ and out‐licensing
strategy. The strategy is to utilize the institutional
capacity of PDPs, key developing country institutions
that are at the forefront of innovation, and prospec‐
tive vaccine manufacturers.
5. Pre‐negotiated royalty rate model
Although this approach might be worth considering
further, it would likely require substantial academic
inputs. It would also not be immediately relevant to
pandemic influenza, SARS, or malaria. Its further
study, however, is worthwhile.
6. Encourage developing countries to accelerate
R&D and vaccine production through appropriate IP
management initiatives
This should be considered from the perspective of
international development policy, incentives, and
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specific initiatives. In other words, discussions must
really be framed in the context of not only encourag‐
ing developing countries in this area, but also provid‐
ing lead institutions with the specific tools needed to
implement it.
7. Take no action
This approach is not worth any serious consideration.
These three case studies, most notably of pandemic
influenza and to a lesser degree malaria, provide us
with important knowledge that gives us the chance to
significantly change how we view and use IP in de‐
veloping countries. If we fail to pursue new IP man‐
agement initiatives that creatively strengthen part‐
nerships and build institutions, we lose not only the
chance to help millions of people who will suffer and
die from these three diseases, but also the positive
repercussions of these changes for many other R&D
efforts and initiatives related to diseases of the poor.
8. Special focus on pandemic influenza
Many experts believe that a pandemic outbreak,
probably in Asia, is virtually certain to occur in the
near future. Because most people will have little or no
immunity to it, its effects will be catastrophic, par‐
ticularly on the economies and people of poorer
countries in Southeast Asia.
Given the high stakes, it is very much an under‐
statement to announce that more coordination and
capacity building in public sector IP management is
urgently needed in relation to avian influenza. Such
efforts could focus on PDPs and developing country

institutions that will be or are already interacting
with companies. The program could work to assist
licensing between the private sector and institutions
in developing countries. A company in a developed
country, for example, could license the rights to
manufacture avian influenza drugs and/or vaccines
to a country in Southeast Asia, such as Vietnam. Such
an endeavor would require a program coordinator to
provide basic information about licensing, technical
assistance with manufacturing/production, guide‐
lines for seeking regulatory approval, and assistance
with planning distribution and access schemes na‐
tionally and within the Southeast Asian region. Spe‐
cifically, the program could be built upon a review of
the IP management strategies of relevant institutions
in such areas as:
Patenting policies,
Common approaches to licensing,
Conducting freedom to operate analyses (FTOs),
which establish in a detailed, product‐by‐product
basis where licenses are needed and how to in‐
license relevant IP,
Technology assistance related to IP (e.g., license
models, commercial arrangements, milestones,
etc.),
Linking IP management with clinical research,
trials, and regulatory data (data protection, confi‐
dentiality, etc.),
The future need perhaps for patent pools of plat‐
form technologies, and
How open source licensing might be applied to
vaccines.

1. IP management to accelerate “global access”
1.1

Background

The increasing threat of an influenza pandemic has
focused attention on developing safe and effective
vaccines. While pandemic influenza has received
much international attention as an “acute emer‐
gency,” particularly from high‐income countries, ma‐
laria already is a “chronic emergency” for millions of
people. We can use the urgency associated with the
potential of a pandemic influenza to hasten in general
the development of medicines for developing coun‐
tries. Because we live in a post‐TRIPS world, this task
can only be achieved by effectively and creatively
addressing IP issues.
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To accelerate vaccine development and early ac‐
cess by developing countries, we need a comprehen‐
sive strategy that anticipates as much as possible the
IP issues that may arise at every step of vaccine pro‐
duction. IP must be considered in a broader context
of innovation management. This includes:
research and development capacity (including
clinical trials),
regulatory policies and frameworks,
manufacturing capabilities,
market access and distribution,
trade issues, and
IP management.

Krattiger et al.

These six components are dynamically linked: a
change in one produces change(s) in the others. Fail‐
ing to address these components as a system will
therefore thwart success. This is why effective IP
management requires the early identification and
effective resolution of issues that will arise from
product development to introduction. It is also why
IP management is so important for Global Access.
Like all of the other innovation components, IP issues
are dynamically inter‐linked with the other compo‐
nents in every stage of the innovation process.

1.2

Defining Global Access

Four criteria should guide global access strategies
(Krattiger et al. 2006):
availability: to the global market place, develop‐
ment agencies, health services, and ultimately to
those who are the poorest and most in need;
affordability: low prices for end‐users and those
institutions that finance its procurement and dis‐
tribution;
acceptability: technological, economic, and social
acceptability to all stakeholders (government pol‐
icy makers, development agencies, health ser‐
vices, and end‐users); and
adoptability: by government policy makers, de‐
velopment agencies, health services, and end‐
users, which requires that the vaccine can be in‐
troduced within existing or achievable capabilities
and systems.

1.3 Innovation Management to Achieve
Global Access
Achieving Global Access requires an understanding
of health innovation systems, particularly in develop‐
ing countries (Morel et al 2005). We can better under‐
stand how innovation occurs in biomedicine through
an analysis that relies on a framework of the six
Components of Innovation:
R&D (i.e., laboratory and clinical studies),
Appropriate regulation to ensure safety and effi‐

cacy,
Manufacturing that meets international quality
standards,
Appropriate IP management,
Delivery of immunization services in the public
and private sectors, and
Procurement and distribution internationally.
As stated above, the six Components of Innovation
cover all aspects of the vaccine innovation process.
There are no others. This is an important aspect of the
theory, because it implies that thorough attention to
all six creates success. The public sector, however,
usually carefully plans each R&D step while disre‐
garding the other components. This non‐integrative
approach should be changed to improve the chances
of success. For example, the preparation of regulatory
dossiers and related Investigational New Drug (IND)
filings (a task of another component) will be impor‐
tant throughout the innovation process.
In terms of IP management, the overall goal is to
use IP tools and management practices to accelerate
access by the poor in developing countries to a high‐
quality vaccine in the necessary quantities at the low‐
est sustainable price. Operationally, this means 1)
establishing IP management capabilities according to
best practices for “humanitarian use”, 2) in‐licensing
necessary IP, materials, and background IP to obtain
FTO, 3) implementing a patenting, confidentiality,
know how, and material transfer strategy in support
of humanitarian use, and 4) publishing results as ap‐
propriate to facilitate use by others. We stress global
access and IP in this study because quite often those
who handle IP create larger barriers for themselves
and their projects by not taking into account the inter‐
relations of the six Innovation Components. In other
words, while each IP constraint may have multiple
solutions, the best solution will be found by taking a
broad, dialectical approach to the Innovation Com‐
ponents.

2. A review of IP management options and “pooling” mechanisms
2.1

Background

Patents and other forms of statutory protection are
rights granted at the national level. The TRIPS accord
under the WTO, however, encourages the global har‐

Innovation Strategy Today

monization of patent systems, and patent filings in
developing countries are increasing steadily. Unfortu‐
nately, this will not solve the problem of Global Ac‐
cess to new drugs and vaccines. This is often because
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obtaining the license for a patent does not mean that it
can be applied to new inventions and/or improve‐
ments, especially in advanced technological fields (e.g.,
biotechnology, where the importance of patents is
equal to know‐how (or “intellectual capital”), access to
markets, and trademarks).
Intellectual capital, or intangible assets, consists
not only of IP (patents, copyright, trademarks, trade
secrets, etc.), but also goodwill, any knowledge that
can be converted into value (e.g., product/market
knowledge for differentiation as a key competitive
advantage), human capital (tacit knowledge, know‐
how, relationships), and other forms of intellectual
assets (codified, know‐how, customer lists, and rela‐
tionships). What more proof do we need of a
“knowledge economy”? Actually, the knowledge
economy is essentially over. Increasingly, what
counts today is “social capital.” Human networks
make things happen, not the inert, underlying data
and information. Indeed, the value of IP depends on
its use. And for IP to be used as widely as possible, it
must be sold or licensed. This requires networking
and transactions between people who know and
trust each other.

2.2 From IP to forms of IP assembly
and licensing
Inventions are often assembled using patents and
other forms of IP from third parties: marketable
technologies and technology platforms are essen‐
tially bundles of IP. By itself, however, mere assem‐
bly will not make an invention commercially useful.
Other steps of technology transfer are required:
product development, regulatory aspects, and alli‐
ances with third parties. These forms of technology
transfer can be grouped into six different types:
1. Licensing—principally IP bundles of an entire
range of inventions required to practice FTO,
2. Turn‐key investments—typically through foreign
direct investments (FDI),
3. Mergers and acquisitions (M&As),
4. Strategic alliances (collaborations, joint ventures,
corporate partnerships),
5. Donations, and
6. Capacity building.
Though not exhaustive, Table 1 lists the main types
of mechanisms that specifically deal with licensing
and, by extension, royalty collections. The main
types of approaches are listed by with examples.
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A recent example of IP assembly relevant to pan‐
demic influenza vaccine development is the case of
MedImmune and reverse genetics technology. Prior
to late 2005, at least four institutions had to be con‐
sidered to obtain FTO. MedImmune reduced this to
one, and immediately publicly announced that it
would permit any public‐sector institution to use
reverse genetics without enforcing its IP. This ex‐
tremely rapid development was very welcome for
those seeking to accelerate R&D into pandemic in‐
fluenza vaccines, partly because it reduced risk, and
partly because the licensing for reverse genetics
suddenly became so much simpler.
But while the MedImmune/reverse genetics story
is very encouraging, it represents only one possible
avenue for IP assemblage. Another often discussed
and frequently misunderstood model is patent pool‐
ing. The following section outlines different pooling
arrangements and highlights the opportunities and
limitations of pooling.

2.3 The importance of IP assembly and
the use of patent pools
The essential purpose of IP management is to get
freedom‐to‐operate (FTO) for a given product in a
given market. Assembling IP is therefore an essential
step in innovation management. But having FTO
alone does not bring a product to market, much less
provide it to the poor in developing countries. In this
context, the value of so‐called “patent pools” is often
over‐estimated. A pool simplifies the assembly of IP,
but does not in itself do much or necessarily lead to
technology transfer or market access and distribution.
A patent pool is a voluntary agreement between
two or more patent owners to license one or more of
their patents to one another or to third parties. In
other words, they are “the aggregation of intellectual
property rights which are the subject of cross‐
licensing, whether they are transferred directly by
patentee to licensee or through some medium, such
as a joint venture, set up specifically to administer
the patent pool” (Klein 1997). Patent pools are espe‐
cially useful for developing industry standards. One
of the first patent pools was created for the manufac‐
turing of sewing machines in the mid‐19th century
(Merges 1999). Other examples include aircraft
manufacturing, glass manufacturing, and radio
technology. In all of these cases, the pools contrib‐
uted significantly to industry standards (e.g., radio
waves). More recently, patent pools were created to
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Table 1:

Types of IP assembly and licensing mechanisms

Type of Mechanism or Service

Characteristics

Examples

Royalty collection agencies: Collec‐
tion of royalties for a small fee by one
entity on behalf of its members.

Useful if licensing industries are already estab‐
lished; can be created by industry itself.

American Soc. of Compos‐
ers, Authors and Publishers;
British Soc. Plant Breeders

Information clearing houses: Broad
term denoting a mechanism matching
providers of goods, services, or info.

Useful for the exchange of specific information
related to an activity or industry; does not facili‐
tate tech transfer per se.

BioBin, BINAS; portals to
country or industry biotech;
training programs

Technology clearing houses
1. Web‐based IP auctions and licens‐
ing, including business‐to‐business.

Appropriate for general purpose technologies,
platform technologies, bundles; limited ability to
spread tech transfer further.

Virtual trading floors, pat‐
ent auctions

2. Public sector initiatives dealing
with training, good practices, and the
bundling of technologies

Appropriate for development; furthers tech
transfer.

Public Intellectual Property
Resource for Agriculture
(PIPRA)

Open‐source innovation clearing
houses: Sites where anyone can post
ideas or inventions and anyone is
allowed to turn the ideas into prod‐
ucts

Potentially appropriate for open‐source licensing
and the diffusion of tangible research materials.

Barry Nalebuff and Ian
Ayres “Why Not?” or Half‐
Bakery

Brokers and other forms of facilita‐
tors: Typically focused on creating
public‐private partnerships and pro‐
viding “managed” tech transfer.

Appropriate for charting new territory and bring‐
ing public and private actors closer.

African Agricultural Tech‐
nology Foundation (AATF);
Global Alliance for Vaccines
and Immunization (GAVI)

IP management services: Comprises
a wide range of entities, both public
and private, assisting institutions in
managing their IP assets.

Good for addressing systemic issues; establishes
new modes of interaction.

Law firms, management
consultants, global non‐
profit entities (e.g., MIHR),
and academic training

IP commercialization agents
1. Commercial entities dedicated to
commercialization of 3rd party IP.

Highly effective business model; useful to learn
from their experiences and adapt to serve nascent
private sectors.

BTG Ltd.; certain special‐
ized law firms

2. Mixed commercial and public good
objectives

Useful to learn from their experiences and adapt
the model to other biotech sectors.

Concept Foundation

Integrated commercial services: A
range of services for M&As, spin‐offs,
including IP audits, business valua‐
tion, due diligence, etc.

There could be a need for a non‐profit merchant‐
bank‐type institution to provide services to
small/medium size enterprises.

Merchant Banks; venture
capital investment services

Patent pools: A voluntary agreement
between two or more patent owners
to license one or more of their patents
to one another or third parties

Pooling unlikely to change the underlying struc‐
tural barriers to tech transfer; difficult to establish
because industry players have divergent strategic
interests; in partial/modified form, effective for
tech transfer.

Internal, company specific
pools; portfolio pooling;
cooperative pooling; third
party aggregations; forced
pooling

Other public tech transfer and fi‐
nancing mechanisms

These range from education and training institutions to consortia in health and
certain specialized UN programs (including south‐south transfers).

Company‐to‐company arrangements
(including collaborations, joint ven‐
tures, strategic partnerships, and cor‐
porate partnering)

Some of the most ubiquitous and efficient systems of tech transfer, rarely requir‐
ing public sector assistance; different government policies either encourage or
thwart them. This is certainly an area where many governments could do much
to reform their policies and regulations, especially by reducing the red tape and
administrative burdens on foreign private investments.

Source: Krattiger 2004.
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enable standard settings in Digital Versatile Discs
(DVDs), video games, and Motion Picture Experts
Group 2 (Standard‐Compressed Video at 4‐9 Mbps
(MPEG2) compression technology). The latter was
formed by private‐ and public‐sector participants in
1997: Columbia University, Fujitsu, General Instru‐
ment, Lucent, Matshushita, Mitsubishi, Philips, and
Sony. Among other considerations, a patent pool:
must include patents that are valid and not ex‐
pired,
must not constitute an aggregation of competi‐
tive technologies by setting a single price for
them,
must have an independent expert to determine
whether a patent is essential to complement
technologies in the pool,
must not disadvantage competitors in down‐
stream product markets, and
must not collude on prices outside the scope of
the pool (i.e., on downstream products).
In the development of drugs and vaccines, however,
setting standards is not such a key issue, which may
explain why patent pools have not been critical for
commercializing these products. Nonetheless, the
issue of “research tools” in the life sciences has led to
a call for patent pooling in the U.S. Companies and
institutions involved in biotechnology research are
encountering widespread delays due to the near‐
universal patenting of research techniques that were
traditionally available in the public domain. Uncer‐
tainty over the prospective costs of licenses, royalty
“stacking” that creates uncompetitive costs, delays
in obtaining licenses, and the differing definitions of
“pure research versus product development” across
different territories are all inhibiting biotechnology
R&D in many areas.
Those who advocate patent pools as a solution to
this problem should keep in mind that they are ex‐
pensive to establish and maintain. Unless a given
technology reaches a certain economic threshold,
there is no financial incentive to establish a pool.
Figure 1 illustrates that the economic feasibility of a
pool is determined by:
number of pool participants,
number of patents held by each pool participant,
likelihood of a patent being useful for a given
platform,
number of patents required to assemble a viable
platform,
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market value of the assembled platform, and
cost to assemble and maintain the pool.
Figure 1 assumes that some 25 IP rights holders
would be required to establish a meaningful pool for
vaccines. It would include DNA sequences, expres‐
sion systems, process technologies, antigens, adju‐
vants, excipients, and delivery devices. The likeli‐
hood of patents being useful for this platform is es‐
timated at 20%. The net present cost of such a pool,
for a 5‐year life span, would be approximately $30
million. Unless the pool value exceeds this figure by
many multiples, it is quite clear that a patent pool in
the area of vaccines could hardly be considered eco‐
nomically feasible. This is summarized in Table 2.
Interestingly, a recent study by Patrick Gaulé (2006;
see paper on page 123) reaches the same conclusion
through a different approach.
Several years ago the concept of patent pooling
was a very hot topic of discussion (e.g., see Essential
Inventions 2005, or www.cptech.org/cm/patentpool.html).
They were often viewed as the solution to obtaining
access to patents, but this pooling and cross‐
licensing, particularly when structured as a horizon‐
tal agreement leading to market domination, leads to
another difficulty. Patent pools are open to potential
abuses and immediately raise anticompetitive cartel
and antitrust considerations in the US, Europe, and
elsewhere. The European Commission is reviewing
the Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regula‐
tion, which currently covers cross‐licensing and pat‐
ent pools but only to a very limited extent. The DVD
patent pool referred to above was approved by the
EC in 2000, as was a more recent patent pool cover‐
ing MPEG technology, but no general guidelines
have been issued for instances when there are more
than two parties or where the parties may be in
competition (Strickland 2003). More nuanced papers
are now being published that consider precisely
these antitrust issues (e.g., van Zimmeren 2006).

2.4

Section conclusions

Patent pools are, at this stage, of limited value for the
life sciences, particularly for vaccines. This is because:
1. Anti‐trust considerations are real and cannot eas‐
ily be overcome in the fast developing areas of
molecular genetics.
2. Ensuring that key players will agree to form a
pool is far form certain because the interests of
the various players are not aligned.
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3. Identifying a donor who would be willing to pay
the significant costs of establishing a pool up
front, especially in an area of limited commercial
interest, is a formidable obstacle.

Figure 1:

Other groups have recently reached similar conclu‐
sions, although they did not specifically consider
these three diseases (see for example van Zimmeren
et al. 2006, Gaulé 2006; see paper on page 123).

The economics of patent pools in health‐related biotechnology applications

Pool value
($m)

20%

100

Platform value: $30 million

50

Cost
10%

0
0
Source:

Table 2:

10

20
30
40
Number of participants

50

Modified after figures provided by Boston Consulting Group.

Summary and Pros/Cons of Patent Pools

Pros

Cons

Conclusions

Integrates complementary
technologies
Reduces transaction costs
Clears blocking positions
Avoids costly infringe‐
ment litigation
Promotes the dissemina‐
tion of technology
Levels the playing field

Difficult to agree on the value of individ‐
ual patents contributed to a pool
Complex to set up and avoid anti‐trust
problems (collusion and price fixing)
May inflate licensing costs through non‐
blocking or unnecessary patents
Complex when many patents are under
litigation, as is the case with biotechnol‐
ogy
May shield invalid patents and thus pre‐
vent much technology from entering the
public domain

Pooling unlikely to change the underly‐
ing structural barriers to industrial bio‐
technology transfer to developing
countries
Difficult to get going because industry
players have divergent strategic inter‐
ests and use their IP portfolios heavily
to strategically position themselves
Appropriate for the biotechnology in‐
dustry to create
Unlikely to benefit from UN involve‐
ment
In modified form, potentially effective
for technology transfer

Source: Krattiger 2004.
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3.

The challenges of pandemic influenza

3.1 Overview: the biology of the influ‐
enza virus and traditional vaccine
strategies
Flu virus is distinguished from most pathogenic vi‐
ruses by its extreme variability. Over time the virus
can change its surface antigens so completely that an
immune response to one infection gives little or no
protection against a subsequent infection. Two inde‐
pendent processes are at work: antigenic drift and
antigenic shift. Antigenic drift results from random
mutations in the RNA. Transcription of RNA is more
error‐prone than that of DNA, and the mutation rate
of RNA viruses is therefore much higher than that of
most organisms. Antigenic shift occurs when two
different viral strains (e.g., human and avian) infect
the same host cell. This could occur in an intermedi‐
ate host, such as swine. The two strain virions can
then recombine RNA strands, generating a new
pandemic strain with altered host ranges and/or
pathogenicities.
Thus, a virus benign for one species can be lethal
in another, and it is believed that influenza pandem‐
ics recorded in the 20th century arose when an avian
strain recombined with a human strain, creating a
pandemic virus against which humans had little or
no pre‐existing immunity and that was able to effi‐
ciently infect human mucosa and be transmitted
through contact or air‐borne droplets.
Traditional Influenza Vaccines: The temporal and
geographic variability of flu strains has produced a
unique global vaccination policy. Flu viruses arising
in humans and birds are under world‐wide surveil‐
lance that is coordinated by the WHO. Samples are
sent to National Influenza Centers (110 centers in 80
countries) for identification. New strains are then
forwarded to the WHO Collaborating Centers for
Influenza Reference and Research in London, At‐
lanta, Melbourne, and Tokyo. Twice yearly the data
are reviewed and WHO experts then meet to agree
the optimal mix of flu virus strains to be incorpo‐
rated in the following seasonʹs flu vaccine. Normal
epidemic flu vaccine incorporates antigens from
three strains: two Type A and one Type B. (Type B
flu is typically less severe than Type A, and shows
less variability). The three approved flu virus strains
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are supplied by the WHO Collaborating Centers,
free of charge, to vaccine companies, which then
have about six months to optimize the production
process for the virus in eggs, carry out an accelerated
small clinical trial to demonstrate safety and immu‐
nogenicity (Europe only), and begin production of
bulk vaccine for distribution. There are two produc‐
tion cycles annually, one each for the Northern and
Southern hemispheres.
Almost all flu vaccines currently approved for
sale are grown in specially produced embryonated
chicken eggs. Specially bred, germ‐free flocks of
chickens are reared in dedicated facilities in huge
numbers. (In the 1990s, the Medeva flu vaccines
plant at Speke, Liverpool, was the third‐largest con‐
sumer of eggs in the UK.) The seed virus strains are
injected into the eggs, which are then incubated. The
resulting virus particles are harvested from the al‐
lantoic fluid, isolated by centrifugation and then
processed into the vaccine preparation, which can be
whole killed virions or virions treated to remove
most of the RNA but with the protein antigens in‐
tact. About 250‐300 million doses of trivalent flu vac‐
cine are made each year, the upper figure represent‐
ing approximately full capacity. Each dose has 15 g
each of the three flu strains approved for that year.
Most vaccine also includes the mercury‐based pre‐
servative, thimerosal (thiomersal). Some vaccine is
produced in one‐shot disposable syringes, with most
of the remainder distributed in ten‐dose vials (where
a preservative is essential). In rare cases, recipients of
the vaccine have an allergic reaction to the traces of
egg protein present. It has also been claimed, al‐
though most experts dismiss this, that some adverse
reactions are due to thimerosal.
Extensive investments have been made in devel‐
oping alternative manufacturing processes based on
growing the virus in mammalian cells cultured in
fermenters. Vaccines made by the two most ad‐
vanced processes, from Solvay (Holland) and Bax‐
ter/Immuno (Austria, Czech Republic), are currently
in late‐stage clinical trials, but they are not expected
to gain broad regulatory approval for a year or two.
Chiron (U.S.) has recently announced that its cell‐
culture flu vaccine has completed Phase II clinical
trials in Europe and that it intends to file an IND
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application in the U.S. Aventis Pasteur (France) has
recently concluded a deal with Crucell (Holland) to
use the latterʹs PER.C6 mammalian cells to make
epidemic and pandemic flu vaccines.
Production of seed strain from wild isolate: As de‐
scribed above, wild flu isolates generally grow
poorly in eggs. The WHO Collaborating Centers
therefore create reassortant strains to combine genes
from the wild isolates with genes from a strain se‐
lected for efficient production in eggs. This is
achieved by infecting eggs with both strains and
selecting reassortants with the desired combination
of genes. Occasionally, it is difficult to produce the
required reassortant, or the best strain produced still
has a poor yield in eggs. In some years, this has
caused a shortfall of vaccine supply.

3.2 The science and technology related
to the development of a pandemic
influenza vaccine
In the event of an H5N1 global influenza pandemic, it
is estimated that at least 4 billion eggs would be
needed to produce adequate quantities of vaccine.
This is also an old technology, in use for well over 50
years, that relies on a combination of hard work, sci‐
entific and technical expertise, and a certain modicum
of educated guesswork; however, it is a well‐
established methodology and is not protected by IPR.
But H5N1 influenza virus poses a unique prob‐
lem: due to its peculiar virulence, it rapidly kills em‐
bryonated chicken eggs. A more focused, non‐egg
technology is necessary, and the only available op‐
tion is reverse genetics, a modern molecular tech‐
nique for producing reference virions. A precise
methodology, it can produce custom‐made virions.
Chicken eggs are not used; instead, cell cultures are
co‐transfected with a series of cDNA plasmids that
encode the viral genes under the control of RNA
polymerase. Of the eight viral gene segments, re‐
searchers can select and molecularly modify the ex‐
act ones that are desired for the final reference virus:
there is no element of chance. Within the cultured
cells, the viral genes are expressed, proteins synthe‐
sized, and the virions assembled and subsequently
harvested and purified. This high‐tech approach is
protected by IP rights.
Three advantages of reverse genetics are directly
relevant to pandemic influenza:
A suitable vaccine production strain can be engi‐
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neered in as little as two weeks;
It avoids the problem of the original wild strain
killing the egg because all the manipulations can
be carried out in mammalian cell culture; and,
It enables the efficient creation of non‐pathogenic
strains, reducing the risk of live virus escaping
during the manufacturing process and allowing
the use of less stringent (and costly) biological
containment facilities.
Seed virus can be cultured in embryonated eggs, or
alternatively, via cell‐culture technology (e.g., green
monkey Vero cells) for vaccine production. A seed
virus generated via reverse genetics could be grown
in embryonated eggs if the deadly virulence is first
eliminated via molecular techniques. However, in
the event of a pandemic H5N1 influenza, egg‐culture
might be a poor and possibly unworkable option: it
takes too long, too many eggs are needed, and
chicken populations may already be decimated or
diseased by the avian H5N1 influenza strain. Indus‐
trialized cell tissue culture would therefore be the
preferred method for vaccine production. Still, this
method presents a series of challenges: it requires
substantial investment, optimization, scale‐up, and,
of course, there are IP rights issues. A virus therefore
might need to be cultured via a combination of egg‐
based and cell‐based techniques—i.e., by whatever
method possible.
DNA vaccines are another possible method for
dealing with a global H5N1 pandemic. These vac‐
cines are not related to the above technologies,
which all rely on the traditional protein/peptide vac‐
cination, possibly bolstered with adjuvant. In DNA
(or genetic) vaccines, viral genes are cloned into a
plasmid. The plasmid is then injected into the pa‐
tient, where some of the plasmids migrate into cells
and then to the nucleus; the viral genes are ex‐
pressed, ultimately generating an immune response.
This is a promising technology because it does not
require eggs, cell cultures, or prolonged cold storage
facilities. However, it is still unproven in humans
and primates (the so‐called “simian barrier”), and
may therefore be remote in terms of deployment.

3.3 The evolving IP landscapes of vac‐
cines for pandemic influenza
The IP landscape surrounding vaccine development
is complex. In the case of pandemic influenza, the
components include:
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1. RNA molecular technology (including reverse
genetics),
2. DNA recombinant technology (including at‐
tenuation mutants),
3. Cell culture production systems,
4. Adjuvants,
5. Excipients,
6. Vaccine production, and
7. Antigen delivery (e.g., liposomal systems).
It is beyond the scope of this study to review the
possible patents for all seven components. Rather,
the objective is to map the field, identify key players
based on their IP stakes, and devise overall strate‐
gies to address IP in a manner that will facilitate the
deployment and use of vaccines. After conducting a
detailed, thorough review of the scientific literature
and patent landscape surrounding the development
and production of vaccines for pandemic flu, a total
of 128 potentially relevant issued patents or patent

applications were identified. There are many as‐
signees or applications (a detailed list of patents is
given in Appendix A), but the major ones are given
in Table 3.
If one considers IP as the main criterion, these are
the key players in pandemic flu vaccine research:
Aviron Inc., Baxter A.G., Chiron Inc., MedImmune
Vaccines, Merck & Co., Inc., Michigan State Univ.,
Mt. Sinai School of Med., SmithKline Beecham, Inc.,
St. Jude’s Children’s R.H., and WARF (U of Wiscon‐
sin)
Less than a year ago, reverse genetics was the
predominant issue, but since then MedImmune
secured exclusive licensing rights to all key patents
from the different inventors/institutions (Aviron
Inc., Mt. Sinai School of Medicine, St. Jude’s Chil‐
dren’s Hospital, etc.). The company has assured
researchers that research licenses can be obtained,
and it has been forthcoming in extending licenses.
To what extent this may impact the costs of a final

Table 3: Summary of patents related to pandemic influenza vaccines

Category/Step

Total No of Pat‐
ents/Applications

Total No of
Assignees

Reverse Genetics

29

6

Mutants

9

4

Cell Culture

21

9

Adjuvant

11

11

Excipient

5

4

Vaccines

36

24

Delivery

17

12
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Principal Assignees
Aviron Inc.
MedImmune Vaccines
(8 Plasmid System)
Mt. Sinai School of Med.
St. Jude’s Children’s R.H.
Aviron Inc.
MedImmune Vaccines
Mt. Sinai School of Med.
WARF (Wisconsin)
Baxter A.G.
Chiron Inc.
Michigan State Univ.
St. Jude’s Children’s R.H.
Baxter A.G.
MedImmune Vaccines
Merck & Co., Inc.
SmithKline Beecham, Inc.
Baxter A.G.
Chiron Inc.
MedImmune Vaccines
Merck & Co., Inc.
SmithKline Beecham, Inc.
Baxter A.G.
Chiron Inc.
SmithKline Beecham, Inc.
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product, if and when it becomes available, remains to
be established. Importantly, MedImmune has a live
attenuated vaccine on the market in other vaccine
areas but does not have the technological capacity to
bring a pandemic flu vaccine to market for use in
humans. Licensing will therefore be a major strategy
for MedImmune, although how this will work for
products entering developed and developing country
markets remains to be seen. Similarly, it is not clear at
this stage whether MedImmune would be willing to
share its know‐how related to reverse genetics with a
potential vaccine manufacturer in a developing coun‐
try.
As noted before, the principal requirements for a
pandemic flu vaccine will be the ability to make a
huge number of doses as rapidly and cheaply as pos‐
sible. Infrastructure to distribute and administer the
vaccine throughout the world will also be required,
but that is outside the scope of this paper. Advance
warning of a potential pandemic is likely to be as lit‐
tle as 6‐9 months. Two doses of vaccine will likely be
required to stimulate immunity. As capacity stands
today, the vaccine (or most of it) will have to be pro‐
duced in eggs, and will probably contain alum adju‐

vant to enable the use of a reduced amount of anti‐
gen. Work at GlaxoSmithKline has shown that as lit‐
tle as 1.9 g of antigen, with alum adjuvant, can induce
a strong immune response in clinical trials. The use of
whole killed virion rather than purified antigen
(ʺsplit virionʺ) will maximize the number of doses
available by avoiding processing losses. Regardless of
the precise formulation of the vaccine, however, the
use of reverse genetics will be essential.

3.4

4.

The complexities of malaria vaccines

4.1

The science

Malaria is caused by Plasmodium falciparum and
Plasmodium vivax. The complex life cycle of these
organisms includes stages in the human host and
Anopheline mosquito vector. The Plasmodium para‐
site has four life stages:
1. A sexual stage (primarily intra‐mosquito),
2. Sporozoite stage (intra‐vascular),
3. Liver stage (intra‐hepatocytic),
4. Merozoite stage (intra‐erythrocytic).
The Plasmodium parasite has evolved a complex
means of surviving and propagating. It evades de‐
tection by the human immune system by hiding in‐
side liver and red blood cells, by presenting different
antigens at the various life stages, and also by hav‐
ing a variable and complicated protein structure that
can hide the immunoreactive portions of its proteins
so as to further evade detection.
Vaccine development has focused primarily on
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Section conclusions

In late 2005, MedImmune completed the assembly of
all relevant IP related to reverse genetics. Fortunately
for the international community, MedImmune an‐
nounced that it would grant wide access to the tech‐
nology. This means that other constraints are more
significant, such as the ownership of whichever adju‐
vant will eventually be used. There, the solution is a
matter of price. More broadly, the speed of R&D is a
major constraint, as is the manufacturing capacity to
rapidly produce sufficient quantities of a pandemic
influenza vaccine. To meet this challenge, interna‐
tional coordination and leadership from an appropri‐
ate type of organization is urgently required.

about 40 Plasmodium antigens, of which 12 have been
the focus of more intense research and development.
In general, malaria vaccines can be broadly placed
into categories that parallel the four life stages of the
Plasmodium parasite:
1. Preerythrocyte vaccines targeting the initial infec‐
tion (vascular) or liver stage (hepatocytic) of the
disease,
2. Vaccines against the blood stage (erythrocytic) of
the disease,
3. Vaccines blocking Plasmodium parasite transmis‐
sion to mosquitoes (“altruistic vaccines”), and
4. Anti‐disease agents.
Due to the sophisticated biology of the Plasmodium
parasite, successful vaccine development will likely
require the inclusion of several antigens, possibly
from different stages of the Plasmodium life cycle.
Several promising vaccines currently under devel‐
opment include:
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Vaccines developed using the MSP‐1 malaria
antigen, from the merozoite stage of the Plasmo‐
dium life cycle, have yielded promising results,
with good immunogenicity and animal model
data. However, IP issues encumber this antigen.
Multiple patents with overlapping claims mean
that it is not readily available. For access, licenses
would be required from at least eight entities.
The RTS,S vaccine consists of selected sequences
from the circumsporozoite protein (sporozoite
stage) fused to the hepatitis B virus surface anti‐
gen, co‐expressed together with unfused hepati‐
tis B antigen in recombinant yeast cells. This vac‐
cine has been shown to be safe, immunogenic,
and efficacious. It is currently undergoing pedi‐
atric evaluation trials and has been shown to pro‐
tect children for up to 18 months.
A novel approach is to use DNA constructs en‐
coding multiple Plasmodium peptide epitopes and
thrombospondin‐related adhesion protein (called
“DNA METRAP”) to generate T‐cell mediated
immune responses against the liver‐stage (hepa‐
tocytic) of malaria. Using a “prime‐boost” tech‐
nique, the immune response of the DNA vaccine
can be significantly increased when it is followed
by administration of a modified vaccina virus
Ankara (MVA).
The use of radiation‐attenuated sporozoites of
Plasmodium falciparum and P. vivax as antigens
may prevent infection in 90% of those vaccinated
for at least one year. However, this is a labor‐
intensive approach, requiring the actual dissec‐
tion of the mosquito salivary glands and extrac‐
tion of the sporozoites. Nevertheless, this tech‐
nology may have possible application in devel‐
oping countries.
Malarial toxin glycosyl phosphatidyl inositol
may offer another route for vaccine production.
This approach does not prevent infection but in‐
stead reduces the mortality and severity of the
disease. It has been shown to be a good candidate
vaccine with promising protective effects ob‐
served in mammalian studies.

4.2 The evolving IP landscapes of
malaria vaccines
The biological complexity of the Plasmodium para‐
site, coupled with the historically chronic nature of
the malarial plague, has led to the development of
numerous vaccination research programs and a con‐
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comitant array of interconnected IP rights known as
“patent thickets.” With up to 40 possible antigens of
interest, and at least 10 of these under intensive de‐
velopment, the number of patents and assignees has
grown so much that, without rational IP manage‐
ment systems, progress towards moving vaccines to
developing countries could be seriously delayed or
even blocked. A good example of an antigen tangled
up in IP rights constraints is MSP‐1. It exhibits good
immunogenicity, but the presence of a number of
patents, overlapping claims, and a gaggle of poten‐
tial licensors presents a virtual tangle of barbed wire
obstructing access to this otherwise attractive sys‐
tem.
In this context, Alta Biomedical Group LLC con‐
ducted a malaria antigen patent access project for the
Malaria Vaccine Initiative (MVI) at PATH. The goal
was to ensure market access to vaccines that are
most likely to receive regulatory approval in the
foreseeable future by identifying potential patent
roadblocks and proposing a mechanism for access to
key patents. Building on a patent landscape devel‐
oped by Falco‐Archer that covered the ten most ad‐
vanced MSP‐1 malaria antigens (many of which are
in clinical trials), the Group’s findings in March 2005
identified 167 patent families filed by 75 different
entities. When prioritized, 23% of the 167 families
were considered to be “moderate to high priority
based on the claim language, length of estimated
patent life, and overlap with the advanced vaccine
projects” (Alta Biomedical). 21 organizations held
them, the majority of which were held by compa‐
nies, 20% by public sector institutions, and nearly
20% were already accessible to MVI through their
partnerships.
Alta Biomedical further reviewed several models
of IP management, including the creation of a formal
patent pool. They concluded that malaria antigen
patents “may not be good candidates for a formal
pool,” partly because of anti‐trust considerations,
and partly because for any given antigen only a few
licenses would be required. There would also be
little business interest because of the modest for‐
profit potential. They concluded that at this stage the
most effective approach for MVI would be to con‐
tinue to in‐license the necessary IP.
A selective patent landscape analysis (Table 4)
was performed in this study, focusing on four differ‐
ent vaccine systems (excluding MSP‐1). Two of these
vaccine systems are being researched and developed
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Table 4:

Summary of patents related to four malaria vaccine systems

Vaccine Category

Total Patents/Patent
Applications

Total Assignees or
Applicants

Principal Assignees or
Applicants

DNA ME‐TRAP Vaccine

16

2

Recombinant Cir‐
cumsporozoite Protein
Vaccine (RTS,S)
Radiation Attenuated P.
falciparum Sporozoite
Glycosyl‐Phosphatidyl
Inositol (GPI)

44

4

Oxxon Pharmaccines
ISIS Innovation
SmithKline Beecham

6

3

Sanaria

7

3

RMF Dictagene

by MVI partnering institutions (see also Tables in
Appendix B for a detailed list of patents):
DNA ME‐TRAP Vaccine (Oxford University, as‐
signed to Oxxon Pharmaccines, ISIS Innovation)
Recombinant Circumsporozoite Protein Vaccine
(RTS,S) (SmithKline Beecham).
As a practical application of MVI’s mission to encour‐
age partnering institutions to coordinate efforts and
synergize their respective IP portfolio potentials,
SmithKline and Oxford University are collaborating to
test the Oxford MVA‐based vaccine in combination
with the SmithKline RTS,S/ASO2A vaccine. Such a co‐
ordination of scientific efforts, made possible by coor‐
dinating IP rights, is a prime example of the effective
implementation of the MVI mission.

4.3

Section conclusions

Malaria is an extremely difficult disease that has
eluded modern science for a long time. Recent ad‐
vances, however, are promising. In contrast to pan‐
demic influenza, where the private sector is taking the
lead through significant investments by the public sec‐
tor into private companies, R&D is characterized by
product development public private partnerships
(PDPs). Recent investments by the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation have provided an enormous push to
accelerate malaria vaccine development. The PDP that

5.

The mysteries of SARS

5.1

Technology brief

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) dramati‐
cally appeared in Asia in February of 2003. Before
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deals with malaria, the Malaria Vaccine Initiative (MVI)
under PATH, was also consulted and is closely en‐
gaged in the present project.
At some stage, vaccine production will need to
move to the private sector because the public sector
generally lacks key capabilities (e.g., manufacturing,
reaching markets, and dealing with regulatory chal‐
lenges). Thus, for each promising malaria vaccine, it
will be necessary to form PDPs for manufacturing and
even for distribution. For example, during the research
and development phase, science and research capacity
are critical, as are market prospects and IP/legal envi‐
ronments. Although production per se comes later, im‐
portant decisions about the choice of technologies for
scale‐up, the location of production, investment re‐
quirements, and others, will have to be made. These
are, in turn, strongly influenced by existing manufac‐
turing capacities and IP systems. Likewise, during
product development and production, the capacity to
manufacture at cGMP standards becomes critical, as
are other factors, such as the drug/vaccine regulatory
framework. During the commercialization, distribu‐
tion, and delivery phase, socio‐economic acceptance
and access to national and international markets are
key drivers. Public and private sectors have much to
offer each other in these phases, and because each
phase affects the success of the others, partnerships
should be sought very early on in the process.

the outbreak could be contained, SARS spread to
over 24 countries, causing 8,098 cases of illness and
claiming the lives of 774 victims. The causative agent
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of SARS is the SARS‐associated coronavirus (SARS‐
CoV). The genome of the SARS virus is a single
strand of RNA, 30,000 nucleotides in length, folding
into regular repeating patterns that form helical sec‐
ondary structures.
The palm civet and the raccoon‐dog may be the
natural reservoirs for SARS‐CoV, and live animal
markets in Southern China might have been the
source of the SARS jump from animals to humans.
Symptoms include flu‐like complaints, fever, head‐
ache, cough, and shortness of breath. Pneumonia is a
common complication.
SARS spreads from human to human by proxi‐
mal contact. The transmission mechanism is respira‐
tory droplets spread by sneezing or coughing. These
virus‐laden mucoid projectiles are deposited into the
mouth, eyes, or nose of those within one meter of the
source.
Strategies for a SARS vaccine include a spike‐1
protein based subunit vaccine, whole‐killed or at‐
tenuated virions, or an engineered adenovirus ex‐
pressing from one to several different protein com‐
ponents of the SARS virus. The later strategy has the
added advantage of stimulating both humoral (B
cells) and cellular (T cells) immune responses.

ity of PDPs for profitable reasons.
Pooling the patent covering the SARS virus ge‐
nomic sequences was proposed and widely publi‐
cized as a possible way to consolidate the IP frag‐
mentation that followed the flurry of research in the
wake of the 2003 threat. Potential participants in‐
cluded the Bernhardt‐Nocht Institute, the British
Columbia Cancer Agency, the Centers for Disease
Control, Erasmus Medical Center, and Hong Kong
University (Versitech Ltd.). Without this consolida‐
tion of IP rights, licensing costs for the requisite IPR
for vaccines, diagnostics, and therapeutics may be
prohibitive. In this case, therefore, patent pooling
could provide access to SARS IP rights and thereby
serve the greater public good.
The suddenness of the SARS threat prompted an
IP rights “gold rush.” Unsurprisingly, there has been
a plethora of SARS related patent applications but a
paucity of actually issued patents. Finally, because
SARS represents an acute, yet apparently ephemeral,
crisis, the lack of a palpable public health threat
means that it remains an open question as to how
the value of the IP related to SARS will impact any
subsequent IP management strategies.

5.3
5.2

IP summary

The perceived threat of SARS prompted a rapid, in‐
tense scientific push to characterize the SARS virus.
Naturally, there was a concomitant push to protect
the fruits of these innovative initiatives via numer‐
ous patent filings, which included patent applica‐
tions on the SARS genome and even the virus. Al‐
though part of the rationale for this patent push was
defensive, the parallel increase in diagnostic and
therapeutic patent applications suggests the possibil‐

Section conclusions

SARS appeared out of nowhere. Much of the con‐
cerns in 2003 were due to the risks of a previously
unknown virus. This led to tremendous efforts to
sequence the genome and to a myriad of patent ap‐
plications (Table 5 lists a summary of the main as‐
signees; see Appendix C for details). Much of the
identified IP is in the form of patent applications,
and it is quite likely that few of them will become
patents.
Unlike pandemic influenza, for which
the best hope is a vaccine, the future strategies

Table 5: Principal patents related to SARS vaccines, diagnostics and therapeutics
Technology Cate‐
gory

Total Patents/Patent
Applications

Total Assignees or Ap‐
plicants

Principal Assignees or Applicants

Vaccine

45

26

Diagnostics

28

17

Therapeutics

15

5

U.S. Government
Sanofi Pasteur
Chiron Corporation
University of Hong Kong
Sanofi Pasteur
University of Hong Kong
The Brigham & Woman’s Hospital, Inc.
B.C. Cancer Agency, Canada
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for SARS are uncertain. The patent applications have
to be looked at in terms of vaccines, diagnostics, and
therapeutic agents. For vaccines, the fundamental
underlying technology is the DNA sequence of the‐
SARS genome, which has been sequenced by four
institutions, almost simultaneously. In this area, the
leadership of the NIH and others led to a consortium
to develop a common licensing approach with the
ultimate objective of forming a patent pool for the
SARS genome. These discussions are still underway.

In the area of diagnostics, there are two players in
the lead (Sanofi Pasteur and the University of Hong
Kong) and other diverse minor players. It is most
unlikely that their interests could be aligned. A fur‐
ther obstacle to pooling is the immature state of diag‐
nostic research (the same applies even more strongly
to therapeutic agents). It is quite impossible to pool
patent applications before they are issued, and before
it is known to what extent the IP is essential (one of
the critical conditions for avoiding anti‐trust issues).

6. Development and assessment of IP management options
6.1

Introduction

Through critical analyses, focused patent reviews,
and reviewing key references, a number of creative
IP options were framed and evaluated. As these op‐
tions are reviewed, tested, and refined, some of them
may provide a starting point from which to move
ahead with feasibility studies aimed towards im‐
plementation. The following sub‐sections detail
these options and summarize the substantial analy‐
ses of each option in relation to pandemic influenza,
malaria, and SARS. Furthermore, since pandemic
influenza occupied a central stage in this project due
to its urgency, a special sub‐section (no 6.11) is de‐
voted to it.

6.2 Formulation of IP management op‐
tions
Malaria, pandemic influenza, and SARS differ sig‐
nificantly not only in terms of the pathogen and
pathogenicity but also in:
institutional frameworks,
market dynamics,
political attentions,
global context, and
IP landscape.
Vaccines for each disease, therefore, confront different
IP management constraints and opportunities. The
following section presents, analyzes, and discusses
seven options to facilitate the IP management aspects
of vaccine developments, although one option (No. 6)
is substantially broader than any of the others. The
different options presented here, therefore, are not
necessarily exclusive. Each option begins with a sim‐
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ple and brief definition, continues with a broad analy‐
sis, and then presents a preliminary recommendation
on whether and how the option might apply to the
three cases under consideration.
Strategies related to making vaccines available to
developing countries have significant IP implica‐
tions. The institutional context of vaccine develop‐
ment will also significantly affect which option
might be the most feasible. For malaria, the majority
of the R&D programs are under the auspices of MVI
through a product development public‐private part‐
nership (PATH), and so the situation is quite differ‐
ent from pandemic influenza, for which the private
sector is taking the lead. Discussions about each op‐
tion are structured to include the role played by in‐
stitutional contexts in addition to the other issues
raised above.

6.3

Compulsory licensing

Definition
According to TRIPS, countries can issue compulsory
licenses to national producers in national emergencies,
provided that a series of complex conditions are met.
The country must have the manufacturing capacity to
produce the patented invention and must also have
attempted to negotiate a license in good faith (al‐
though the WTO Council recently instituted a waiver
to the original TRIPS agreement that allows develop‐
ing countries without manufacturing capabilities to
import patented drugs from sources other than the
originator company). Compulsory licensing has to be
initiated by governments and may take one or more
years to complete; it is a complex process and requires
significant government resources and experience.
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Analysis
Production under compulsory licenses presents sev‐
eral operational challenges. Patent holders are
unlikely to license and transfer their know‐how un‐
der compulsory licenses, so companies in develop‐
ing countries will need to develop it internally. Ex‐
ports, moreover, may only be made to certain coun‐
tries under specific conditions, which limits econo‐
mies of scale and potentially increases production
costs significantly.
Compulsory licensing may be a beneficial tool—
for example as a negotiation strategy—although in‐
ternational IP standards mandated by TRIPS already
allow member nations considerable discretion to
enact laws and provisions that not only meet treaty
obligations but also support national innovation
policies, development priorities, and cultural values.
This includes voluntary pricing and licensing ar‐
rangements. Other options primarily relate to na‐
tional policies and laws beyond the purview of this
document (e.g., permitting and regulating the gov‐
ernment use of patented inventions, taking actions
through patent courts to protect public interests, and
the judicious framing of competition law and pol‐
icy). Importantly, when compulsory licenses are is‐
sued, the licensor has no obligation to transfer not
only know‐how/trade secrets but also any safety,
efficacy, or clinical data. In other words, the compul‐
sory license may be limited to the information dis‐
closed in a patent specification, which frequently
represents only an early “best mode” of an inven‐
tion. It will not include subsequently developed
and/or ancillary technical know‐how or related
show‐how.
Applicability and Feasibility
Given the range of necessary licenses and the time
required to issue a compulsory license, this option
might not permit a developing country to quickly
develop a vaccine. Moreover, even raising the possi‐
bility of compulsory licensing would significantly
deter future investments. A false alarm scenario, in
which the outbreak used to justify compulsory li‐
censing was misjudged, would be particularly harm‐
ful because it might become a future disincentive for
developing pandemic flu‐related vaccines and tech‐
nologies. Granted, the threat of a compulsory license
can prompt an early agreement, but it is always wis‐
est to seek a commercial license early.
If and when a product reaches the market, the
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international pressure to produce the vaccine in
large quantities and to distribute it to every corner of
the world will be so huge that no major hold ups
due to IP will be tolerated. It would be incredibly
damaging for any company to hold any country ran‐
som. For this reason, it is unlikely that compulsory
licensing will be a useful strategy, at least not for
pandemic influenza, although the option should
always remain on the table.
With malaria, since no product is yet developed
it would be premature to analyze it in more detail.
The same applies even more to SARS.
In all three areas, R&D can proceed without the
need for any compulsory licensing.

6.4

Patent pools

Definition
Although there are many forms of patent pools, such
an arrangement fundamentally consists of the inter‐
change (cross‐licensing) of rights to essential patents
by a number of companies, as well as an agreed
framework for out‐licensing the pooled IP to third
parties, including an agreed pricing and royalty
sharing scheme.
Analysis
As pro‐competitive arrangements, patent pools are
aimed at IP assembly. They seek to resolve patent
conflicts (reducing litigation), settle disputes over
blocking patents (accelerating product development
and FTO), and facilitate arrangements for licensing
patents in the pool to outside members (accelerating
the setting of standards and reducing licensing
transaction costs). They exploit economies of scale by
integrating the technical complementarities of the
pool members.
From a legal perspective, pools require careful
anti‐trust considerations to avoid potential, per‐
ceived, or real anti‐competitive behavior by pool
members or, more importantly, by the pool itself.
From an operational perspective, only essential pat‐
ents can be included in a pool. And finally, from a
business perspective, the interests of the various IP
holders need to be aligned in order to bring them to
the table (pools are invariably voluntary arrange‐
ments).
At this stage, it is unclear which patents might be
essential for vaccines for the three diseases discussed
in this study, so it may be premature to discuss
whether or not any assembly of potential patents
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would be subject to the antitrust guidelines for IP
licensing established by the U.S. Department of Jus‐
tice (DOJ) and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission
(FTC). Even a pool established outside the U.S. could
trigger U.S. antitrust considerations, because many
entities that would be members of pools are U.S.‐
based or have substantial U.S. operations.
Moreover, while a patent pool is very useful for
platform technologies that need to establish indus‐
try‐wide standards (e.g., DVD, MP3), its value is
much less when industry interests are not aligned. In
the context of research on vaccines—an evolving
field with no platform and with no technology
clearly in the lead—industry interests can hardly be
considered aligned. Indeed, the technology has not
matured to the stage where industry standards can
even be contemplated. At this stage in the R&D of
innovative technologies, few companies will have an
interest in giving their rivals preferential access to
their technologies. Companies also typically become
cautious about anti‐trust issues when a patent pool
is suggested, which might hinder participation.
Patent pools serve the assembly of IP, not the
transfer of technologies per se. Although the DOJ and
FTC observe that “by promoting the dissemination
of technology, cross‐licensing and pooling arrange‐
ment are often pro‐competitive,” in the context of
technology transfer and collaboration with develop‐
ing country partners, patent pools would mainly
assist with licensing IP. But these countries would
not necessarily benefit equally from sharing know‐
how, show‐how and trade secrets.
A patent pool can have advantages: IP can be
licensed through an efficient “one‐stop” shop. Sig‐
nificant research and administrative costs would
decrease dramatically. Speed and efficiency would
be greatly increased. But a pool is not the only way
to achieve these objectives.
Applicability and Feasibility
Patent pooling has been more focused in the realm
of DVD technologies, where it makes sense to gener‐
ate revenue through sales and not licensing. Such
patent pools help to clear blocking positions. But in
regards to patent pools for public health initiatives,
it appears that there is little likelihood that compa‐
nies will give up their exclusive IP rights, at least in
the case of adjuvant technologies. Pools tend to arise
organically because the owners of IP are mutually
stymied; this has not yet happened for vaccines. The
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technology is not at the same level of maturity as in
the DVD industry.
Still, it is worth noting that patent pools can be
set up in many configurations, which will then drive
the options that participants will consider as they
assemble new patent pools. Under certain circum‐
stances, the patent pool concept might provide
greater impetus for exploration and discussion.
However, as stated above, most other aspects of vac‐
cine production are likely not sufficiently mature to
fit into such an IP management strategy. As the
technologies develop and the industry matures, this
option might be more interesting.
Given the current state of research, a patent pool
seems premature at best and irrelevant at worst for
all three case studies. The key reasons are:
The interests of the players are not aligned.
The cost of establishing a pool (many millions of
US dollars) could not easily be funded, much less
the required funds to maintain the pool.
Antitrust considerations are real and would re‐
quire significant legal expenses to be overcome.
Overall, there is no product for which IP needs to
be pooled; rather, the priority should be on
downstream licensing for production and the
availability of the pandemic influenza vaccine.
Platform technologies may be significant in the
future for malaria.

6.5 Portfolio completion (and other co‐
ordinated IP management approaches)
Definition
In this IP management model, a non‐profit entity in‐
licenses the different IP pieces that may be required
to produce a vaccine in a developing country, in‐
cluding know‐how/trade secrets. This entity is re‐
stricted to negotiating access to IP and know‐how
for use in developing country markets (as defined,
for example, by the World Bank). Within developing
countries, the entity would also oversee and facili‐
tate clinical testing, the establishment of a manufac‐
turing base, distribution, and other related regula‐
tory issues.
Analysis
It should first be mentioned that this option could be
considered the “industry standard.” Any company
that brings a product to the market will need to in‐
license a range of IP as well as know‐how/trade se‐
crets from a range of players in order to obtain FTO.
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Depending on the industry, player, and market dy‐
namics, the entity may also sub‐license the bundled
IP portfolio for manufacturing elsewhere by third
parties. Although companies routinely do this, the
non‐profit sector has been slow to perceive this basic
strategy. As a result, non‐profits working to benefit
developing countries sometimes approach third par‐
ties relatively late, which often leads to complica‐
tions, and, in cases where royalties are involved, to
higher prices. Once an institution has invested sig‐
nificant sums in product R&D, the bargaining power
to obtain licenses is reduced.
However, industry does not perceive non‐profit
entities and other companies in the same way. The
key issue is often not competition but product stew‐
ardship and guarantees that only a high‐quality,
safe, and effective product will reach the market.
Approaching licensors later, therefore, may be in a
non‐profit’s interest because it can demonstrate its
success.
The first step for this option is an IP logistics
evaluation. Given the available technologies and
players, what would be the fastest and cheapest way
to create a vaccine? This requires identifying the key
technologies at every step of vaccine development,
production, and deployment. The IP holders for each
step must also be identified, after which it would be
possible to map out various logistical combinations
(perhaps 5‐6) and evaluate specific paths with the
highest likelihood of success.
Donor funding would be required to negotiate
access to the technology, and a solid scientific/legal
panel would also be needed to evaluate the IP logis‐
tics. The entity in charge of determining the options
and negotiating for access would need to be trust‐
worthy, credible, professional, and apolitical.
Applicability and Feasibility
This option has potential for all three case studies,
particularly for malaria. Capacity building and net‐
working elements appear to be key elements for suc‐
cess. Since institutional and personal relationships
are key drivers, networking is a critical precursor to
licensing.

6.6 IP logistics to facilitate global
access
Definition
U.S. Congressman Sharrod Brown has introduced a
bill (H.R. 4131) that would provide for compulsory
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licensing of patents in the event of a severe public
emergency, such as the outbreak of an H5N1 influ‐
enza pandemic. But as reassuring as this might
sound, it is like putting on a Kevlar® vest after hav‐
ing heard the gunshot. Such an approach is most
likely too little, too late.
What is needed is an alignment of technologies,
IP, and options. In other words, a preconceived, pre‐
arranged, logistical plan is essential well in advance
of a pandemic outbreak or Phase III testing of a ma‐
laria vaccine. Logistics involves identifying, assem‐
bling, and organizing resources across the innova‐
tion matrix; hence, a logistical approach dictates that
the resulting product, or vaccine, will need to be:
produced rapidly, efficiently, safely, and reliably,
using the lowest optimal dosage of antigen,
with the highest immunological response,
and delivered in the most efficient manner.
In the case of pandemic influenza, the components
of the technological landscape to consider in expedit‐
ing the production and use of a vaccine include:
1. RNA molecular technology (including reverse
genetics),
2. DNA recombinant technology (including at‐
tenuation mutants),
3. Cell culture production systems,
4. Adjuvants,
5. Excipients,
6. Vaccine production,
7. Antigen delivery (for example, liposomal sys‐
tems).
A comprehensive view of the IP landscape requires a
careful technological analysis of alternative path‐
ways to make the vaccine, from RNA molecular
technology to vaccine delivery. This means lining up
the technologies, then the IP holders, and then de‐
veloping a logistical plan to deal with FTO issues.
Analysis
An IP logistics approach determines the optimal
vaccine production/delivery steps, who owns the IP
for each technological “step” in vaccine production,
and which IP thickets might need to be resolved.
This will require sophisticated input from leading
researchers in the field of vaccine science. An align‐
ment based on optimal technologies and corre‐
sponding optimal IP might involve several technol‐
ogy and IP holders. Again, with pandemic influenza
as the example, this could include the best reverse
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genetics technology, combined with an optimal ad‐
juvant, cell culture system, and delivery mechanism.
This would make it possible to make the best vaccine
in the shortest period of time … when that time
arises. After determining the best approach, it will be
necessary to negotiate access with the IP holders.
Fortunately, because this would be a vertical and not
a horizontal arrangement of IP, the possibility of
antitrust complications may be diminished.
IP logistics is a methodical, organized approach
for delineating and assessing access to the best tech‐
nology alignments for rapidly producing and de‐
ploying a vaccine. Its advantages suggest that there
may be other models for which IP logistics would
also provide a foundation.
Applicability and Feasibility
IP logistics is the basis for any in‐ and out‐licensing
strategy. The key strategy again relates to institu‐
tional capacity within PDPs, key developing country
institutions that are at the forefront of innovation,
and prospective future vaccine manufacturers.

6.7

Pre‐negotiated “royalty rate” model

Definition
This presumably untried option has some similari‐
ties to a patent pool. It would bring parties together
to pool their IP, but it differs from a traditional cross‐
licensing patent pool in that the parties agree in ad‐
vance to share the profits from a successful vaccine.
The “winner” (i.e., the company that first reaches the
market) would receive a higher portion of the royal‐
ties, but all parties would receive a pre‐determined
royalty rate. In this model there is a reasonable dis‐
tribution of risk and an equitable sharing of reward.
For example, assume that six companies, A, B, C,
D, E, and G join the “royalty rate model.” Each
would allow the others access to their own patents.
Assume that Company A successfully develops a
vaccine, then Company A would gain the largest
share of the profit, but the other companies also
profit at the pre‐determined rate for accessing the
technology. The proposal would provide guaranteed
access to the “winning” technology at a pre‐agreed
price. This option provides companies with a kind of
“insurance”—it is not a winner take all system—that
provides the incentive for companies to enter the
patent pool. For no up‐front cost, a company gives
up rights but is not precluded from accessing the IP
of others. The entity that administers this would also
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be able to license to a 3rd party if all member compa‐
nies agree.
Analysis
Many of the same concerns regarding patent pools
are likely to apply. Because this option has pre‐
sumably not been tested so far, it is not known
whether industry and academia would agree to it:
not everyone may want to participate, and so the
possibility that critical IP owners will holdout could
torpedo such a strategy from the start. Those with
the most promising patent portfolios may not wish
to enter since their investments in innovation are
based on the proposition that they will be the win‐
ning team. This proposal presupposes a level‐
playing field in technology development, which is
not really the case with technologies pertinent to
pandemic influenza at this stage.
Nevertheless, having all of the other relevant
patents assembled for one‐stop access could dra‐
matically reduce research and development costs for
such a company. A risk/benefit analysis may suggest
that participation is worthwhile, especially since
even if they win, their “loss” is predetermined, (i.e.,
their risk is paid for by their acceptance of a reduced
share of the ultimate revenue flow). They don’t get
the whole cake, just a tasty slice.
Applicability and Feasibility
This concept may very well be worth considering
further, but it would require substantial academic
inputs. Indeed, relevant academic groups may be
valuable partners in its future conceptualization. It
would not seem to be immediately relevant to pan‐
demic influenza, SARS, or malaria. Nevertheless, it
is hoped that the concept will be further studied and
elaborated upon so that it could potentially become
a useful model.

6.8 Encourage developing countries to
accelerate R&D and vaccine Production
through stronger linkages related to IP
management
Variant 1:

Encourage low‐income countries
to develop and manufacture vac‐
cines

Definition
A vaccine could be developed for developing coun‐
tries by a developing country that is outside of the
global IP regime. This would involve accessing
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whatever patent and patent‐related documentation
is available and using this to develop and produce a
vaccine.
Analysis
Research and development funds would be required
from donors. Such efforts, however, would duplicate
those already underway in both the public and pri‐
vate sectors, but with the added caveat that the criti‐
cally important ancillary know‐how would not be
available, since the IP holders would not be partners
in this sort of scheme. Indeed, it is unlikely to make
vaccines available before private companies. Export
issues are also a very big problem: the vaccine might
be illegal to import into countries that recognize
even one patent used to develop or produce the vac‐
cine, or for the vaccine itself.
Besides the obvious R&D capacity considerations,
once a product was exported to countries where one
or several patents are issued, some level of IP man‐
agement/licensing might still be required.
Variant 2:

Facilitate international linkages
with centers of excellence, both
public and private, in innovative
developing countries

Definition
The capability to undertake health innovation in
many developing countries is rapidly growing. Such
Innovative Developing Countries (IDCs) have the
capacity to develop, manufacture, ensure the safety,
and market new health products and to develop,
test, and introduce new health policies or strategies.
They are distinguished by their rapidly growing
strength in health innovation, as illustrated by ex‐
panding patenting and publishing activities; increas‐
ing investments in technology by both the public
and private sectors; rapidly growing numbers of
health technology companies; and health systems
able to analyze, evaluate, and adopt new practices
and technologies.
This innovation capability provides an underlev‐
eraged opportunity to accelerate the development of
new products, policies, and strategies for diseases of
the poor. The primary mission of an Initiative for
Health Product Innovation in Developing Countries
would be to accelerate the translation of new knowl‐
edge into health innovations that are relevant to dis‐
eases of the poor and to economic growth, taking
into account national priorities and sensitivities. The
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Initiative could promote innovation through pro‐
grams to:
support research on health innovation systems;
promote collaboration and coordination among
countries to develop, disseminate and implement
good practices; and
implement demonstration projects. (Morel et al
2005b)
Analysis
Although only proposed in 2004 at a Bellagio meet‐
ing organized by the Rockefeller Foundation, MIHR,
and Arizona State University, and first published in
2005, the idea of IDCs has garnered significant atten‐
tion. The concept has several appealing features with
the potential for major impacts: the streamlining of
resources, the conduct of R&D close to the location
of the overwhelming health needs in developing
countries, and proximity to neighboring countries
with lower incomes and resources. Since IDCs are
partly defined as countries with public and private
R&D institutions that patent inventions to a certain
degree, it follows that IP management is emerging as
an important field. In order to strengthen this, the
proposed strategy would target specific initiatives
centered on pandemic flu, malaria, and/or SARS
through a two‐pronged approach:
The formation of a consortium of R&D institu‐
tions to funnel potentially valuable health‐related
IP to IDCs, thus promoting access to improved
health technologies for poorer populations in de‐
veloping countries. A consortium would need to
be assembled that would provide a defined
mechanism for licensing and IP management.
Technologies of possible interest to developing
countries would be made available, and public‐
private partnerships for product development
would be facilitated.
The formation of a ʺSister Institutionsʺ program.
R&D centers in a developing country would form
an on‐going, mutually beneficial relationship for
capacity building and experience sharing in IP
management and licensing. Based on the Tech‐
nology Managers for Global Health (TMGH) ex‐
perience (an AUTM initiative), it is clear that U.S.
and Canadian universities are prepared to reach
out to their developing country counterparts to
provide training and capacity building experi‐
ences, including internships and visiting staff ex‐
changes. This concept could be expanded to in‐
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clude private‐private interfaces, as well as a
combination of private‐public programs.
Whereas the “Sister Institutions” program seeks
to strengthen IP management capabilities, this
proposal would promote linkages for specific
product development R&D (viz., pandemic in‐
fluenza, malaria and/or SARS).
Applicability and Feasibility
This aspect fits broadly into the overall IP manage‐
ment strategic formulations for international devel‐
opment policies, incentives, and specific initiatives.
The concept is designed not only to encourage de‐
veloping countries but to assist leading institutions
with the specific tools necessary for its implementa‐
tion.

6.9

Take no action

Definition
Let market forces determine the development and
distribution of a vaccine.
Analysis
While market forces are essential for developing a
vaccine, it is unlikely that they would quickly move
a vaccine to market, particularly the “invisible”
market of the very poor in developing countries. It is
generally accepted that for vaccines, there is no a
priori market to drive development. This is the heart
of the problem. With the “take no action” approach,
countries will likely to plan to adopt compulsory
licensing, which will decrease present and future
investments and innovation in vaccine technologies,
research, and development. In other words, what
ensues is a downward spiral, a race to the bottom,
with no winners … only losers.
Applicability and Feasibility
These three case studies, most notably of pandemic
influenza and to a lesser degree malaria, provide us
with important knowledge that gives us the chance
to significantly change how we view and use IP in
developing countries. If we fail to pursue new IP
management initiatives that creatively strengthen
partnerships and build institutions, we lose not only
the chance to help millions of people who will suffer
and die from these three diseases, but also the posi‐
tive repercussions of these changes for many other
R&D efforts and initiatives related to diseases of the
poor.
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The “do nothing approach” raises the critical
question of whether or not to even seek IP rights
protection, a question that is important to consider
and work through because some have strongly ad‐
vocated against the global harmonization of IP
rights. While this approach may be an option in de‐
veloping countries where IP rights to not protect key
technologies, the crucial question is really what IP is
required to further research, develop, and commer‐
cialize an urgently needed medical product. IP rights
also play a critical, indispensable role in attracting
investments.

6.10 Open source and capacity building
Over the past several years, pandemic influenza re‐
ceived a lot of attention. Within the context of this
potential threat, IP per se is surely an important and
constant consideration. But an “integration” of IP
into a wider product development strategy is also
crucial. It allows for a contextual model of analysis
that addresses the interrelated facets of the influenza
challenge. This information must be presented to the
general population to galvanize public opinion and
put pressure on leaders to act. This must be followed
by “organization”: maintaining momentum with
public and political support for constructing an or‐
ganization that will facilitate global access. A six step
action agenda could:
1. Assess and then communicate the level of the
threat.
2. What tools are available now? Soon? Later?
3. Determine the level of national infrastructure
that supports vaccine development and distribu‐
tion, i.e.,
Manufacture,
Distribution,
Storage, and
Administration.
4. Policy development will be key.
5. Finances are critical because gaps must be filled
for short‐, medium‐ and long‐term special
groups.
6. Legal and IP issues are interwoven throughout.
The fundamental premise is that without the pres‐
ence of the first three, there may not be any need to
address any potential IP constraints.
In terms of institutional structure, a Global
Fund/PATH hybrid organization with a global man‐
date specifically for managing technologies and IP
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related to avian and pandemic influenza should be
created. This would be a one‐stop shopping entity
for access. This organization would have both global
managerial authority and financial accountability
(precedents include successful AIDS initiatives).
Specifically serving the needs of developing coun‐
tries, the organization would serve medium‐ and
longer term‐needs by managing finances, technology
and IP.
Within the broad discussion of IP issues, the con‐
cept of open source inevitable arises. Often men‐
tioned as a possible option, it likely raises more
questions than it answers. For example, what would
be the effects and consequences of going with open
source in health innovation? A proposed model
needs to be carefully and critically evaluated. OECD
best practices for licensing genomic technology
might be a place to start this sort of discussion.
However broad the discussion of IP issues might
be, it is important to note that training in IP rights
management is critical for both developed and de‐
veloping countries. It is a universal condition for
success. Building IP institutions will require long‐
term focused action in order to lead to sustainable
results, and more pro bono services are needed for
developing countries (e.g., PIIPA and PIPRA), a con‐
tribution that has also been an important part of
WIPO’s mission and agenda.

6.11 Specific issues related to Pandemic
influenza
The Threat
Unlike SARS, anthrax, and HIV/AIDS, “influenza” is
not viewed as an exotic, unknown threat. Indeed, the
public’s perception in developed countries that
“Nobody dies from infectious disease” may be what
has restrained public alarm, especially for a menace
as familiar as “influenza.” The word “influenza”
itself may hide the real threat level (imagine if the
word “plague” were used instead). Such inappropri‐
ate perceptions about a pandemic influenza must be
corrected. Influenza is generally not perceived to be
a major public threat but rather like a bad cold. Mis‐
takenly, people assume that they already know what
“the flu” is, including the highly lethal avian influ‐
enza H5N1.
Tools, Vaccines, and Drugs
The H5N1 strain of influenza virus does not replicate
well under laboratory conditions, which will dra‐
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matically reduce the capacity for vaccine production.
To reduce the amount of virus antigen, trial vaccine
must be adjuvanted. Safe and widely used in other
vaccines, alum adjuvant is a very practical option
that is not covered by a patent. However, this should
not rule out work on other potentially superior ad‐
juvants, since alum may still not prove suitably anti‐
gen sparing (e.g., Chiron has developed a proprie‐
tary adjuvant).
In terms of vaccine production, scale‐up issues
are not necessarily specific to the antigen(s). At the
moment, if vaccine could be mass‐produced via tis‐
sue culture, it would still be very sophisticated but
costly. Egg‐based production is therefore the (cur‐
rent) feasible approach. Orienting the approach via
the worst‐case scenario, it is critically important to
find ways to optimize the use of current technologies
that can be quickly scaled‐up.
Infrastructure Issues
Issues relating to infrastructure can be conceptual‐
ized under four broad headings:
1) Manufacture:
a. Process Technology IP,
b. Cell vs. egg,
c. Available plants/facilities,
d. New plants,
e. Regional/country location,
f. “Competition” with existing vaccine produc‐
tion, and
g. Technology transfer issues.
2) Distribution (technology and politics). Would
there be coverage if there were a vaccine? PDP
vaccine achieves only 50% coverage in India….
3) Storage.
4) Administration.
A reverse genetics‐engineered reassortment virus in‐
corporating genes from the surface antigens of pan‐
demic virus and the internal genes of another virus
influenza virus can be prepared in about two weeks
and distributed to all vaccine companies. The critical
issue is to make sure that the HN51 strain replicates
well in production facilities and is immunogenic. Only
then should we deal with scale‐up timing issues.
The next consideration revolves around vaccine
distribution policy. This decision would be made by
political and not economic or epidemiological fac‐
tors. For example, even if Argentina had an advance
purchasing agreement with Germany for vaccines
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and Poland did not, it would be inconceivable that
doses would not be sent to Poland before Argentina.
This is why Vietnam is developing its own vaccine
manufacturer—it realizes that it would not be able to
rely on an outside supply.
Price spikes would potentially confuse distribu‐
tion (both globally and within each country). A good
supply response is the best way to dampen these
(theory and evidence of asset and commodity price
bubbles tells us this). The best response is to globally
distribute a more than adequate supply—not a tar‐
geted distribution of a less than adequate supply.
Policy
Broadly speaking, policy issues can be conceptually
reduced to five components:
1) Regulatory convergence (this will also help create
more flexible international markets for influenza
vaccines),
2) Global fund with a global mandate,
3) Removing barriers to IP and technology‐transfer,
4) Education and capacity building, and
5) A distribution policy for limited production (both
within country and trans‐nationally).
The “Global Fund” concept is a possible institutional
mechanism for overcoming obstacles and advancing
feasible agendas. In terms of an institutional struc‐
ture, a Global Fund/PATH hybrid organization with
a global mandate specifically for managing tech‐
nologies and IP related to avian and pandemic influ‐
enza should be created. This would be a one‐stop
shopping entity for global access. With the precedent
of existing successful AIDS initiatives, the organiza‐
tion would have both global managerial authority

and financial accountability.
o Unlike PATH, the Global Fund would not de‐
velop vaccines. The advantages of a “Global
Fund” type set‐up with a “global mandate” are:
♣ It helps to “pull activities together”. Indeed, the
original Global Fund was created because other
players were not/could not pull together;
♣ It has political legitimacy/authority;
♣ It is accountable;
♣ It “gets others off the hook”, a useful political
advantage;
♣ It is a managerial authority and can write con‐
tracts;
♣ It would be taking on an already working
model. It “has precedent”.
o The emphasis here is on the word “manage” not
so much on the word “coordinate”. Management
equals authority, that is, action.
With regard to pandemic influenza, there appears to
be a general lack of leadership. The suggested or‐
ganization would fill this void and begin to address
those needs that established organizations and their
leadership have not adequately addressed.
Legal issues
Focusing on issues related to IP, legal considerations
might be premature if there are still outstanding and
serious problems vis‐à‐vis the above issues. How‐
ever, IP challenges are likely on the horizon with
some of the newer technologies; given the multi‐step
process in vaccine research, development, produc‐
tion, and deployment, the question of whether IP
issues are resolved remains open.

7. Conclusion and proposed follow‐up
7.1 Intellectual asset management for
the building of international partnerships
and the creation of value
This comprehensive paper examines options and
possible modalities of patent pool arrangements re‐
lated to the development of a pandemic (avian) flu
vaccine, SARS diagnostics and treatments, and ma‐
laria vaccines. It identified critical issues affecting
the current and future provision of vaccines to de‐
veloping countries and analyzed several possible
solutions related to the three infectious diseases. The
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results of these case studies clearly indicate that crea‐
tive/dynamic management of IP is integral to foster‐
ing global access for critically essential vaccines in
the developing world.
The study incorporated:
1. Analysis of patent landscape and literature,
2. Consideration of potential IP constraints,
3. Development of various business models to
overcome and manage IP constraints in a proac‐
tive manner, and
4. Evaluation of the comparative advantages of the
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various business models, as well as the determi‐
nation of which one(s) are most appropriate for
the different health challenges.
This analysis carefully considered the feasibility of
patent pools in relation to IP issues and the changing
contexts of vaccine R&D, including product diver‐
gence across markets, the rapid emergence of sup‐
pliers in developing nations, potential arrangements
to be forged between the R&D based industry and
emerging suppliers, and the role of PDPs. In the case
of SARS, a patent pool related to genomic data is
already being pursued through the U.S. Public
Health Service. They are completing a licensing
strategy. Vaccine technologies were emphasized in
the analysis because IP has an increasing potential to
act as a disincentive and hamper or block vaccine
R&D. This is especially true of critical technologies
such as recombinant and sub‐unit vaccines.
The research tool access problem is of course a
general challenge for the scientific community. Crea‐
tive resolutions in the health sciences, however, may
find the most fertile ground in the context of global
health products, since they represent non‐
commercial or low margin R&D and industry may
be more amenable to shared schemes. Indeed, we are
learning through the experience of PDPs that com‐
panies have several motivations to work collabora‐
tively and share IP that is relevant to neglected dis‐
eases with the public sector. These motivations in‐
clude corporate social responsibility and strategic
considerations, such as positioning for emerging
markets or the cross‐applicability of neglected dis‐
ease research and platform technologies for com‐
mercial projects.

7.2

MIHR and PIPRA

Depending on the particular needs of the scientific
challenge, an emerging range of IP management
tools can be applied (e.g., patent pools, humanitarian
licensing, clearing house reduction of transaction
costs, open source schemes). However, it is impor‐
tant to note that existing ad hoc experiments in IP
management are often inefficient or fragmented.
MIHR and PIPRA have discussed the need for an

92

organized effort to identify where and when current
or emerging IP management strategies might best be
applied so that their application can be facilitated.
There are a number of platforms in need of analysis,
platforms that should be given thoughtful attention
by research agencies and foundations concerned
with development. This includes qualitative research
to identify public‐sector best practices that encour‐
age commercial development but obtain the broad‐
est public benefit. Inventories of IP rights currently
held by the public sector (and their licensing status)
could assist inventors. Most importantly, scalable
models of collaborative marketing and pooling that
would enable greater research access could be ex‐
plored and piloted.
On this latter point, PIPRA has noted that there
are opportunities that have yet to be explored. In the
health arena, MIHR and PIPRA have discussed the
instructive precedent of the Single Nucleotide Poly‐
morphism consortium, which is exemplary for a
number of reasons, not least of which is their com‐
bined use of defensive publishing and patenting to
achieve a well‐defined goal. iEdison, the invention
disclosure databank for NIH‐sponsored research,
also offers a particularly interesting prospect. A
PIPRA‐like organization in health, first tested as a
pilot with a limited subset of NIH‐funded technolo‐
gies, is therefore a model worthy of serious consid‐
eration. Propitiously, the licensing information (to
varying degrees of accuracy) has been collected al‐
ready in iEdison. MIHR has not yet advanced such
discussions within NIH. But it is one possible direc‐
tion.
In sum, the challenge is to identify the specific
enabling technology platforms around which the
alignment of public‐private interests are ripe. Even
more importantly, the key players who should be
brought together to discuss such a consortium‐based
approach need to be identified. If the formative days
of PIPRA provide any roadmap, what is required is:
1. leadership from one or more of the core IP own‐
ers,
2. a supportive donor to provide manage‐
ment/analysis support, and
3. a trusted third party catalyst.
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Notes
1
2

3

See also Lall 2003; Mahoney 2004; Mahoney et al 2005.
The U.S. Patent Office issued a useful paper on this issue
which concluded that patent pooling in the research tools
area could be valuable and pro‐competitive (see Clark
2000).
There were three flu pandemics in the 20th century. All of
them spread worldwide within 1 year of being detected:
1918‐19, ʺSpanish fluʺ (Type A H1N1) caused the high‐
est number of known flu deaths: more than 500,000
people died in the U.S. Estimates for worldwide mor‐
tality range from 20 to 60 million. In India alone over 7
million are estimated to have died. Many died within
the first few days; others died of complications soon af‐
ter. Unlike typical epidemic flu, which kills predomi‐
nantly the old, the infirm, and the very young, nearly
half of those who died were young, healthy adults.
1957‐58, ʺAsian fluʺ (Type A H2N2) caused about
80,000 deaths in the United States and 1 million world‐
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4

wide. First identified in China in late February 1957, the
Asian flu spread to the United States by June 1957.
1968‐69, ʺHong Kong fluʺ (Type A H3N2) caused ap‐
proximately 34,000 deaths in the United States and an
estimated 700,000 worldwide. This virus was first de‐
tected in Hong Kong in early 1968 and spread to the
United States later that year. Type A H3N2 viruses still
circulate today.
Both the 1957‐58 and 1968‐69 pandemic viruses were a re‐
sult of the reassortment of a human virus with an avian in‐
fluenza virus. The origin of the 1918 pandemic virus is un‐
clear. Once a new pandemic influenza virus emerges and
spreads, it typically becomes established among people and
circulates for many years (Source CDC Website, Nguyen‐
Van‐Tam, J, Hampson, A, The epidemiology and clinical
impact of pandemic influenza Vaccine (2003))21 1762‐1768 .
Gerdil, C. The annual production cycle for influenza vac‐
cine. Vaccine (2003) 21 1776‐1779

93

5

Solvayʹs cell culture flu vaccine has recently been approved
for sale in the Netherlands.

6

Adapted from “Intellectual Property Rights and Vaccines
for Developing Countries,” WHO Meeting Report, 19‐20
April, 2004.

7

Evidently, there are exceptions to this. For example, reverse
genetics would be one such platform technology. But the IP
situation surrounding reverse genetics is “simple” by any

standard and hardly requires even talk of a patent pool.
8

The term “health innovation” includes the development of
new drugs, vaccines, and diagnostics, as well as new tech‐
niques in process engineering/manufacturing and new ap‐
proaches/policies in health systems and services.

9
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Appendices
The following tables are intended solely as illustrative examples of overall patent landscapes, and are not in‐
tended, either implicitly or explicitly, as comprehensive or complete listings.

A. Patents related to certain recombinant vaccine productions and pan‐
demic influenza
Table A1. Reverse Genetics
Patent or Applica‐
tion Number
5166057

5578473

5820871

Dates
Filed: May 22, 1990; ;
Issued: November v24,
1992

Title
Recombinant negative strand
RNA virus expression‐
systems

Inventors
Palese; Peter (Leonia, NJ); Par‐
vin; Jeffrey D. (Belmont, MA);
Krystal; Mark (Leonia, NJ)

Filed:
Issued:
1996
Filed:
Issued:

March 10, 1994; ;
November 26,

Recombinant negative strand
RNA virus

June 6, 1995; ;
October 13, 1998

Recombinant negative strand
RNA virus expression sys‐
tems and vaccines

Palese; Peter (Leonia, NJ); Par‐
vin; Jeffrey D. (Belmont, MA);
Krystal; Mark (Leonia, NJ)
Palese; Peter (Leonia, NJ);
Garcia‐Sastre; Adolfo (New
York, NY)

5854037

Filed: June 1, 1994; ;
Issued: December 29,
1998

Recombinant negative strand
RNA virus expression sys‐
tems and vaccines

Palese; Peter (Leonia, NJ);
Garcia‐Sastre; Adolfo (New
York, NY)

6001634

Filed: June 29, 1998; ;
Issued: December 14,
1999

Recombinant negative strand
RNA viruses

6524588

Filed: March 24, 1997; ;
Issued: February 25, 2003

6544785

Filed: July 14, 2000; ;
Issued: April 8, 2003

Attenuated vaccination and
gene‐transfer virus, a method
to make the virus and a
pharmaceutical composition
comprising the virus
Helper‐free rescue of recom‐
binant negative strand RNA
viruses

Palese; Peter (414 Highwood
Ave., Leonia, NJ 07605); Garcia‐
Sastre; Adolfo (1249 Park Ave.,
#8D, New York, NY 10029)
Hobom; Gerd (Arndtstrasse 14,
D 35392 Giessen, DE); Neu‐
mann; Gabriele (Maintal, DE);
Menke; Annette (Marburg, DE)

6649372

Filed: November 28,
2000; ; Issued: November
18, 2003

Helper‐free rescue of recom‐
binant negative strand RNA
virus

6,887,699

Filed: September 14,
1999; Issued: May 3, 2005

6951754

Filed:

Recombinant negative strand
RNA virus expression sys‐
tems and vaccines
DNA transfection system for
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April 27, 2001; ;

Palese; Peter (Leonia, NJ); Gar‐
cia‐Sastre; Adolfo (New York,
NY); Brownlee; George G. (Ox‐
ford, GB)
Palese; Peter (Leonia, NJ); Gar‐
cia‐Sastre; Adolfo (New York,
NY); Brownlee; George G. (Ox‐
ford, GB); Fodor; Ervin (Oxford,
GB)
Palese; Peter (Leonia, NJ);
Garcia‐Sastre; Adolfo (New
York, NY)
Hoffmann; Erich (Memphis,

Assignee and/or Applicant
The Mount Sinai School of
Medicine of The City Univer‐
sity of New York (New York,
NY)
Aviron, Inc. (Mountain View,
CA)
The Mount Sinai School of
Medicine of the City Univer‐
sity of New York (New York,
NY)
The Mount Sinai School of
Medicine of the City Univer‐
sity of New York (New York,
NY)

Hobom; Gerd (Giessen, DE)

Mount Sinai School of Medi‐
cine of New York University
(New York, NY)
Mount Sinai School of Medi‐
cine of New York University
(New York, NY)

MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
(Mountain View, CA)
St. Jude Childrenʹs Research
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Issued: October 4, 2005;
20020164770

20030035814

20030129729

20040002061

Filed: April 27, 2001;
Publication: November 7,
2002
Filed: October 4, 2001;
Publication: February 20,
2003
Filed: October 1, 2002;
Publication: July 10, 2003

the generation of infectious
influenza virus
DNA transfection system for
the generation of infectious
influenza virus
Recombinant influenza vi‐
ruses for vaccines and gene
therapy
Novel methods for rescue of
RNA viruses

Filed: February 12,
2003; Publication: Janu‐
ary 1, 2004
Filed: April 25, 2003; ;
Publication: February 12,
2004

Signal for packaging of influ‐
enza virus vectors

20040142003

Filed: August 28, 2003;
Publication: July 22, 2004

Helper‐free rescue of recom‐
binant negative strand RNA
virus

20040219170

Filed: April 20, 2004;
Publication: November 4,
2004
Filed: July 19, 2001;
Publication: December 2,
2004

Viruses encoding mutant
membrane protein

20040029251

20040241139

20050003349

20050032043

20050037487

20050158342
20050186563

20050221489

20050266026

Filed: May 27, 2004; ;
Publication: January 6,
2005
Filed: April 7, 2004;
Publication: February 10,
2005
Filed: May 27, 2004;
Publication: February 17,
2005
Filed: December 22, 2004;
Publication: July 21, 2005
Filed: March 29, 2005; ;
Publication: August 25,
2005
Filed: May 17, 2005;
Publication: October 6,
2005
Filed: May 20, 2005;
Publication: December 1,
2005

Multi plasmid system for the
production of influenza virus

Recombinant influenza vi‐
ruses with bicistronic vRNAs
coding for two genes in tan‐
dem arrangement
High titer recombinant influ‐
enza viruses for vaccines and
gene therapy
Recombinant negative strand
RNA virus expression sys‐
tems and vaccines
Recombinant influenza vec‐
tors with a PolII promoter
and ribozymes for vaccines
and gene therapy
Multi plasmid system for the
production of influenza virus
DNA transfection system for
the generation of infectious
influenza virus
Recombinant negative strand
virus rna expression systems
and vaccines
Multi plasmid system for the
production of influenza virus

CN1624116

Publication date: 2005‐06‐
08;

Artificial recombined influ‐
enza virus and its application

WO2005062820

Published: 2005‐07‐14;

MULTI PLASMID SYSTEM
FOR THE PRODUCTION OF
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TN)

Hospital (Memphis, TN)

Hoffmann, Erich; (Memphis,
TN)

St. Jude Childrenʹs Research
Hospital

Kawaoka, Yoshihiro; (Middle‐
ton, WI) ; Neumann, Gabriele;
(Nanuet, NY)
Parks, Christopher L.; (Boonton,
NJ) ; Sidhu, Mohinderjit S.;
(Scotch Plains, NJ) ; Udem,
Stephen A.; (New York, NY) ;
Kovacs, Gerald R.; (Morristown,
NJ)
Kawaoka, Yoshihiro; (Middle‐
ton, WI)
Hoffman, E; (Sunnyvale, CA) ;
Jin, Hong; (Cupertino, CA) ; Lu,
Bin; (Los Altos, CA) ; Duke,
Greg; (Redwood City, CA) ;
Kemble, George; (Saratoga, CA)
Palese, Peter; (Leonia, NJ) ;
Garcia‐Sastre, Adolfo; (New
York, NY) ; Brownlee, George
G.; (Oxford, GB) ; Fodor, Ervin;
(Oxford, GB)
Kawaoka, Yoshihiro; (Middle‐
ton, WI)

Medlmmune Vaccines, Inc.

Hobom, Gerd; (Giessen, DE) ;
Menke, Annette; (Marburg, DE)
; Meyer‐Rogge, Sabine;
(Laubach‐Munster, DE)
Kawaoka, Yoshihiro; (Middle‐
ton, WI)
Palese, Peter; (Leonia, NJ) ;
Garcia‐Sastre, Adolfo; (New
York, NY)
Kawaoka, Yoshihiro; (Middle‐
ton, WI) ; Hamm, Stefan; (River
Vale, NJ) ; Ebihara, Hideki;
(Winnipeg, CA)
Kemble, G; (Saratoga, CA) ;
Duke, G ; (Redwood City, CA)
Hoffmann, Erich; (Memphis,
TN)
Garcia‐Sastre, Adolfo; (New
York, NY) ; Palese, Peter;
(Leonia, NJ)
Hoffmann, Erich; (Memphis,
TN) ; Jin, Hong; (Cupertino,
CA) ; Lu, Bin; (Los Altos, CA) ;
Duke, Gregory; (Redwood City,
CA) ; Kemble, G; (Saratoga, CA)
; Chen, Z; (Cupertino, CA)
CHEN HUALAN (CN); YU
KANGZHEN (CN); TIAN
GUOBIN (CN)
DUKE GREG (US); KEMBLE
GEORGE (US)

HARBIN VETERINARY INST
CHINESE (CN)
MEDIMMUNE VACCINES
INC (US); DUKE GREG (US);
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WO2005115448

Published: 2005‐12‐08;

INFLUENZA VIRUS
MULTI PLASMID SYSTEM
FOR THE PRODUCTION OF
INFLUENZA VIRUS

HOFFMANN ERICH (US); JIN
HONG (US); LU BIN (US);
DUKE GREGORY (US);
KEMBLE GEORGE (US); CHEN
ZHONGYING (US)

KEMBLE GEORGE (US)
MEDIMMUNE VACCINES
INC (US); HOFFMANN
ERICH (US); JIN HONG (US);
LU BIN (US); DUKE
GREGORY (US); KEMBLE
GEORGE (US); CHEN
ZHONGYING (US)

Table A2. Mutants
Patent or Applica‐
tion Number
6090391

6022726

6316243

6322967

6528064

6843996

Dates
Filed: February 23,
1996;;Issued: July 18,
2000;;;
Filed: December 20,
1994;;Issued: February 8,
2000;

Title
Recombinant tryptophan
mutants of influenza

Inventors
Parkin; Neil T. (Belmont, CA)

Genetically engineered
attenuated viruses

Filed: June 6,
1995;;Issued: November
13, 2001;
Filed: July 10,
2000;;Issued: November
27, 2001;;
Filed: November 26,
2001;;Issued: March 4,
2003;;
Filed: December 1,
1999;;Issued: January 18,
2005;;

Genetically engineered
attenuated double‐stranded
RNA viruses
Recombinant tryptophan
mutants of influenza

Palese; Peter (414 Highwood
Ave., Leonia, NJ 07605); Mus‐
ter; Thomas (Nussadorser
Lande 11, A‐1190 Vienna, AT);
Masayoshi; Enami (Hei‐
washukusha C‐54‐33, Heiwa‐
machi 3‐20‐10, Kanazawa,
Ishikawa 921, JP); Bergmann;
Michael (10 E. 95th St., #10,
New York, NY 10128)
Palese; Peter (414 Highwood
Ave., Leonia, NJ 07605)

6,866,853

Filed: December 9,
2002;Issued: March 15,
2005;

6872395

Filed: April 12,
2001;;Issued: March 29,
2005;;
Filed: December 20,
2002;;Issued: December
13, 2005;

6974686

Assignee and/or Applicant
Aviron (Mountain View,
CA)

Parkin; Neil T. (Belmont, CA)

Aviron (Mountain View,
CA)

Recombinant trytophan
mutants of influenza

Parkin; Neil T. (Belmont, CA)

Med Immune Vaccines, Inc.
(Gaithersburg, MD)

Immunogenic composition
comprising an influenza
virus with a temperature
sensitive PB2 mutation
Interferon inducing geneti‐
cally engineered attenuated
viruses

Parkin; Neil T. (South San
Francisco, CA); Coelingh;
Kathleen L. (Mountain View,
CA)
Egorov; Andrei (Vienna, AT);
Muster; Thomas (Vienna, AT);
Garcia‐Sastre; Adolfo (New
York, NY); Palese; Peter
(Leonis, NJ); Brandt; Sabine
(Vienna, AT)
Kawaoka; Yoshihiro (Madi‐
son, WI)

Medimmune Vaccines, Inc.
(Mountain View, CA)

Viruses comprising mutant
ion channel protein

Mount Sinai School of Medi‐
cine of New York University
(New York, NY)

Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation (Madison, WI)

Recombinant tryptophan
mutants of influenza

Parkin; Neil T. (Belmont, CA)

MedImmune Vaccines, Inc.
(Mountain View, CA)

Dates

Title

Inventors

Assignee and/or Applicant

Filed: October 22, 1984;
Issued: November 8,
1988

Influenza‐A virus vaccine
from fish cell cultures

Gabliks; Janis (103 Cabot St.,
Newton, MA 02158)

Table A3. Cell Culture
Patent or Applica‐
tion Number

4,783,411
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RE33,164

Filed: February 18,
1987; Issued: February
13, 1990;

Influenza vaccine produc‐
tion in liquid cell culture

Brown; Karen K. (Kansas City,
MO); Stewart; Richard C.
(Merriam, KS)

Mobay Corporation (Pitts‐
burgh, PA)

5550051

Filed: December 1,
1994; ; Issued: August 27,
1996;

Filed: June 7, 1995;
Issued: May 19, 1998

5,824,536

Filed: June 17, 1996;
Issued: October 20, 1998

Influenza virus replicated
in mammalian cell culture
and vaccine production

Mundt; Wolfgang (Vienna,
AU); Woehrer; Wilfried (Bad
Voeslau, AU); Dorner;
Friedrich (Vienna, AU); Eibl;
Johann (Vienna, AU)
Kistner; Otfried (Vienna, AT);
Barrett; Noel (Klosterneu‐
berg/Weidling, AT); Mundt;
Wolfgang (Vienna, AT);
Dorner; Friedrich (Vienna,
AT)
Webster; Robert G. (Memphis,
TN); Kaverin; Nicolai V.
(Moscow, RU)

Immuno Aktiengesellschaft
(Vienna, AU)

5,753,489

Avian embryo cell aggre‐
gate biomass for producing
virus/virus antigen and
method for producing
virus/virus antigen
Method for producing
viruses and vaccines in
serum‐free culture

5840565

Filed: August 21, 1996; ;
Issued: November 24,
1998;

Methods for enhancing the
production of viral vaccines
in PKR‐deficient cell culture

Lau; Allan S. (San Francisco,
CA)

The Regents of the Univer‐
sity of California (Oakland,
CA)

5,989,805

Filed: November 10, 1997;
; Issued: November 23,
1999

Immortal avian cell line to
grow avian and animal
viruses to produce vaccines

Board of Trustees operating
Michigan State University
(East Lansing, MI)

6,146,873

Filed: October 15, 1997;
Issued: November 14,
2000;

Production of ortho‐
myxoviruses in monkey
kidney cells using protein‐
free media

6344354

Filed: June 16, 1998; ;
Issued: February 5, 2002;

Influenza virus replicated
in mammalian cell culture
and vaccine production

Reilly; John David (Lansing,
MI); Taylor; Daniel C. (East
Lansing, MI); Maes; Roger
(Okemos, MI); Coussens; Paul
M. (Lansing, MI)
Kistner; Otfried (Vienna, AT);
Barrett; Noel (Klosterneub‐
urg/Weidling, AT); Mundt;
Wofgang (Vienna, AT); Dorner;
Friedrich (Vienna, AT)
Webster; Robert G. (Memphis,
TN); Kaverin; Nicolai V.
(Moscow, RU)

6,455,298

Filed: September 29, 1998;
; Issued: September 24,
2002;

Animal cells and processes
for the replication of influ‐
enza viruses

Groner; Albrecht
(Fasanenweg, DE); Vorlop;
Jurgen (Marburg, DE)

Chiron Behring GmbH & Co.
(Marburg, DE)

20030073223

Filed: July 12, 2002; ; Pub‐
lished: April 17, 2003;

Animal cells and processes
for the replication of influ‐
enza viruses

Groner, Albrecht; (Seeheim,
DE) ; Vorlop, Jurgen;
(Marburg, DE)

Chiron Corporation

20030119183

Filed: September 16, 2002;
; Published: June 26, 2003;

Groner, Albrecht; (Seeheim,
DE)

Chiron Corporation

6,656,720

Filed: July 12, 2002;
Issued: December 2,
2003;

Processes for the replica‐
tion of influenza viruses in
cell culture, and the influ‐
enza viruses obtainable by
the process
Animal cells and processes
for the replication of influ‐
enza viruses

Groner; Albrecht (Seeheim,
DE); Vorlop; Jurgen (Marburg,
DE)

Chiron Behring GmbH & Co.
(Marburg, DE)

6,686,190

Filed: December 13,
2000; Issued: February 3,
2004;

Methods for enhancing the
production of viral vaccines
in cell culture

Lau; Allan S. (San Francisco,
CA)

The Regents of the Univer‐
sity of California (Oakland,
CA)

20040142450

Filed: November 5, 2003; ;
Published: July 22, 2004;

Lung epithelial cell line for
propagating viruses

Seo, Sang Heui; (Taejon, KR) ;
Webster, Robert C; (Memphis,
TN)

20050202553

Filed: February 15, 2005; ;
Published: September 15,
2005

Animal cells and processes
for the replication of influ‐
enza viruses

Groner, Albrecht; (Seeheim,
DE) ; Vorlop, Jurgen;
(Marburg, DE)
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IMMUNO AG (Vienna, AT)

St. Jude Childrenʹs Research
Hospital (Memphis, TN)

Baxter Aktiengesellschaft
(Vienna, AT)

St. Jude Childrenʹs Research
Hospital (Memphis, TN)

CHIRON BEHRING GMBH
& CO
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6,951,752

Filed: December 10,
2001; Issued: October 4,
2005;

Method for large scale
production of virus antigen

Reiter; Manfred (Vienna, AT);
Mundt; Wolfgang (Vienna,
AT)

Bexter Healthcare S.A. (Kan‐
ton Zurich, CH)

WO9216619

Publication date: 1992‐10‐
01;

Expression Of Influenza
Nucleoprotein Antigens In
Baculovirus

ROTA PAUL A (US); BLACK
RENNE A (US)

US ARMY (US)

WO9924068

Publication date: 1999‐05‐
20;

REILLY JOHN DAVID;
TAYLOR DANIEL C; MAES
ROGER; COUSSENS PAUL M

UNIV MICHIGAN (US)

WO2005024039

Publication: 2005‐03‐17;

Immortal Avian Cell Line
To Grow Avian And Ani‐
mal Viruses To Produce
Vaccines
Improved Method For
Generating Influenza Vi‐
ruses And Vaccines

WEBSTER ROBERT
GORDON (US); WEBBY
RICHARD JOHN (US);
OZAKI HIROICHI (US)

WO2005113758

Publication: 2005‐12‐01;

Process For The Production
Of An Influenza Vaccine

TREPANIER PIERRE (CA);
DUGRE ROBERT (CA);
HASSELL TOM (CA)

ST JUDE CHILDREN S RES
HOSPTIA (US); WEBSTER
ROBERT GORDON (US);
WEBBY RICHARD JOHN
(US); OZAKI HIROICHI (US
ID BIOMEDICAL CORP
(CA); ID BIOMEDICAL
CORP OF WASHINGT (US);
TREPANIER PIERRE (CA);
DUGRE ROBERT (CA);
HASSELL TOM (CA)

Table A4. Adjuvants
Patent or Applica‐
tion Number
5,679,356

Dates
Filed: January 5, 1995; ;
Issued: October 21, 1997

Title
Use of GM‐CSF as a vac‐
cine adjuvant

6024963

Filed: November 17,
1998; ; Issued: February
15, 2000;

Potentiation of immuno‐
genic response

6090406

Filed: February 26,
1990; ; Issued: July 18,
2000;

Potentiation of immune
responses with liposomal
adjuvants

6,372,223

Filed: June 12, 2001;
Issued: April 16, 2002

Influenza virus vaccine
composition

6485729

Filed: August 11, 1999; ;
Issued: November 26,
2002;

Neuraminidase‐
supplemented composi‐
tions

6534065

Filed: May 30, 2000; ;
Issued: March 18, 2003; ;

Influenza vaccine compo‐
sition with chitosan adju‐
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Inventors
Bonnem; Eric M. (Mr. Vernon,
NH); Chaudry; Imtiaz A.
(North Caldwell, NJ); Stupak;
Elliot (West Caldwell, NJ)
Becker; Robert S. (Henryville,
PA); Biscardi; Karen (South
Sterling, PA); Ferguson; Laura
(Bethlehem, PA); Erdile; Lorne
(Stroudsberg, PA
Popescu; Mircea C. (Plains‐
boro, NJ); Weiner; Alan L.
(Lawrenceville, NJ); Recine;
Marie S. (Hamilton Township,
NJ); Janoff; Andrew S. (Yard‐
ley, PA); Estis; Leonard (Up‐
ton, MA); Keyes; Lynn D.
(Upton, MA); Alving; Carl R.
(Bethesda, MD)
Kistner; Otfried (Vienna, AT);
Barrett; Noel (Klosterneub‐
urg/Weidling, AT); Mundt;
Wolfgang (Vienna, AT);
Dorner; Friedrich (Vienna, AT)
Smith; Gail Eugene (Walling‐
ford, CT); Matthews; James T.
(Allamuchy, NJ); Kilbourne;
Edwin D. (Madison, CT); Jo‐
hansson; Bert E. (Armonk,
NY); Wilkinson; BE. (Hig‐
ganum, CT); Voznesensky;
Andrei I. (West Hartford, CT);
Hackett; Craig S. (Wallingford,
CT); Volvovitz; Franklin
(Woodbridge, CT)
Makin; Jill Catherine (Liver‐
pool, GB); Bacon; Andrew

Assignee and/or Applicant
Schering Corporation (Ken‐
ilworth, NJ)

Connaught Laboratories, Inc.
(Swiftwater, PA)

The Liposome Company,
Inc. (Princeton, NJ)

Baxter Aktiengesellschaft
(Vienna, AT)

Protein Sciences Corporation
(Meridien, CT)

West Pharmaceutical Ser‐
vices Drug Delivery & Clini‐

Krattiger et al.

6565849

Filed: March 2, 2001; ;
Issued: May 20, 2003; ; ;

6641816

Filed: March 9, 2001; ;
Issued: November 4,
2003;

6649172

Filed: March 16, 2001; ;
Issued: November 18,
2003
Filed: February 25,
1999; ; Issued: September
28, 2004;

6797276

WO9952549

Published: 1999‐10‐21

vant

David (London, GB)

Methods of enhancing
activity of vaccines and
vaccine compositions
Use of poxviruses as en‐
hancer of specific immu‐
nity

Koenig; Scott (Rockville, MD)

Amphipathic aldehydes
and their uses as adjuvants
and immunoeffectors
Use of penetration enhan‐
cers and barrier disruption
agents to enhance the
transcutaneous immune
response
ADJUVANT
COMPOSITIONS

cal Research Centre (Not‐
tingham, GB)
MedImmune, Inc. (Gaithers‐
burg, MD)

Chevalier; Michel (Beaure‐
paire, FR); Meignier; Bernard
(Thurins, FR); Moste; Cath‐
erine (Charbonnieres‐les‐Bains,
FR); Sambhara; Suryaprakash
(Markham, CA)
Johnson; David A. (Hamilton,
MT)

Aventis Pasteur S.A. (Lyons
Cedex, FR)

Glenn; Gregory M. (Cabin
John, MD); Alving; Carl R.
(Bethesda, MD)

The United States of Amer‐
ica as represented by the
Secretary of the Army
(Washington, DC)

FRIEDE MARTIN (BE);
HERMAND PHILIPPE (BE)

SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
BIOLOG (BE); FRIEDE
MARTIN (BE); HERMAND
PHILIPPE (BE)

Inventors
Fanget; Bernard (Saint‐
Germain‐sur‐lʹArbresle, FR);
Francon; Alain (Bessenay, FR)
Illum; Lisbeth (Nottingham,
GB); Chatfield; Steven Neville
(Berkshire, GB)

Assignee and/or Applicant
Pasteur Merieux Serums &
Vaccins (Lyons, FR)

Corixa Corporation (Seattle,
WA)

Table A5. Excipient
Patent or Applica‐
tion Number
6231860

Dates
Filed: September 21,
1998Issued: May 15, 2001

Title
Stabilizers for live vaccines

6391318

Filed: June 1,
1998Issued: May 21, 2002

20040049150

Filed: August 12,
2003Published: March 11,
2004

Vaccine compositions in‐
cluding chitosan for intra‐
nasal administration and
use thereof
Vaccines

20040138165

Filed: October 30,
2003Published: July 15,
2004

DNA vaccine formulations

EP0906110

Publication: 1999‐04‐07

DNA VACCINE
FORMULATIONS

Dalton, Colin Cave; (Rixen‐
sart, BE) ; Easeman, Richard
Lewis; (Brentford, GB) ; Gar‐
con, Nathalie; (Rixensart, BE)
Volkin, David B.; (Doyles‐
town, PA) ; Evans, Robert K.;
(Soudertown, PA) ; Bruner,
Mark; (Norristown, PA)
VOLKIN DAVID B (US);
EVANS ROBERT K (US);
BRUNER MARK (US)

West Pharmaceutical Ser‐
vices Drug Delivery & Clini‐
cal Research Centre (Not‐
tingham, GB)
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
CORPORATION

Merck & Co., Inc.

MERCK & CO INC (US)

Table A6. Vaccine
Patent or Applica‐
tion Number
5674502

5766601

5897873

5,916,879

Dates
Filed: June 5,
1995Issued: October 7,
1997
Filed: April 7,
1995Issued: January 16,
1998
Filed: February 23,
1995Issued: April 13,
1999
Filed: November 12,
1996Issued: June 29, 1999
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Title
Cross‐reactive influenza a
immunization

Inventors
Ennis; Francis A. (Shrews‐
bury, MA)

Cross‐reactive influenza a
immunization

Ennis; Francis A. (Shrews‐
bury, MA)

Affinity associated vaccine

Popescu; Mircea (Plainsboro,
NJ)

Assignee and/or Applicant
University of Massachusetts
Medical Center (Worcester,
MA)
University of Massachusetts
Medical Center (Worcester,
MA)
The Liposome Company,
Inc. (Princeton, NJ)

DNA transcription unit
vaccines that protect against
avian influenza viruses and
methods of use thereof

Webster; Robert (Memphis,
TN)

St. Jude Childrenʹs Research
Hospital (Memphis, TN)
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5882650

Filed: August 13,
1997Issued: March 16,
1999
Filed: May 22,
1998Issued: December
28, 1999

Cross‐reactive influenza A
immunization

Ennis; Francis A. (Shrews‐
bury, MA)

Method for purifying vi‐
ruses by chromatography

Filed: April 29,
1998Issued: October 24,
2000
Filed: October 15,
1997Issued: November
14, 2000

Influenza vaccine composi‐
tions

Fanget; Bernard (Saint‐
Germain‐sur‐lʹArbresle, FR);
Francon; Alain (Bessenay,
FR)
Chatfield; Steven Neville
(London, GB)

Filed: March 20,
1998Issued: April 24, 2001
Filed: October 9,
1998Issued: June 12, 2001

NucA protein of Haemophi‐
lus influenzae
Method for producing influ‐
enza hemagglutinin multi‐
valent vaccines

6337181

Filed: December 21,
1998Issued: January 8,
2002

Method of specifying vac‐
cine components for viral
quasispecies

6337070

Filed: January 8,
1998Issued: January 8,
2002

Polypeptides for use in
generating anti‐human
influenza virus antibodies

6531313

Filed: October 26,
2000Issued: March 11,
2003

Invasive bacterial vectors for
expressing alphavirus repli‐
cons

20020156037

Filed: September 7,
2001Published: October
24, 2002

DNA vaccine formulations

6635246

Filed: December 5,
2001Issued: October 21,
2003

Inactivated influenza virus
vaccine for nasal or oral
application

6669943

Filed: June 11,
1999Issued: December
30, 2003

6740325

Filed: July 30,
2001Issued: May 25, 2004

Attenuated negative strand
viruses with altered inter‐
feron antagonist activity for
use as vaccines and phar‐
maceuticals
Peptide‐based vaccine for
influenza

6743900

Filed: February 15,
2001Issued: January 1,
2004

6,008,036

6136606

6,146,873

6,221,365
6,245,532
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Production of orthomyxovi‐
ruses in monkey kidney
cells using protein‐free
media

Proteosome influenza vac‐
cine

Kistner; Otfried (Vienna, AT);
Barrett; Noel (Klosterneub‐
urg/Weidling, AT); Mundt;
Wofgang (Vienna, AT);
Dorner; Friedrich (Vienna,
AT)
Jones; Kevin F. (New York,
NY)
Smith; Gale E. (Middlefield,
CT); Volvovitz; Franklin
(New Haven, CT); Wilkinson;
Bethanie E. (Middletown,
CT); Voznesensky; Andrei I.
(West Hartford, CT); Hackett;
Craig S. (Wallingford, CT)
Stewart; Jeffrey Joseph (1
Club Rd., Chatham, NJ
07928); Litwin; Samuel (8328
Roberts Rd., Elkins Pk., PA
19027); Watts; Perry (8328
Roberts Rd., Elkins Pk., PA
19027)
Okuno; Yoshinobu (Toyo‐
naka, JP); Isegawa; Yuji (Ta‐
katsuki, JP); Sasao; Fuyoko
(Ibaraki, JP); Ueda; Shigeharu
(Nishinomiya, JP)
Goudsmit; Jaap (Amsterdam,
NL); Sadoff; Jerald C. (Blue‐
bell, PA); Koff; Wayne (Stony
Brook, NJ)
Volkin, David B.; (Doyles‐
town, PA) ; Evans, Robert K.;
(Soudertown, PA) ; Bruner,
Mark; (Norristown, PA)
Barrett; Noel (Klosterneub‐
urg/Weidling, AT); Kistner;
Otfried (Vienna, AT); Ger‐
encer; Marijan (Vienna, AT);
Dorner; Friedrich (Vienna,
AT)
Palese; Peter (Leonia, NJ);
Garcia‐Sastre; Adolfo (New
York, NY); Muster; Thomas
(Vienna, AT)
Arnon; Ruth (Rehovot, IL);
Ben‐Yedidia; Tamar
(Mazkeret Batya, IL); Levi;
Raphael (Yahud, IL)
Burt; David S. (Ormeaux,
CA); Jones; David Hugh
(Baie DʹUrfe, CA); Lowell;

University of Massachusetts
Medical Center (Worcester,
MA)
Pasteur Merieux Serums et
Vaccins (Lyons, FR)

Medeva Holdings BV (Am‐
sterdam, NL)
Baxter Aktiengesellschaft
(Vienna, AT)

American Cyanamid Com‐
pany (Madison, NJ)
Protein Sciences Corporation
(Meriden, CT)

Takara Shuzo Co., Ltd.
(Kyoto‐Fu, JP)

International Aids Vaccine
Initiative (New York, NY)

Merck & Co., Inc.

Baxter Healthcare S.A. (Zu‐
rich, CH)

Mount Sinai School of Medi‐
cine of New York University
(New York, NY)

Yeda Research and Devel‐
opment Co. Ltd. (Rehovot,
IL)
ID Biomedical Corporation
of Quebec (Ville St. Laurent,
CA)Appl. No.: 788280

Krattiger et al.

6,866,853

Filed: December 9,
2002Issued: March 15,
2005

Interferon inducing geneti‐
cally engineered attenuated
viruses

6,884,613

Filed: August 24,
2001Issued: April 26,
2005

Selective precipitation of
viruses

20040109877

Filed: November 14,
2003Publication: June 10,
2004

20050054846

Filed: September 4,
2003Publication: March
10, 2005

Attenuated negative strand
viruses with altered inter‐
feron antagonist activity for
use as vaccines and phar‐
maceuticals
Method for generating in‐
fluenza viruses and vaccines

20040265987

Filed: February 25,
2004Published: December
30, 2004

Methods of producing in‐
fluenza vaccine composi‐
tions

CN1618956

Publication date: 2005‐05‐
25

CN1632124

Publication date: 2005‐06‐
29

Virus strain for preventing
poultry influenza and its
animal infection model
Gene encoding hemaggluti‐
nin protein of H5 avian
influenza virus and its ap‐
plication
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George H. (Hampstead, CA);
White; Gregory Lee (Mont‐
real, CA); Torossian; Kirkor
(Verdun, CA); Fries, III; Louis
F. (Columbia, MD); Plante;
Martin (Montreal, CA)
Egorov; Andrei (Vienna, AT);
Muster; Thomas (Vienna,
AT); Garcia‐Sastre; Adolfo
(New York, NY); Palese;
Peter (Leonis, NJ); Brandt;
Sabine (Vienna, AT)
Le Doux; Joseph M. (Decatur,
GA); Yarmush; Martin L.
(Newton, MA); Morgan;
Jeffrey R. (Sharon, MA)

Palese, Peter; (Leonia, NJ) ;
Garcia‐Sastre, Adolfo; (New
York, NY) ; Muster, Thomas;
(Vienna, AT)
Webster, Robert Gordon;
(Memphis, TN) ; Webby,
Richard John; (Memphis, TN)
; Ozaki, Hiroichi; (Memphis,
TN)
Trager, George Robert; (San
Mateo, CA) ; Kemble,
George; (Saratoga, CA) ;
Schwartz, Richard M.; (San
Mateo, CA) ; Mehta, Harsh‐
vardhan; (Fremont, CA) ;
Truong‐Le, Vu; (Campbell,
CA) ; Chen, Zhongying; (Los
Altos, CA) ; Pan, Alfred A.;
(Walnut Creek, CA) ; Tsao,
Eric; (Potomac, MD) ; Wang,
Chiaoyin Kathy; (Sunnyvale,
CA) ; Yee, Luisa; (Los Altos,
CA) ; Balu, Palani; (Cuper‐
tino, CA)
CHEN ZE (CN)

CHEN HUALAN (CN);
JIANG YONGPING (CN);
BU ZHIGAO (CN)

Mount Sinai School of Medi‐
cine of New York University
(New York, NY)

The General Hospital Corpo‐
ration (Boston, MA)

Mount Sinai School of Medi‐
cine of New York University
(New York, NY)

Medlmmune Vaccines, Inc.

WUHAN INST OF
VIROLOGY CAS (CN)
HARBIN VETERINARY RES
INST CAA (CN)
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WO02064757

Publication date: 2002‐08‐
22

INFLUENZA VIRUSES
WITH ENHANCED
TRANSCRIPTIONAL AND
REPLICATIONAL
CAPACITIES

HOBOM GERT; MENKE
ANNETTE

ARTEMIS
PHARMACEUTICALS
GMBH (DE)

WO2004022760

Publication date:
2004‐03‐18

GENERATION OF
RECOMBINANT
INFLUENZA VIRUS
USING BACULOVIRUS
DELIVERY VECTOR

GRABHERR REINGARD
(AT); EGOROV ANDREJ
(AT); POOMPUTSA
KANOKWAN (TH); ERNST
WOLFGANG (AT); KITTEL
CHRISTIAN (AT);
KATINGER HERMANN
(AT)

WO2005018539

Publication date:
2005‐03‐03

INFLUENZA
HEMAGGLUTININ AND
NEURAMINIDASE
VARIANTS

YANG CHIN‐FEN (US);
KEMBLE GEORGE (US); LIU
C G (US)

POLYMUN SCIENT
IMMUNBIO FORSCH (AT);
GRABHERR REINGARD
(AT); EGOROV ANDREJ
(AT); POOMPUTSA
KANOKWAN (TH); ERNST
WOLFGANG (AT); KITTEL
CHRISTIAN (AT);
KATINGER HERMANN
(AT)
MEDIMMUNE VACCINES
INC (US); YANG CHIN‐FEN
(US); KEMBLE GEORGE
(US); LIU C G (US)

WO2005020889

Publication date: 2005‐03‐
10

FUNCTIONAL
INFLUENZA VIRUS‐LIKE
PARTICLES (VLPS)

ROBINSON ROBIN A (US);
PUSHKO PETER M (US)

NOVAVAX INC (US);
ROBINSON ROBIN A (US);
PUSHKO PETER M (US)

WO2005027825

Publication date:
03‐31

RECOMBINANT
PARAINFLUENZA VIRUS
EXPRESSION SYSTEMS
AND VACCINES
COMPRISING
HETEROLOGOUS
ANTIGENS DERIVED
FROM
METAPNEUMOVIRUS

FOUCHIER RONALDUS
ADRIANUS MAR (NL);
VAN DEN HOOGEN
BERNADETTA GERA (NL);
OSTERHAUS ALBERTUS
DOMINICUS M (NL);
HALLER AURELIA (US);
TANG RODERICK (US)

WO2005090584

Publication date: 2005‐09‐
29

INFLUENZA VACCINE
BASED ON FOWL
PLAGUE VIRUSES

WAGNER RALF (DE);
KLENK HANS‐DIETER (DE)

MEDIMMUNE VACCINES
INC (US); VIRONOVATIVE
BV (NL); FOUCHIER
RONALDUS ADRIANUS
MAR (NL); VAN DEN
HOOGEN BERNADETTA
GERA (NL); OSTERHAUS
ALBERTUS DOMINICUS M
(NL); HALLER AURELIA
(US); TANG RODERICK
(US)
PHILIPPS UNI MARBURG
(DE); WAGNER RALF (DE);
KLENK HANS‐DIETER
(DE)

WO2005107797

Publication date: 2005‐11‐
17

INFLUENZA VIRUS
VACCINES

PODDA AUDINO (IT);
POPOVA OLGA (IT);
PICCENETTI FRANCESCA
(IT)

WO2005113756

Publication date: 2005‐12‐
01

METHOD

HANON EMMANUEL (BE);
NEUMEIER ELISABETH
(DE); NOZAY FLORENCE
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2005‐

CHIRON CORP (US);
PODDA AUDINO (IT);
POPOVA OLGA (IT);
PICCENETTI FRANCESCA
(IT)
GLAXOSMITHKLINE
BIOLOG SA (BE);
SAECHSISCHES

Krattiger et al.

(BE)

WO2005116258

Published: 2005‐12‐08

INFLUENZA
HEMAGGLUTININ AND
NEURAMINIDASE
VARIANS
INFLUENZA
HEMAGGLUTININ AND
NEURAMINIDASE
VARIANTS

WO2005116260

Publication date: 2005‐12‐
08

EP0366238

Publication date:
1990‐05‐02

Influenza vaccinal polypep‐
tides.

EP0366239

Publication date:
1990‐05‐02

EP1216053

Publication date:
2002‐06‐26

Purification process for
recombinant influenza pro‐
teins.
INFLUENZA VACCINE

YANG CHIN‐FEN (US);
KEMBLE GEORGE (US)

YANG CHIN‐FEN (US);
KEMBLE GEORGE (US);
SUBBARAO KANTA (US);
MURPHY BRIAN (US)

YOUNG JAMES FRANCIS;
DILLON SUSAN B; ENNIS
FRANCIS A; DEMUTH
SANDRA G
YOUNG JAMES FRANCIS;
JONES CHRISTOPHER S

SERUMWERK (DE);
HANON EMMANUEL (BE);
NEUMEIER ELISABETH
(DE); NOZAY FLORENCE
(BE)
MEDIMMUNE VACCINES
INC (US); YANG CHIN‐FEN
(US); KEMBLE GEORGE
(US)
MEDIMMUNE VACCINES
INC (US); US
GOVERNMENT (US);
YANG CHIN‐FEN (US);
KEMBLE GEORGE (US);
SUBBARAO KANTA (US);
MURPHY BRIAN (US)
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
CORP (US); ENNIS
FRANCIS A (US)
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
CORP (US)

D HONDT ERIK (BE);
HEHME NORBERT (DE)

SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
BIOLOG (BE);
SAECHSISCHES
SERUMWERK (DE)

Inventors
Pang; Gerald Toh (Newlamb‐
ton, AU); Clancy; Robert
Llewellyn (Newlambton,
AU)
de Haan; Aalzen (Weesp,
NL); Geerligs; Harmen J.
(Weesp, NL); Wilschut; Jan C.
(Weesp, NL)
Tice; Thomas R. (Birming‐
ham, AL); Gilley; Richard M.
(Birmingham, AL); Eldridge;
John H. (Birmingham, AL);
Staas; Jay K. (Birmingham,
AL)
Pang; Gerald Toh (New
South Wales, AU); Clancy;
Robert Llewellyn (New South
Wales, AU); Cripps; Allan
William (Curtin, AU);
Dunkley; Margaret Lorraine
(New South Wales, AU)
Kedar; Eliezer (Jerusalem,
IL); Babai; Ilan (Petach Tivka,
IL); Barenholz; Yechezkel
(Jerusalem, IL)
Ford; Martin James
(Beckenham, GB)

Assignee and/or Applicant
The University of Newcastle
Research Associates Limited
(AU)

Table A7. Delivery
Patent or Applica‐
tion Number
5643577

Dates
Filed: October 23,
1992Issued: July 1, 1997

Title
Oral vaccine comprising
antigen surface‐associated
with red blood cells

5756104

Filed: June 5,
1995Issued: May 26, 1998

Liposome‐containing intra‐
nasal vaccine formulation

5,853,763

Filed: June 6,
1995Issued: December 29,
1998

Method for delivering bioac‐
tive agents into and through
the mucosally‐associated
lymphoid tissue and con‐
trolling their release

5882649

Filed: January 6,
1997Issued: March 16,
1999

Oral vaccine comprising
antigen surface‐associated
with red blood cells

5919480

Filed: June 23,
1997Issued: July 6, 1999

Liposomal influenza vaccine
composition and method

5985318

Filed: March 16,
1995Issued: November
16, 1999
Filed: April 2,
1997Issued: April 11,
2000

Fusogenic liposomes that
are free of active neura‐
minidase
Vaccine compositions

6048536
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Chatfield; Steven Neville
(London, GB)

Duphar International Re‐
search B.V. (Weesp, NL)

Southern Research Institute
(Birmingham, AL); The UAB
Research Foundation (Bir‐
mingham, AL)

Flustat Pty. Ltd. (AU)

Yissum Research Develop‐
ment Company of the He‐
brew University of Jerusa‐
lem (Jerusalem, IL)
Burroughs Wellcome Co.
(Research Triangle Park, NC)
Medeva Holdings BV (Am‐
sterdam, NL)
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6,096,291

Filed: December 27,
1996Issued: August 1,
2000

Mucosal administration of
substances to mammals

20040082531

Filed: October 29,
2003Published: April 29,
2004

Dna expression vectors

20040087521

Filed: April 16,
2001Published: May 6,
2004

Nucleic acid pharmaceuti‐
cals‐influenza matrix

6824793

Filed: November 28,
2000Issued: November
30, 2004

20050009008

Filed: July 11,
2003Published: January
13, 2005
Filed: August 13,
2003Issued: March 1,
2005

Use of hyaluronic acid
polymers for mucosal deliv‐
ery of vaccine antigens and
adjuvants
Functional influenza virus‐
like particles (VLPs)

6,861,244

Inactivated influenza virus
vaccine for nasal or oral
application

20050186225

Filed: March 3,
2005Published: August 25,
2005

Adenovirus formulations

20050197308

Filed: December 20,
2004Published: September
8, 2005

Vaccines

WO2005117958

Published: 2005‐12‐15

VACCINE
COMPOSITIONS
COMPRISING VIROSOMES
AND A SAPONIN
ADJUVANT

EP0620277

Issued: 1994‐10‐19

Nucleic acid pharmaceuti‐
cals
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Betbeder; Didier (Aucam‐
ville, FR); Etienne; Alain
(Toulouse, FR); de Miguel;
Ignacio (Toulouse, FR);
Kravtzoff; Roger (Fourque‐
vaux, FR); Major; Michel
(Toulouse, FR)
Catchpole, Ian Richard; (Ste‐
venage, GB) ; Ellis, Jonathan
Henry; (Stevenage, GB) ; Ertl,
Peter Franz; (Stevenage, GB) ;
Rhodes, John Richard; (Ste‐
venage, GB)
Donnelly, John J.; (Haver‐
town, PA) ; Dwarki, Varavani
J.; (Alameda, CA) ; Liu, Mar‐
garet A.; (Rosemont, PA) ;
Montgomery, Donna L.;
(Chalfont, CA) ; Parker, Su‐
ezanne E.; (San Diego, CA) ;
Shiver, John W.; (Doyles‐
town, PA) ; Ulmer, Jeffrey B.;
(Chalfont, PA)
OʹHagan; Derek (Berkeley,
CA); Pavesio; Alessandra
(Padua, IT)
Robinson, Robin A.;
(Dickerson, MD) ; Pushko,
Peter M.; (Frederick, MD)
Barrett; Noel (Klosterneub‐
urg/Weidling, AT); Kistner;
Otfried (Vienna, AT); Ger‐
encer; Marijan (Vienna, AT);
Dorner; Friedrich (Vienna,
AT)
Evans, Robert K.; (Souderton,
PA) ; Volkin, David B.;
(Doylestown, PA) ; Isopi,
Lynne A.; (Sellersville, PA)
Dalton, Colin Cave; (Rixen‐
sart, BE) ; Easeman, Richard
Lewis; (Brentford, GB) ; Gar‐
con, Nathalie; (Rixensart, BE)
COLLER BETH‐ANN (BE);
HENDERICKX VERONIQUE
(BE); GARCON NATHALIE
MARIE‐JOSEPHE (BE

DONNELLY JOHN J (US);
MONTGOMERY DONNA L
(US); DWARKI VARAVANI
J (US); PARKER SUEZANNE
E (US); LIU MAGARET A
(US); SHIVER JOHN W (US);
ULMER JEFFREY B (US)

Biovector Therapeutics, S.A.
(Labege Cedex, FR)

SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
CORPORATION

Merck & Co., Inc.

Chiron Corporation (Emery‐
ville, CA); Fidia Advanced
Biopolymers Srl (Brindisi, IT)

Baxter Healthcare S.A. (Zu‐
rich, CH)

MERCK AND CO., INC

SmithKline Beecham
Biologicals s.a.

GLAXOSMITHKLINE
BIOLOG SA (BE); COLLER
BETH‐ANN (BE);
HENDERICKX
VERONIQUE (BE);
GARCON NATHALIE
MARIE‐JOSEPHE (BE)
MERCK & CO INC (US);
VICAL INC (US)

Krattiger et al.

B.

IP related to selected malaria vaccine approaches

Table B1. DNA ME‐TRAP Vaccine and Related Patents (PATH Affiliation)
Patent or Applica‐
tion Number
US20050025747

Dates
Published: February 3,
2005Filed:
May 27,
2004

Title
Vaccine

US20040213799

Published:
October
28, 2004Filed: October 16,
2003

Methods and reagents for
vaccination which generate
a CD8 T cell immune re‐
sponse

US20040131594

Published:
July 8,
2004Filed: September 2,
2003

Methods and reagents for
vaccination which generate
a CD8 T cell immune re‐
sponse

US20040018177

Published: January 29,
2004Filed: July 15, 2003

Vacination method

US20030138454

Published: July 24,
2003Filed: February 19,
2002

Vaccination method

US 6,663,871

Issued: December 16,
2003Filed: December 9,
1999

Methods and reagents for
vaccination which generate
a CD8 T cell immune re‐
sponse

US 5,972,351

Issued: October 26,
1999Filed: December 5,
1994

Plasmodium falciparum
MHC class I‐restricted CTL
epitopes derived from pre‐
erythrocytic stage antigens

WO9856919

Published: 1998‐12‐17

METHODS AND
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Inventors
Laidlaw, Stephen; (Wantage,
GB) ; Skinner, Mike; (Wan‐
tage, GB) ; Hill, Adrian V.S.;
(Oxford, GB) ; Gilbert, Sarah
C.; (Oxford, GB) ; Anderson,
Richard; (Headington, GB)
McMichael, Andrew; (Beck‐
ley, GB) ; Hill, Adrian V.S.;
(Old Headington, GB) ; Gil‐
bert, Sarah C.; (Headington,
GB) ; Schneider, Jorg; (Barton,
GB) ; Plebanski, Magdalena;
(Melbourne, AU) ; Hanke,
Tomas; (Old Marston, GB) ;
Smith, Geoffrey L.; (Oxford,
GB) ; Blanchard, Tom; (Banjul,
GM)
McMichael, Andrew; (Beck‐
ley, GB) ; Hill, Adrian V.S.;
(Old Headington, GB) ; Gil‐
bert, Sarah C.; (Headington,
GB) ; Schneider, Jorg; (Barton,
GB) ; Plebanski, Magdalena;
(Melbourne, AU) ; Hanke,
Tomas; (Old Marston, GB) ;
Smith, Geoffrey L.; (Oxford,
GB) ; Blanchard, Tom; (Banjul,
GM)
Hill, Adrian V.S.; (Oxford,
GB) ; McShane, Helen; (Ox‐
ford, GB) ; Gilbert, Sarah;
(Oxford, GB) ; Schneider,
Joerg; (Oxford, GB)
Hill, Adrian V. S.; (Oxford,
GB) ; McShane, Helen; (Ox‐
ford, GB) ; Gilbert, Sarah C.;
(Oxford, GB) ; Reece, William;
(Newtown, AU) ; Schneider,
Joerg; (Barton, GB)
McMichael; Andrew (Beckley,
GB); Hill; Adrian V. S. (Old
Headington, GB); Gilbert;
Sarah C. (Headington, GB);
Schneider; Jorg (Barton, GB);
Plebanski; Magdalena (Mel‐
bourne, AU); Hanke; Tomas
(Old Marston, GB); Smith;
Geoffrey L. (Oxford, GB);
Blanchard; Tom (Banjul, ZA)
Hill; Adrian Vivian Sinton
(Oxford, GB); Gotch; Frances
Margaret (Oxford, GB); Elvin;
John (Oxford, GB);
McMichael; Andrew James
(Horton‐cum‐Studley, GB);
Whittle; Hilton Carter (The
Gambia, GB
MCMICHAEL ANDREW

Assignee and/or Applicant
Isis Innovation Ltd.

Oxxon Pharmaccines Lim‐
ited

Oxxon Pharmaccines, Ltd.

Oxxon Pharmaccines Ltd.
(Oxford, GB)

Isis Innovation Limited
(Oxford, GB)

ISIS INNOVATION (GB);
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REAGENTS FOR
VACCINATION WHICH
GENERATE A CD8 T CELL
IMMUNE RESPONSE

JAMES (GB); HILL ADRIAN
VIVIAN SINTON (GB);
GILBERT SARAH
CATHERINE (GB);
SCHNEIDER JOERG (GB);
PLEBANSKI MAGDALENA
(GB); HANKE TOMAS (GB);
SMITH GEOFFREY LILLEY
(GB); BLANCHARD TOM
(GM)
MCMICHAEL ANDREW
JAMES (GB); PLEBANSKI
MAGDALENA (AU);
BLANCHARD TOM (GB);
HANKE TOMAS (GB);
SCHNEIDER JOERG (GB);
GILBERT SARAH
CATHERINE (GB); HILL
ADRIAN VIVIAN SINTON
(GB); SMITH GEOFFREY
LILLEY (GB)
SCHNEIDER JOERG (GB);
GILBERT SARAH
CATHERINE (GB);
HANNAN CAROLYN
MARY (AU); HILL ADRIAN
VIVIAN SINTON (GB)
MCMICHAEL ANDREW
JAMES (GB); PLEBANSKI
MAGDALENA (AU);
BLANCHARD TOM (GB);
HANKE TOMAS (GB);
SCHNEIDER JOERG (GB);
GILBERT SARAH
CATHERINE (GB); HILL
ADRIAN VIVIAN SINTON
(GB); SMITH GEOFFREY
LILLEY (GB)
MCMICHAEL ANDREW
JAMES (GB); HILL ADRIAN
VIVIAN SINTON (GB);
GILBERT SARAH
CATHERINE (GB);
SCHNEIDER JOERG (GB);
PLEBANSKI MAGDALENA
(GB); HANKE TOMAS (GB);
SMITH GEOFFREY LILLEY
(GB); BLANCHARD TOM
(GM)
SCHNEIDER JOERG (GB);
GILBERT SARAH
CATHERINE (GB);
HANNAN CAROLYN
MARY (GB); HILL ADRIAN
VIVIAN SINTON (GB)

EP1616954

Published: 2006‐01‐18

Methods and reagents for
vaccination which generate
a CD8 T cell immune re‐
sponse

EP1612269

Published: 2006‐01‐04

Use of replication‐deficient
adenoviral vector to boost
CD8+ T cell immune re‐
sponse to antigen

EP1589108

Published: 2005‐10‐26

Methods and reagents for
vaccination which generate
a CD8 T cell immune re‐
sponse

EP1335023

Published: 2003‐08‐13

Methods and reagents for
vaccination which generate
a CD8 T cell immune re‐
sponse

EP1214416

Published: 2002‐06‐19

EP0979284

Published: 2000‐02‐16

USE OF REPLICATION‐
DEFICIENT
ADENOVIRAL VECTOR
IN THE MANUFACTURE
OF A MEDICAMENT TO
BOOST CD8+ T CELL
IMMUNE RESPONSE TO
ANTIGEN
METHODS AND
REAGENTS FOR
VACCINATION WHICH
GENERATE A CD8 T CELL
IMMUNE RESPONSE
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MCMICHAEL ANDREW
JAMES (GB); HILL ADRIAN
VIVIAN SINTON (GB);
GILBERT SARAH
CATHERINE (GB);
SCHNEIDER JOERG (GB);

MCMICHAEL ANDREW
JAMES (GB); HILL ADRIAN
VIVIAN SINTON (GB);
GILBERT SARAH
CATHERINE (GB);
SCHNEIDER JOERG (GB);
PLEBANSKI MAGDALENA
(GB); HANKE TOMAS (GB);
SMITH GEOFFREY LILLEY
(GB); BLANCHARD TOM
(GM)
OXXON THERAPEUTICS
LTD (GB)

ISIS INNOVATION (GB)

OXXON THERAPEUTICS
LTD (GB)

OXXON PHARMACCINES
LTD (GB)

ISIS INNOVATION (GB)

OXXON PHARMACCINES
LIMITED (GB)

Krattiger et al.

EP0753009

Published: 1997‐01‐15

MALARIA PEPTIDES

EP0633894

Published: 1995‐01‐18

PEPTIDES OF AN
ANTIGEN, CAPABLE OF
RECOGNITION BY OR
INDUCTION OF
CYTOTOXIC T
LYMPHOCYTES, AND
METHOD OF THEIR
IDENTIFICATION.

PLEBANSKI MAGDALENA
(GB); HANKE TOMAS (GB);
SMITH GEOFFREY LILLEY
(GB); BLANCHARD TOM
(GM)
HILL ADRIAN VIVIAN
SINTON (GB); AIDOO
MICHAEL (GB); ALLSOPP
CATHERINE ELIZABETH
MA (GB); LALVANI AJIT
(GB); PLEBANSKI
MAGDALENA (GB);
WHITTLE HILTON CARTER
(GM)
HILL ADRIAN VIVIAN
SINTON (GB); GOTCH
FRANCES MARGARET (GB);
ELVIN JOHN (GB);
MCMICHAEL ANDREW
JAMES (GB); WHITTLE
HILTON CARTER MEDICAL
(GM)

ISIS INNOVATION (GB)

ISIS INNOVATION (GB)

Table B2. Recombinant Circumsporozoite Protein Vaccine (RTS,S) and Related Patents
(PATH Affiliation)
Patent or Applica‐
tion Number
US20050002958

Dates
Published: January 6,
2005Filed: February 27,
2004

Title
Vaccines

US20050197308

Published: September 8,
2005Filed:
Decem‐
ber 20, 2004

Vaccines

US 20050054726

Published: March 10,
2005Filed: October 11,
2004
Published: June 30,
2005Filed: September 9,
2004
Published: September 22,
2005Filed:
August
30, 2004
Published: February 17,
2005Filed: June 14, 2004
Published: April 29,
2004Filed:
October
29, 2003

Vaccine

Published: April 8,
2004Filed: October 24,
2003
Published: July 8,
2004Filed: October 8, 2003
Published: March 11,
2004Filed: September 30,
2003

Immunogenic compositions
comprising liver stage malar‐
ial antigens
Vaccine delivery device

US 20050143284

US 20050208068

US 20050038239
US 20040082531

US 20040067236

US 20040133160
US 20040047869
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Vaccination

Malaria immunogen and
vaccine
Novel compositions
Dna expression vectors

Adjuvant composition com‐
prising an immunostimula‐
tory oligonucleotide and a
tocol

Inventors
Cohen, Joseph; (Rixensart,
BE) ; Garcon, Nathalie; (Rix‐
ensart, BE) ; Voss, Gerald;
(Rixensart, BE)
Dalton, Colin Cave; (Rixen‐
sart, BE) ; Easeman, Richard
Lewis; (Brentford, GB) ;
Garcon, Nathalie; (Rixensart,
BE)
Thomsen, Lindy Louise;
(Stevenage, GB)
Thomsen, Lindy Louise;
(Stevenage, GB) ; Tite, John
Philip; (Stevenage, GB)
Milich, David R.;
(Escondido, CA) ; Birkett,
Ashley; (Escondido, CA)
Catchpole, Ian; (Stevenage,
Hertfordshire, GB)
Catchpole, Ian Richard;
(Stevenage, GB) ; Ellis, Jona‐
than Henry; (Stevenage, GB)
; Ertl, Peter Franz; (Steve‐
nage, GB) ; Rhodes, John
Richard; (Stevenage, GB)
Cohen, Joe; (Rixensart, BE) ;
Druilhe, Pierre; (Paris, FR)
Dalton, Colin Clive; (Rixen‐
sart, BE)
Garcon, Nathalie; (Rixensart,
BE) ; Gerard, Catherine
Marie Ghislaine; (Rixensart,
BE) ; Stephenne, Jean; (Rix‐

Assignee and/or Applicant
SmithKline Beecham
Biologicals SA

SmithKline Beecham
Biologicals s.a.

SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
CORPORATION
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
CORPORATION

SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
CORPORATION
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
CORPORATION

SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
CORPORATION
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
CORPORATION
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
CORPORATION
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US 20040076633

Published: April 22,
2004Filed: September 23,
2003

Use of immidazoquinoli‐
namines as adjuvants in dna
vaccination

US 20040043038

Published: March 4,
2004Filed: September 3,
2003

Vaccines

US 20040049150

Published: March 11,
2004Filed: August 12,
2003

Vaccines

US 20040013695

Published: January 22,
2004Filed: August 4, 2003
Published: January 22,
2004Filed: July 3, 2003

Oral solid dose vaccine

US 20040013688

US20030133944

US20020172692

US 20030054337

US 20020058047

Published: July 17,
2003Filed:
Novem‐
ber 18, 2002
Published: November 21,
2002Filed: December 18,
2001
Published: March 20,
2003Filed: August 15,
2001
Published: May 16,
2002Filed: April 24, 2000

Vaccines to induce mucosal
immunity

Vaccine composition against
malaria
Vaccine composition against
malaria

Cohen, Joseph; (Ixelles, BE)

Malaria immunogen and
vaccine

Birkett, Ashley J.; (Escon‐
dido, CA)

VACCINES

GARCON, NATHALIE;
(WAVRE, BE) ; MOMIN,
PATRICIA MARIE
CHRISTINE ALINE
FRANCOISE; (BRUSSELLS,
BE)
Garcon; Nathalie (Wavre,
BE); Momin; Patricia Marie
Christine Aline Francoise
(Brussells, BE)
Momin; Patricia Marie
(Brussels, BE); Garcon; Na‐
thalie Marie‐Josephe (Wavre,
BE)
Friede; Martin (Court St
Etienne, BE); Hermand;
Philippe (Court St Etienne,
BE)
De Wilde; Michel (Glabais,
BE); Cohen; Joseph (Brussels,
BE)
De Wilde; Michel (Glabais,
BE); Cohen; Joseph (Brussels,
BE)
Momin; Patricia Marie
(Brussels, BE); Garcon; Na‐
thalie Marie‐Josephe (Wavre,
BE)
Prieels; John Paul (Brussels,
BE); Garcon‐Johnson; Natha‐
lie Marie‐Josephe Claude

US 6,372,227

Issued: April 16,
2002Filed: April 24, 2000

Vaccines

US 6,623,739

Issued: September 23,
2003Filed: February 24,
2000

Vaccines

US 6,558,670

Issued: May 6, 2003Filed:
April 29, 1999

Vaccine adjuvants

US 6,169,171

Issued: January 2,
2001Filed: September 18,
1997
Issued: July 27, 1999Filed:
December 4, 1996

Hybrid protein between CS
from plasmodium and
HBSAG
Hybrid protein between CS
from plasmodium and
HBsAg
Vaccines

US 5,928,902

US 6,146,632

Issued: November 14,
2000Filed: July 2, 1996

US 5,750,110

Issued: May 12, 1998Filed:
February 17, 1995
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ensart, BE)
Thomsen, Lindy Loise;
(Hertfordshire, GB) ; Tite,
John Philip; (Stevenage, GB)
; Topley, Peter; (Hertford‐
shire, GB)
Momin, Patricia Marie;
(Brussels, BE) ; Garcon, Na‐
thalie Marie‐Josephe; (Wa‐
vre, BE)
Dalton, Colin Cave; (Rixen‐
sart, BE) ; Easeman, Richard
Lewis; (Brentford, GB) ;
Garcon, Nathalie; (Rixensart,
BE)
Vande‐Velde, Vincent; (Rix‐
ensart, BE)
Wise, Donald L.; (Belmont,
MA) ; Trantolo, Debra J.;
(Princeton, MA) ; Hile,
David D.; (Medford, MA) ;
Doherty, Stephen A.; (New‐
market, NH)
Cohen, Joseph; (Ixelles, BE)

Vaccine composition contain‐
ing adjuvants

SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
CORPORATION

SmithKline Beecham
Biologicals S.A.

SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
CORPORATION

SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
CORPORATION
Cambridge Scientific, Inc.

SmithKline Beecham
Biologicals s.a.
SmithKline Beecham
Biologicals s.a.

SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
CORPORATION

SmithKline Beecham
Biologicals, s.a. (Rixensart,
BE)
SmithKline Beecham
Biologicals s.a. (Rixensart,
BE)
SmithKline Beechman
Biologicals s.a. (Rixensart,
BE)
SmithKline Beecham
Biologicals (s.a.) (Rixensart,
BE)
SmithKline Beecham
Biologicals (s.a.) (Rixensart,
BE)
SmithKline Beecham
Biologicals s.a. (Rixensart,
BE)
SmithKline Beecham
Biologicals, s.a (GB2)

Krattiger et al.

(Wavre, BE); Slaoui; Moncef
(Rixensart, BE); Pala; Pietro
(Rixensart, BE)
Brey, III; Robert N. (Roches‐
ter, NY); Majarian; William
R. (Pittsford, NY); Pillai;
Subramonia (Rochester, NY);
Hockmeyer; Wayne T. (Pitts‐
ford, NY)
CHOMEZ PATRICK (BE);
COLLIGNON CATHERINE
PASCALINE (BE); VAN
MECHELEN MARCELLE
PAULETTE (BE)

US 5,112,749

Issued: May 12, 1992Filed:
October 2, 1987

Vaccines for the malaria
circumsporozoite protein

WO2005112991

Published: 2005‐12‐01

VACCINES

WO2005049079

Published: 2005‐06‐02

WO2005039634

Published: 2005‐05‐06

VISCOUS, NON‐
POLYMORPHIC, NON‐
WATER SOLUBLE LIQUID
ADJUVANTS
VACCINE COMPOSITIONS
COMPRISING AN
INTERLEUKIN 18 AND
SAPONIN ADJUVANT
SYSTEM

WO2005025614

Published: 2005‐03‐24

IMPROVEMENTS IN
VACCINATION

BEMBRIDGE GARY PETER
(GB); CRAIGEN JENNIFER
L (GB)

WO2004016241

Published: 2004‐02‐26

ANTIGENIC
COMPOSITIONS

VANDERVELDE VINCENT
(BE)

WO9805355

Published: 2002‐04‐21

WO9952549

Published: 1999‐10‐21

VACCINE COMPOSITION
AGAINST MALARIA
ADJUVANT
COMPOSITIONS

FRIEDE MARTIN (BE);
HERMAND PHILIPPE (BE)

WO9911241

Published: 1999‐03‐11

OIL IN WATER
EMULSIONS CONTAINING
SAPONINS

GARCON NATHALIE (BE);
MOMIN PATRICIA MARIE
CHRISTINE (BE)

WO9856414

Published: 1998‐12‐17

OIL IN WATER VACCINE
COMPOSITIONS

GARCON NATHALIE (BE);
MOMIN PATRICIA MARIE
CHRISTINE (BE)

WO9310152

Published: 1993‐05‐27

DE WILDE MICHEL (BE);
COHEN JOSEPH (BE)

EP1327451

Published: 2003‐07‐16

HYBRID PROTEIN
BETWEEN CS FROM
PLASMODIUM AND
HBsAG
Adjuvants for vaccines

EP1201250

Published: 2002‐05‐02
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Immunogenic compositions
comprising liver stage malar‐
ial antigens

LONGACRE SHIRLEY (FR)

BRUCK CLAUDINE
ELVIRE MARIE (US);
GERARD CATHERINE
MARIE GHISLAI (BE);
JONAK ZDENKA
LUDMILA (US)

MOMIN PATRICIA MARIE
(BE); GARCON NATHALIE
MARIE‐JOSEPHE (BE)
COHEN JOE (BE);
DRUILHE PIERRE (FR)

Praxis Biologics, Inc. (Roch‐
ester, NY)

GLAXOSMITHKLINE
BIOLOG SA (BE); CHOMEZ
PATRICK (BE);
COLLIGNON CATHERINE
PASCALINE (BE); VAN
MECHELEN MARCELLE
PAULETTE (BE)
PASTEUR INSTITUT (FR);
CENTRE NAT RECH
SCIENT (FR); LONGACRE
SHIRLEY (FR)
GLAXOSMITHKLINE
BIOLOG SA (BE);
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
CORP (US); BRUCK
CLAUDINE ELVIRE
MARIE (US); GERARD
CATHERINE MARIE
GHISLAI (BE); JONAK
ZDENKA LUDMILA (US)
GLAXO GROUP LTD (GB);
BEMBRIDGE GARY PETER
(GB); CRAIGEN JENNIFER
L (GB)
GLAXOSMITHKLINE
BIOLOG SA (BE);
VANDERVELDE VINCENT
(BE)
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
BIOLOG (BE)
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
BIOLOG (BE); FRIEDE
MARTIN (BE); HERMAND
PHILIPPE (BE)
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
BIOLOG (BE); GARCON
NATHALIE (BE); MOMIN
PATRICIA MARIE
CHRISTINE (BE)
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
BIOLOG (BE); GARCON
NATHALIE (BE); MOMIN
PATRICIA MARIE
CHRISTINE (BE)
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
BIOLOG (BE)

GLAXOSMITHKLINE
BIOLOG SA (BE)
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
BIOLOG (BE); PASTEUR
INSTITUT (FR)
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EP1198243

Published: 2002‐04‐24

EP0957933

Published: 1999‐11‐24

EP0735898

Published: 1996‐10‐09

EP0614465

Published: 1994‐09‐14

JP7501213T

Published: 1995‐02‐09

USE OF CPG AS AN
ADJUVANT FOR MALARIA
VACCINE
VACCINE COMPOSITION
AGAINST MALARIA
VACCINES
HYBRID PROTEIN
BETWEEN CS FROM
PLASMODIUM AND
HBsAG.
HYBRID PROTEIN
BETWEEN CS FROM
PLASMODIUM AND
HBsAG

COHEN JOSEPH (BE);
GARCON NATHALIE (BE);
VOSS GERALD (BE)
COHEN JOSEPH (BE)
MOMIN P M (BE);
GARCON N MARIE‐J (BE)
DE WILDE MICHEL (BE);
COHEN JOSEPH
SMITHKLINE BEECHA (BE)

SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
BIOLOG (BE)
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
BIOLOG (BE)
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
BIOLOG (BE)
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
BIOLOG (BE)

Table B3. Radiation Attenuated P. falciparum Sporozoite Vaccine and Related Patents
Patent or Applica‐
tion Number
US 20050220822

Dates

Title

Inventors

Published: October 6,
2005Filed: May 20, 2005

Methods for the prevention
of malaria

US 20050208078

Published: September 22,
2005Filed: April 22, 2005

Methods for the prevention
of malaria

WO2004045559

Published: 2004‐06‐03

WO0025728

Published: 2000‐05‐11

EP1563301

Published: 2005‐08‐17

EP0600884

Published: 1992‐12‐30

METHOD FOR THE
PREVENTION OF
MALARIA
CHROMOSOME 2
SEQUENCE OF THE
HUMAN MALARIA
PARASITE PLASMODIUM
FALCIPARUM AND
PROTEINS OF SAID
CHROMOSOME USEFUL
IN ANTI‐MALARIAL
VACCINES AND
DIAGNOSTIC REAGENTS
METHOD FOR THE
PREVENTION OF
MALARIA
PROTECTIVE FOUR
AMINO ACID EPITOPE
AGAINST ‐i(PLASMODIUM
VIVAX) MALARIA.

Hoffman, Stephen L.;
(Gaithersburg, MD) ;
Luke, Thomas C.; (Brook‐
ville, MD)
Hoffman, Stephen L.;
(Gaithersburg, MD) ;
Luke, Thomas C.; (Brook‐
ville, MD)
HOFFMAN STEPHEN L
(US); LUKE THOMAS C
(US)
HOFFMAN STEPHEN
(US); CARUCCI DANIEL
(US); GARDNER
MALCOLM (US);
VENTER J CRAIG (US)

HOFFMAN STEPHEN L
(US); LUKE THOMAS C
(US)
HOFFMAN STEPHEN L
(US); CHAROENVIT
YUPIN (US); JONES
TREVOR R (US)

Assignee and/or Applicant

HOFFMAN STEPHEN L
(US); LUKE THOMAS C (US)
HOFFMAN STEPHEN (US);
CARUCCI DANIEL (US);
GARDNER MALCOLM (US);
VENTER J CRAIG (US)

SANARIA INC (US)

US NAVY (US)

Table B4. Glycosyl‐Phosphatidyl Inositol (GPI) Based Vaccine and Related Patents
Patent or Applica‐
tion Number
US 6,958,235

US 6,113,917
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Dates
Issued: October 25,
2005Filed: February 14,
1997

Title
Recombinant protein con‐
taining a C‐terminal frag‐
ment of plasmodium MSP‐1

Issued: September 5,
2000Filed: April 25, 1995

Modified polypeptides for
enhanced immunogenicity

Inventors
Longacre‐Andre; Shirley
(Paris, FR); Roth; Charles
(Rueil‐Malmaison, FR);
Nato; Faridabano (Antony,
FR); Barnwell; John W.
(New York, NY); Mendis;
Kamini (Columbo, LK)
Fasel; Nicolas Joseph (Epal‐
inges, CH); Reymond;
Christophe Dominique
(Prilly, CH)

Assignee and/or Applicant
Institute Pasteur (Paris, FR);
New York University (New
York, NY)

RMF Dictagene S.A. (CH)

Krattiger et al.

WO2004005532

Published: 2004‐01‐15

SOLID‐PHASE AND
SOLUTION‐PHASE
SYNTHESIS OF
GLYCOSYLPHOSPHATIDY
LINOSITOL GLYCANS
MODIFIED POLYPEPTIDES
FOR ENHANCED
IMMUNOGENICITY

SEEBERGER PETER H
(US); HEWITT MICHAEL
C (US); SNYDER DANIEL
(US)

WO9634105

Published: 1996‐10‐31

EP0826050

Published: 1998‐03‐04

MODIFIED POLYPEPTIDES
FOR ENHANCED
IMMUNOGENICITY

EP0540719

Published: 1993‐05‐12

JP11504215T

Published: 1999‐04‐20

DICTYOSTELID
EXPRESSION VECTOR
AND METHOD FOR
EXPRESSING A DESIRED
PROTEIN.
Modified polypeptides for
enhanced immunogenicity

FASEL NICOLAS JOSEPH
(CH); REYMOND
CHRISTOPHE
DOMINIQUE (CH)
FASEL NICOLAS JOSEPH
(CH); REYMOND
CHRISTOPHE
DOMINIQUE (CH)
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FASEL NICOLAS JOSEPH
(CH); REYMOND
CHRISTOPHE
DOMINIQUE (CH)

MASSACHUSETTS INST
TECHNOLOGY (US);
SEEBERGER PETER H (US);
HEWITT MICHAEL C (US);
SNYDER DANIEL (US)
RMF DICTAGENE SA (CH);
FASEL NICOLAS JOSEPH
(CH); REYMOND
CHRISTOPHE DOMINIQUE
(CH)
RMF DICTAGENE SA (CH)

RMF DICTAGENE SA (CH);
RMF DICTAGENE SA (CH)
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C.

SARS patents related to vaccines, diagnostics and therapeutic agents

Table C1. Vaccines
Patent or Applica‐
tion Number
US20050208060

US20050069869

Dates
Published: September 22,
2005Filed: November 15,
2004
Published: March 31,
2005Filed: August 4, 2004

Title
Vaccine composition

Inventors
Haensler, Jean; (Valency,
FR)

SARS nucleic acids, pro‐
teins, antibodies, and uses
thereof

Ambrosino, Donna;
(Avon, MA) ; Hernandez,
Hector; (Canton, MA) ;
Greenough, Thomas;
(Shrewsbury, MA) ; Luzu‐
riaga, Katherine; (Har‐
vard, MA) ; Somasunda‐
ran, Mohan; (Shrewsbury,
MA) ; Babcock, Gregory J.;
(Marlborough, MA) ;
Thomas, William D. JR.;
(Somerville, MA) ; Sulli‐
van, John; (West Boylston,
MA)
Cham, Bill E.; (Queen‐
sland, AU) ; Maltais, Jo‐
Ann B.; (San Ramon, CA) ;
Bellotti, Marc; (Pleasanton,
CA)

US20050032222

Published: February 10,
2005Filed: June 21, 2004

US20050025788

Published: February 3,
2005Filed: June 4, 2004

US20050002953

Published: January 6,
2005Filed: May 4, 2004

US20050031630

Published: February 10,
2005Filed: April 2, 2004

US20040258688

Published: December 23,
2004Filed: March 12, 2004

Enhanced antigen delivery
and modulation of the
immune response there‐
from

US20050031592

Published: February 10,
2005Filed: November 13,
2003

Methods and compositions
for inducing immune re‐
sponses and protective
immunity by priming with
alpha virus replicon vac‐
cines

US20040170649

Published: September 2,
2004Filed: June 20, 2003

Method of treating and
preventing infectious dis‐
eases via creation of a
modified viral particle with
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Modified viral particles
with immunogenic proper‐
ties and reduced lipid
content useful for treating
and preventing infectious
diseases
Systemic delivery of non‐
viral vector expressing
SARS viral genomic vac‐
cine
SARS‐coronavirus virus‐
like particles and methods
of use
Novel adjuvant capable of
specifically activating the
adaptive immune response

Assignee and/or Applicant
Aventis Pasteur S.A.

Chou, George Chin‐Sheng;
(Hsin‐Shi, TW

Herold, Jens; (Puchheim,
DE)
Pizzo, Salvatore V.; (Ba‐
hama, NC) ; Hart, Justin
P.; (Durham, NC) ;
McLachlan, James B.;
(Raleigh, NC) ; Staats,
Herman F.; (Hillsborough,
NC) ; Abraham, Soman
N.; (Chapel Hill, NC)
Hawiger, Daniel; (Bran‐
ford, CT) ; Nussenzweig,
Michel; (New York, NY) ;
Steinman, Ralph M.;
(Westport, CT) ; Bonifaz,
Laura; (Del Alvaro Obre‐
gon, MX)
Doolan, Denise L.; (Rock‐
ville, MD) ; Brice, Gary L.;
(McKees Rock, PA) ; Do‐
bano‐Lazaro, Carlota;
(Barcelom, ES) ; Chulay,
Jeffrey D.; (Chapel Hill,
NC) ; Kamrud, Kurt I.;
(Apex, NC) ; Smith, Jona‐
than F.; (Cary, NC)
Cham, Bill E.; (Sheldon,
AU) ; Maltais, Jo‐Ann B.;
(San Ramon, CA)

NAVAL MEDICAL
RESEARCH CENTER

Krattiger et al.

US20040009943

Published: January 15,
2004Filed: May 12, 2003

US20040006001

Published: January 8,
2004Filed: May 12, 2003

US20040013641

Published: January 22,
2004Filed: April 18, 2003
Published: April 15,
2004Filed: April 14, 2003

US20040071709

immunogenic properties
Pathogen vaccines and
methods for using the
same

Ferritin fusion proteins for
use in vaccines and other
applications
Disease prevention by
reactivation of the thymus
Corona‐virus‐like particles
comprising functionally
deleted genomes

WO2005120565

Publication: 2005‐12‐22

WO2005117965

Publication: 2005‐12‐15

WO2005117960

Publication: 2005‐12‐15

SARS DNA VACCINE
AND ITS PREPARING
METHOD, THE USE OF
SPIKE GENE OF
CORONAVIRUS FOR
VACCINE

WO2005118813

Publication: 2005‐12‐15

NUCLEIC ACIDS,
POLYPEPTIDES,
METHODS OF
EXPRESSION, AND
IMMUNOGENIC
COMPOSITIONS
ASSOCIATED WITH SARS
CORONA VIRUS SPIKE
PROTEIN

WO2005081716

Publication: 2005‐09‐09

WO2005072087

Publication: 2005‐08‐11

DNA VACCINES
TARGETING ANTIGENS
OF THE SEVERE ACUTE
RESPIRATORY
SYNDROME
CORONAVIRUS (SARS‐
CoV)
SYSTEM AND METHODS
FOR NUCLEIC ACID
AND POLYPEPTIDE
SELECTION
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SARS VACCINES AND
METHODS TO PRODUCE
HIGHLY POTENT
ANTIBODIES
METHODS FOR
PREPARING
IMMUNOGENIC
CONJUGATES

Semple, Sean C.; (Vancou‐
ver, CA) ; Tam, Ying Kee;
(Vancouver, CA) ; Chikh,
Ghania; (Vancouver, CA) ;
Hope, Michael J.; (Van‐
couver, CA)
Carter, Daniel C.;
(Huntsville, AL) ; Li,
Chester Q.; (Madison, AL)
Boyd, Richard; (Victoria,
AU)
Rottier, Petrus Josephus
Marie; (Groenekan, NL) ;
Bosch, Berend‐Jan;
(Utrecht, NL)
JIANG SHIBO (US); HE
YUXIAN (US); LIU
SHUWEN (CN)
SCHNEERSON RACHEL
(US); KUBLER‐KIELB
JOANNA (US);
MAJADLY FATHY (US);
LEPPLA STEPHEN H
(US); ROBBINS JOHN B
(US); LIU DARRELL T
(US); SHILOACH JOSEPH
(US)
ZENG YIXIN (CN);
HUANG WENLIN (CN);
WANG JIAN (CN); TAN
HAIDE (CN); LIU PENG
(CN); PAN ZHIGANG
(CN); FENG QISHENG
(CN); LI JIANG (CN);
HUANG LIXI (CN);
ZHANG MIAOHUA
(CN); CHEN LIZHEN
(CN
ALTMEYER RALF (CN);
NAL‐ROGIER BEATRICE
(CN); CHAN CHEMAN
(CN); KIEN FRANCOIS
(CN); KAM YIU WING
(CN); SIU YU LAM (CN);
TSE KONG SAN (CN);
STAROPOLI ISABELLE
(FR); MANUGUERRA
JEAN‐CLAUDE (FR)

WU TZYY‐CHOOU (US);
HUNG CHIEN‐FU (US);
KIM TAE WOO (KR)

WILLIAMS RICHARD B
(US)

Inex Pharmaceuticals Corpo‐
ration

Monash University

NEW YORK BLOOD CT (US);
JIANG SHIBO (US); HE
YUXIAN (US); LIU SHUWEN
(CN)
US GOVERNMENT (US);
SCHNEERSON RACHEL
(US); KUBLER‐KIELB
JOANNA (US); MAJADLY
FATHY (US); LEPPLA
STEPHEN H (US); ROBBINS
JOHN B (US); LIU DARRELL
T (US); SHILOACH JOSEPH
(US
CANCER CT SUN YAT SEN
UNIVERSI (CN); ZENG
YIXIN (CN); HUANG
WENLIN (CN); WANG JIAN
(CN); TAN HAIDE (CN); LIU
PENG (CN); PAN ZHIGANG
(CN); FENG QISHENG (CN);
LI JIANG (CN); HUANG LIXI
(CN); ZHANG MIAOHUA
(CN); CHEN LIZHEN (CN)
PASTEUR INSTITUT (FR);
HONG KONG PASTEUR RES
CT LTD (CN); ALTMEYER
RALF (CN); NAL‐ROGIER
BEATRICE (CN); CHAN
CHEMAN (CN); KIEN
FRANCOIS (CN); KAM YIU
WING (CN); SIU YU LAM
(CN); TSE KONG SAN (CN);
STAROPOLI ISABELLE (FR);
MANUGUERRA JEAN‐
CLAUDE (FR)
UNIV JOHNS HOPKINS
(US); WU TZYY‐CHOOU
(US); HUNG CHIEN‐FU (US);
KIM TAE WOO (KR)

PROTEONOVA INC (US);
WILLIAMS RICHARD B (US)
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WO2005071093

Publication: 2005‐08‐04

CHIMPANZEE
ADENOVIRUS VACCINE
CARRIERS

WO2005063801

Publication: 2005‐07‐14

CORONA‐VIRUS‐LIKE
PARTICLES COMPRISING
FUNCTIONALLY
DELETED GENOMES

WO2005056584

Publication: 2005‐06‐23

NOVEL STRAIN OF SARS‐
ASSOCIATED
CORONAVIRUS AND
APPLICATIONS
THEREOF

WO2005054473

Publication: 2005‐06‐16

WO2005049080

Publication: 2005‐06‐02

WO2005035556

Publication: 2005‐04‐21

WO2005030122

Publication: 2005‐04‐07

WO2005027963

Publication: 2005‐03‐31

GENETICALLY
MODIFIED PLANTS
COMPRISING SARS‐CoV
VIRAL NUCLEOTIDE
SEQUENCES AND
METHODS OF USE
THEREOF FOR
IMMUNIZATION
AGAINST SARS
VACCINE COMPOSITION
ADMIXED WITH AN
ALKYLPHOSPHATIDYLC
HOLINE
SARS‐CORONAVIRUS
VIRUS‐LIKE PARTICLES
AND METHODS OF USE
INACTIVATED HOST
CELL DELIVERY OF
POLYNUCLEOTIDES
ENCODING
IMMUNOGENS
METHODS AND
COMPOSITIONS FOR
THE GENERATION OF A
PROTECTIVE IMMUNE
RESPONSE AGAINTS
SARS‐CoV
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CIRILLO AGOSTINO (IT);
COLLOCA STEFANO
(IT); ERCOLE BRUNO
BRUNI (IT); MEOLA
ANNALISA (IT);
NICOSIA ALFREDO (IT);
SPORENO ELISABETTA
(IT)
ROTTIER PETRUS
JOSEPHUS MARIE (NL);
BOSCH BEREND JAN
(NL)

VAN DER WERF SYLVIE
(FR); ESCRIOU NICOLAS
(FR); CRESCENZO‐
CHAIGNE BERNADETTE
(FR); MANUGUERRA
JEAN‐CLAUDE (FR);
KUNST FRANCK (FR);
CALLENDRET BENOIT
(FR); BETTON JEAN‐
MICHEL (FR); LORIN
VALERIE (FR);
GERBAUD SYLVIE (FR);
BURGUIERE ANA
MARIA (FR); AZEBI
SALIHA (FR);
CHARNEAU PIERRE
(FR); TANGY FREDERIC
(FR); COMBREDET
CHANTAL (FR);
DELAGNEAU JEAN‐
FRANCOIS (FR);
MARTIN MONIQUE (FR)
CHYE MELEEN; LI
HONGYE;
SATHISHKUMAR
RAMALINGAM; POON
LITMAN LEO; PEIRIS
SRIYAL MALIK JOSEPH

ANGELETTI P IST
RICHERCHE BIO (IT);
CIRILLO AGOSTINO (IT);
COLLOCA STEFANO (IT);
ERCOLE BRUNO BRUNI (IT);
MEOLA ANNALISA (IT);
NICOSIA ALFREDO (IT);
SPORENO ELISABETTA (IT)
UNIVERSITEIT UTRECHT
HOLDING B (NL); UNIV
UTRECHT (NL); ROTTIER
PETRUS JOSEPHUS MARIE
(NL); BOSCH BEREND JAN
(NL)
PASTEUR INSTITUT (FR);
CENTRE NAT RECH SCIENT
(FR); UNIV PARIS 7 (FR);
VAN DER WERF SYLVIE
(FR); ESCRIOU NICOLAS
(FR); CRESCENZO‐
CHAIGNE BERNADETTE
(FR); MANUGUERRA JEAN‐
CLAUDE (FR); KUNST
FRANCK (FR);
CALLENDRET BENOIT (FR);
BETTON JEAN‐MICHEL
(FR); LORIN VALERIE (FR);
GERBAUD SYLVIE (FR);
BURGUIERE ANA MARIA
(FR); AZEBI SALIHA (FR);
CHARNEAU PIERRE (FR);
TANGY FREDERIC (FR);
COMBREDET CHANTAL
(FR); DELAGNEAU JEAN‐
FRANCOIS (FR); MARTIN
MONIQUE (FR)
UNIV HONG KONG (CN)

HAENSLER JEAN

SANOFI PASTEUR (FR)

HEROLD JENS (DE)

IGUAZU BIOSCIENCES
CORP (US); HEROLD JENS
(DE)
CHIRON CORP (US); XU
FENG (US)

XU FENG (US)

NABEL GARY J (US);
YANG ZHI‐YONG (US);
HUANG YUE (US);
KONG WING‐PUI (US)

US HEALTH (US); NABEL
GARY J (US); YANG ZHI‐
YONG (US); HUANG YUE
(US); KONG WING‐PUI (US)

Krattiger et al.

WO2005021713

Publication: 2005‐03‐10

WO2005021707

Publication: 2005‐03‐10

WO2005016247

Publication: 2005‐02‐24

WO2005016246

Publication: 2005‐02‐24

WO2005013904

Publication: 2005‐02‐17

WO2005012538

Publication: 2005‐02‐10

ACCELERATED
VACCINATION

WO2004108937

Publication: 2004‐12‐16

CELL SURFACE
EXPRESSION VECTOR OF
SARS VIRUS ANTIGEN
AND MICROORGANISMS
TRANSFORMED
THEREBY

WO2004092360

Publication: 2004‐10‐28

THE SEVERE ACUTE
RESPIRATORY
SYNDROME
CORONAVIRUS
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VECTORS EXPRESSING
SARS IMMUNOGENS,
COMPOSITIONS
CONTAINING SUCH
VECTORS OR
EXPRESSION PRODUCTS
THEREOF, METHODS
AND ESSAYS FOR
MAKING AND USING
SEVERE ACUTE
RESPIRATORY
SYNDROME DNA
VACCINE
COMPOSITIONS AND
METHODS OF USE
DNA SEQUENCES,
PEPTIDES, ANTIBODIES
AND VACCINES FOR
PREVENTION AND
TREATMENT OF SARS
MODIFIED VIRAL
PARTICLES WITH
IMMUNOGENIC
PROPERTIES AND
REDUCED LIPID
CONTENT USEFUL FOR
TREATING AND
PREVENTING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES
SARS NUCLEIC ACIDS,
PROTEINS, VACCINES,
AND USES THEREOF

ANDERSON KARL D;
HOLTZ‐CORRIS
KATHLEEN M; CHUBET
RICK; ADAMS DANIEL;
COX MANON

PROTEIN SCIENCES CORP
(US)

VILALTA ADRIAN (US);
EVANS THOMAS G (US);
QUONG MELANIE W
(US); MANTHORPE
MARSTON (US)

VICAL INC (US); VILALTA
ADRIAN (US); EVANS
THOMAS G (US); QUONG
MELANIE W (US);
MANTHORPE MARSTON
(US)
PROTEIN POTENTIAL LLC
(US); HOFFMAN STEPHEN L
(US); LIANG HONG (US);
SIM KIM LEE (US)

HOFFMAN STEPHEN L
(US); LIANG HONG (US);
SIM KIM LEE (US)

CHAM BILL E (AU);
MALTAIS JO‐ANN B
(US); BELLOTTI MARC
(US)

LIPID SCIENCES INC (US);
CHAM BILL E (AU);
MALTAIS JO‐ANN B (US);
BELLOTTI MARC (US)

LU SHAN (US); CHOU
TE‐HUI W (US); WANG
SHIXIA (US)

UNIV MASSACHUSETTS
(US); LU SHAN (US); CHOU
TE‐HUI W (US); WANG
SHIXIA (US)
US GOVERNMENT (US);
NABEL GARY J (US);
SULLIVAN NANCY J (US);
GEISBERT THOMAS W (US);
JAHRLING PETER B (US)
BIOLEADERS CORP (KR); M
D LAB (KR); BIOLEADERS
JAPAN CORP (JP); KOREA
RES INST OF BIOSCIENCE
(KR); SUNG MOON HEE
(KR); KIM CHUL JOONG
(KR); JUNG CHANG MIN
(KR); HONG SEUNG PYO
(KR); LEE JONG SU (KR);
CHOI JAE CHUL (KR); KIM
KWANG (KR); SHUNICHI
KURODA (JP); POO HA
RYOUNG (KR)
CHIRON CORP (US);
RAPPUOLI RINO (IT);
MASIGNANI VEGA (IT);
STADLER KONRAD (DE);
GREGERSEN JENS‐PETER
(DE); CHIEN DAVID (US);
HAN JANG (US); POLO
JOHN (US); WEINER AMY
(US); HOUGHTON
MICHAEL (US); SONG
HYUN CHUL (US); SEO MI
YOUNG (US); DONNELLY
JOHN J (US); KLENK HANS

NABEL GARY J (US);
SULLIVAN NANCY J
(US); GEISBERT
THOMAS W (US);
JAHRLING PETER B (US)
SUNG MOON HEE (KR);
KIM CHUL JOONG (KR);
JUNG CHANG MIN (KR);
HONG SEUNG PYO (KR);
LEE JONG SU (KR); CHOI
JAE CHUL (KR); KIM
KWANG (KR);
SHUNICHI KURODA
(JP); POO HA RYOUNG
(KR)

RAPPUOLI RINO (IT);
MASIGNANI VEGA (IT);
STADLER KONRAD
(DE); GREGERSEN JENS‐
PETER (DE); CHIEN
DAVID (US); HAN JANG
(US); POLO JOHN (US);
WEINER AMY (US);
HOUGHTON MICHAEL
(US); SONG HYUN
CHUL (US); SEO MI
YOUNG (US);
DONNELLY JOHN J (US);
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WO2004091524

Publication: 2004‐10‐28

RESPIRATORY VIRUS
VACCINES

WO2004085633

Publication: 2004‐10‐07

A NOVEL HUMAN
VIRUS CAUSING SEVERE
ACUTE RESPIRATORY
SYNDROME (SARS) AND
USES THEREOF

WO2004064759

Publication: 2004‐08‐05

WO2004060308

Publication: 2004‐07‐22

USE OF TRYPTANTHRIN
COMPOUNDS FOR
IMMUNE
POTENTIATION
THIOSEMICARBAZONES
AS ANTI‐VIRALS AND
IMMUNOPOTENTIATOR
S

WO2004005493

Publication: 2004‐01‐15

ANIMAL PROTEIN FREE
MEDIA FOR
CULTIVATION OF CELLS

EP1571204

Publication: 2005‐09‐07

EP1553169

Publication: 2005‐07‐13

EP1526175

Publication: 2005‐04‐27

EP1508615

Publication: 2005‐02‐23

FR2862981

Publication: 2005‐06‐03

Leukocyte stimulation
matrix
Coronavirus, nucleic acid,
protein, and methods for
the generation of vaccine,
medicaments and diagnos‐
tics
Coronavirus, nucleic acid,
protein and methods for
the generation of vaccine,
medicaments and diagnos‐
tics
Coronavirus, nucleic acid,
protein, and methods for
the generation of vaccine,
medicaments and diagnos‐
tics
New isolated and purified
strain of coronavirus asso‐
ciated with severe acute
respiratory syndrome,
useful for preparing diag‐
nostic reagents and vac‐
cines, also derived pro‐
teins, nucleic acids and
antibodies
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KLENK HANS DIETER
(DE); VALIANTE
NICHOLAS (US
MONATH THOMAS P
(US); KLEANTHOUS
HAROLD (US)
CHAN KWOKHUNG;
GUAN YI; NICHOLLS
JOHN MALCOLM;
PEIRIS JOSEPH SRIYAL
MALIK; POON LITMAN;
YUEN KWOKYUNG;
LEUNG FREDERICK C
VALIANTE NICHOLAS
(US)

DIETER (DE); VALIANTE
NICHOLAS (US)
ACAMBIS INC (US);
MONATH THOMAS P (US);
KLEANTHOUS HAROLD
(US)
UNIV HONG KONG (CN)

CHIRON CORP (US);
VALIANTE NICHOLAS (US)

BARSANTI PAUL (US);
BRAMMEIER NATHAN
(US); DIEBES ANTHONY
(US); LAGNITON LIANA
(US); NG SIMON (US); NI
ZHI‐JIE (US); PFISTER
KEITH B (US); PHILBIN
CASEY (US); VALIANTE
NICHOLAS (US); WANG
WEIBO (US); WEINER
AMY (US)
REITER MANFRED;
MUNDT WOLFGANG;
GRILLBERGER
LEOPOLD; KRAUS
BARBARA
SCHOLZ MARTIN DR
(DE)
VAN DER HOEK
CORNELIA (NL)

CHIRON CORP (US);
BARSANTI PAUL (US);
BRAMMEIER NATHAN (US);
DIEBES ANTHONY (US);
LAGNITON LIANA (US); NG
SIMON (US); NI ZHI‐JIE (US);
PFISTER KEITH B (US);
PHILWAGMAN ALLAN
(US); WANG WEIBO (US);
WEINER AMY (US)

VAN DER HOEK
CORNELIA (NL)

AMSTERDAM INST OF
VIRAL GENOMI (NL)

VAN DER HOEK
CORNELIA (NL)

AMSTERDAM INST OF
VIRAL GENOMI (NL)

VAN DER WERF SYLVIE;
ESCRIOU NICOLAS;
CRESCENZO CHAIGNE
BERNADETTE;
MANUGUERRA JEAN
CLAUDE; KUNST
FRANCK; CALLENDRET
BENOIT; BETTON JEAN
MICHEL; LORIN
VALERIE; GERBAUD
SYLVIE; BURGUIERE
ANA MARIA

PASTEUR INSTITUT (FR);
CENTRE NAT RECH SCIENT
(FR)

BAXTER INT (US); BAXTER
HEALTHCARE SA (CH)

LEUKOCARE GMBH (DE)
AMSTERDAM INST OF
VIRAL GENOMI (NL)

Krattiger et al.

Table C2 : Diagnostics
Patent or Applica‐
tion Number
US20050214748

Dates
Published: September 29,
2005Filed: November 8, 2004

Title
Peptide‐based diagnostic
reagents for SARS

US20050112559

Published: May 26,
2005Filed: September 29,
2004

Compositions and meth‐
ods for diagnosing and
preventing severe acute
respiratory syndrome
(SARS)

US20050106563

Published: May 19, 2005
Filed: September 8, 2004

Epitope profiles of SARS
coronavirus

US20060003340

Published: January 5,
2006Filed: August 13, 2004

US20050095618

Published: May 5, 2005Filed:
July 28, 2004

Multi‐allelic molecular
detection of SARS‐
associated coronavirus
Compositions and meth‐
ods for diagnosing and
treating severe acute
respiratory syndrome
(SARS)

US20050112554

Published: May 26,
2005Filed: July 9, 2004

Characterization of the
earliest stages of the se‐
vere acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) virus
and uses thereof

US20050039220

Published: February 17,
2005Filed: May 27, 2004

Imageable animal model
of SARS infection

US20050136395

Published: June 23,
2005Filed: May 10, 2004

Method for genetic analy‐
sis of SARS virus

US20050142536

Published:
June 30,
2005Filed: April 30, 2004

Method and kit for the
detection of a novel
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Inventors
Wang, Chang Yi; (Cold
Spring Harbor, NY) ;
Fang, Xinde; (Fresh
Meadows, NY) ; Chang,
Tseng Yuan; (West Islip,
NY) ; Liu, Scott; (Lake
Grove, NY) ; Lynn,
Shugene; (Taoyuan, TW) ;
Sia, Charles; (North York,
CA
Leung, Tze Ming Danny;
(Ma On Shan, HK) ; Tam,
Chi Hang Frankie;
(Shatin, HK) ; Ma, Chun
Hung; (Siu Sai Wan, HK) ;
Lim, Pak Leong; (Ma On
Shan, HK) ; Chan, Kay
Sheung Paul; (North
Point, HK)
Huang, Jen‐Pin; (Sindian
City, TW) ; Chen, Lee‐
Hsuan; (Taipei City, TW)
Kostrikis; Leondios G.;
(Limassol, CY)
Tsui, Kwok Wing; (Ma On
Shan, HK) ; Fung, Kwok
Pui; (Shatin, HK) ; Waye,
Mary Miu Yee; (Shatin,
HK) ; Lo, Yuk Ming Den‐
nis; (Kowloon, HK) ;
Chim, Siu Chung Stephen;
(Wan Chai, HK) ; Chiu,
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A growing number of voices are raising concerns
about the impact on biomedical innovation of frag‐
mented intellectual property rights. Although sys‐
tematic analysis is lacking, there is anecdotal evi‐
dence of fragmented patent landscapes—including
in such highly significant public health cases as ma‐
laria vaccine development. It has often been sug‐
gested that patent pools (agreements where patent
holders agree to license their IP as a package) could
help to solve this problem. The rationale for patent
pools is simple: by reducing the number of neces‐
sary transactions and by simplifying patent land‐
scapes, they can reduce transaction costs and facili‐
tate technology transfers. Yet, despite this potential
and the success of patent pools in other sectors (no‐
tably consumer electronics), they remain largely
untested in biotechnology. In this paper, we seek to
explain this fact and to evaluate the future pros‐
pects for the use of patent pools in biotechnology.
As patent pools are horizontal agreements be‐
tween patent holders, they can be anticompetitive
and are regulated by competition authorities. De‐
spite a more favourable outlook from these authori‐
ties, the biotechnology industry still believes that
patent pools are an antitrust litigation risk. In both
the United States and Europe the key antitrust re‐
quirement is that all patents included in the pool
should be essential. The consumers electronics

pools fulfilled this requirement by showing that
they included only patents necessary for compli‐
ance with the technical standard which under‐
pinned the pool (such as MPEG and DVDs). The
lack of standards and long product development
cycles in biotechnology make it difficult to show
that pooled patents are complementary. Hence, the
current antitrust requirements are an important
obstacle to the formation of patent pools in biotech‐
nology.
A second suggested explanation emphasizes
other ways of dealing with fragmented patent land‐
scapes—cross‐licensing and aggregations of rights
by one party through exclusive licenses. In biotech‐
nology exclusive use is often more profitable than
licensing so that industry will tend to prefer these
alternatives to patent pools. Note also that the im‐
portant patent portfolios held by universities and
specialized research firms imply that more patents
are available for exclusive licenses, which facilitates
aggregation of rights by one party.
The above considerations lead us to be relatively
pessimistic about the prospects for biotechnology
patent pools in the present regulatory and industrial
context. The usefulness of institutions to facilitate
transactions in the market for technology neverthe‐
less suggests that patent pools may have a role to
play in biotechnology in the future.
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What is a Patent Pool?
A growing number of voices are raising concerns
about the impact on biomedical innovation of frag‐
mented intellectual property rights. Although sys‐
tematic analysis is lacking, there is anecdotal evi‐
dence of fragmented patent landscapes—including in
such highly significant public health cases as malaria
vaccine development. It has often been suggested (for
example, UPSTO 2000, FTC 2002, OECD 2002, WHO
2005, WHO 20061) that patent pools (agreements
where patent holders agree to license their IP as a
package) could help to solve this problem. The ra‐
tionale for patent pools is simple: by reducing the
number of necessary transactions and by simplifying
patent landscapes, they can reduce transaction costs
and facilitate technology transfers. Yet, despite this
potential and the success of patent pools in other sec‐
tors (notably consumer electronics), they remain
largely untested in biotechnology.

Definition
Throughout this paper we use the following defini‐
tion from the European Commission’s guidelines on
technology transfer agreements (European Commis‐
sion, 2004, hereafter “EC guidelines”):
“The notion of technology pools covers agreements
whereby two or more parties agree to pool their re‐
spective technologies and license them as a package.”
It is useful to emphasize some differences be‐
tween patent/technology pools as defined above and
other ways of aggregating IP that have sometimes
been associated with patent pools.
Focusing on reciprocal access to IP rights, cross‐
licensing agreements are very common. But while a
patent pooling agreement may also include reciprocal
access to IP, it differs from a cross‐licensing agree‐
ment in that it explicitly allows for (package) licens‐
ing to third parties.
Non‐voluntary patent pools are at odds with our
definition of patent pools as agreements. One exam‐
ple is the proposal to form a non‐voluntary patent
pool for AIDS, in which holders of patents essential
to the production of antiretrovirals would be invited
to join the pool and accept capped royalties; should
they decline, compulsory licenses would be sought
(Essential Inventions, 2005).2
Patent clearing houses and single licensing authorities
share many characteristics with patent pools, al‐
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though they aim to be more comprehensive in scope,
which is problematic from the viewpoint of competi‐
tion law. Resnik (2003) proposes a single licensing
authority (which he calls a patent pool) for biotech‐
nology that would rely on voluntary participation
and operate like collective rights management asso‐
ciations for copyrighted music. Van Zimmeren et al.
(2006) discuss a royalty collection clearing house for
diagnostic testing.

Recent practice
Despite the recent surge of interest in patent pools,
they remain relatively rare. In the last decade, only
four pools have solicited and obtained business re‐
views from the U.S. Department of Justice (others
may be pending).3 These four pools (the MPEG‐2
pool, the 3G platform, and the two DVD pools) are
the best known, summarized in Table 1, and are well
documented elsewhere; nonetheless, a couple of ob‐
servations on what they have in common are worth‐
while:
• Technologies covered. All four abovementioned
pools are in the electronics/video content indus‐
try, are intimately linked to a technical standard,
and appeared during the formation of emerging
technologies that are now dominant (with the ex‐
ception of the most recent, 3G, that has not yet be‐
come mainstream).
• Membership. The pool members/licensors are usu‐
ally large vertically integrated firms (e.g., Toshiba,
Philips, Sony). Membership is open to anyone
who wants to join, and an external review process
is in place to determine whether patents consid‐
ered for inclusion in the pool are valid and essen‐
tial for the standard.
• Licensing terms. The licensing terms are typically
standard, publicly disclosed, non‐discriminatory,
fairly linear (with small up‐front fees), and open
to anyone who wants to license. The licensing
terms are designed for specific types of consumer
goods, such as an MPEG‐2 decoding product, a
DVD player, a DVD recorder, a DVD disc, etc.
So far, the modern patent pool has been closely
linked to a technical standard and is designed to fa‐
cilitate large‐scale technology licensing (with a total
of 790 patents (134 families) owned by 24 different
licensors and more than thousand licensees, the
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MPEG‐2 patent pool is an excellent example.)4 Sig‐
nificantly, the few other pools that have been formed
(IEEE 394, DVB‐T, AVC/H.264, MPEG‐4) share the
same features as those outlined above.

Table 1: The four well‐known pools in the modern era

Technology

Admi‐
nistrator

Forma‐
tion
Year

MPEG‐2
Digital
Video
Digital stan‐
dard for
video com‐
pression

MPEG
LA

1997

DVD (3C)
DVD (6C)

Philips
DVD 6C
licensing
agency

1998
1999

3G Platform
Third gen‐
eration mo‐
bile phones

3G Pat‐
ents
Limited

2001

Members
Alcatel, Canon, CIF
Licensing, Columbia
University, France
Télécom, Fujitsu,
General Instrument,
GE Technology De‐
velopment, Hitachi,
KDDI Corporation,
LG Electronics, Mat‐
sushita, Mitsubishi,
Nippon Telegraph
and Telephone Cor‐
poration, Philips,
Robert Bosch, Sam‐
sung, Sanyo Electric,
Scientific Atlanta,
Sharp, Sony, Thom‐
son Licensing, To‐
shiba, and Victor
Company of Japan.
Philips, Sony, Pioneer
Hitachi, Matsuhita,
Mistubishi Electric,
Time Warner, To‐
shiba, Victor Com‐
pany of Japan
Alcatel, Bosch, Ce‐
getel, the Electronics
and Telecommunica‐
tions Research Insti‐
tute, France Telecom,
Fujitsu, KPN, Korea
Telecom, LG Telecom,
Matsushita Electric
Industrial, Mitsubishi
Electronic Corp.,
NEC, NTT DoCoMo,
Samsung Electronics,
Siemens, SK Telecom,
Sonera, Sony, and
Telecom Italia Mobile

Sources: www.mpegla.com; www.3gpatents.com ; www.dvd6cla.com/ ;
www.licensing.philips.com/licensees/conditions/dvd/
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Other interesting types of pools
Of course, new types of pools may emerge that do
not conform to the above practices (although they
may raise fresh antitrust issues). A potential SARS
patent pool may be one example. Shortly after the
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak
in February 2003, patent applications covering se‐
quences of the genome of the SARS coronavirus were
filed by several research teams around the globe
(Simon et al., 2005).5 Some have argued that this may
result in a complex, uncertain IP situation that could
delay the development of SARS vaccines and diag‐
nostic tools (ibid.). As a result, the four parties known
to own key patent applications6 (CDC) have ex‐
pressed their willingness to form a patent pool and
enable wide access to the SARS genome (Simon et al.
2005).
But consider the differences between the SARS
patent pool and the consumer electronics pools. The
SARS patent pool will not be in an industry charac‐
terized by all‐important network effects or be closely
linked to a standard. For the moment, the licensors
are not vertically integrated firms but universities
and public institutions,7 and so there will be far fewer
licensees. Most importantly, however, the commercial
products in which the licensed technology will be
embedded do not yet exist and will be developed by
the licensees after extensive R&D efforts. Therefore,
the licensing policy of the SARS patent pool might be
quite different from other modern patent pools.
Yet another type of patent pool could emerge in
the context of research consortiums and other re‐
search collaborations. Participants could commit ex
ante to contribute patents to the pool that result
from their joint research efforts. The parties could
then use the pool to jointly manage IP and to sup‐
port the exchange of unpatented technical informa‐
tion and know‐how between the parties.8 The SNP
consortium is especially interesting in this regard. A
non‐profit foundation that has discovered 1.5 mil‐
lion SNPs,9 it has made all the related information
available to the public without IP restrictions. Fi‐
nanced by the Wellcome Trust and large pharma‐
ceutical firms—Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline, Aventis,
AstraZeneca, Novartis, Roche, Bayer, etc.—the ini‐
tiative may owe much to these corporate sponsors’
desire to undermine attempts by biotech tool com‐
panies to obtain proprietary positions on SNPs, as
Agrawal & Garlappi (2002) and Cockburn (2004)
suggest. A patent pool with low, non‐
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discriminatory licensing terms might have achieved
the same objectives while at the same time provid‐
ing some cost‐recovery through royalties.
More generally, consortia or research collabora‐
tions may find pooling attractive for collectively

managing IP rights and/or as an institutionalized
mechanism for sharing non‐patented information.
This type of patent pool, however, falls outside the
parameters of this Chapter because of its different
rationale.

The Rationale for Patent Pools in Biotechnology
The anti‐commons in biomedical research
The rationale for patent pools in biotechnology is in‐
tricately linked to a problem identified in a famous
article by Heller and Eisenberg (1998): the anti‐
commons in biomedical research. Their argument ech‐
oes earlier concerns about university patenting and
the patentability of genomic sequences. However, they
stress that the costs of patents in the early stages of
biomedical research stem not only from the standard
restrictions that patents place on use but also from the
specific problems of fragmented IP rights. They sug‐
gest that when the development of a commercial
product requires access to multiple patents, negotiat‐
ing access with different patent owners may be pro‐
hibitively difficult and costly. Too many property
rights lead to the under‐use of valuable resources,
which Heller and Eisenberg consider “the tragedy of
the anti‐commons, ” a mirror image of the tragedy of
commons (ie. the irony about patenting being an at‐
tempt to solve the tragedy of the commons but leading
to an apparent tragedy of the anti‐commons).
The strength of the anti‐commons thesis rests on
two assumptions that are very difficult to test: (1)
that developing commercial biomedical products
requires access to many different IP rights and (2)
that negotiating access with different patent owners
is prohibitively difficult and costly. On the first
point, the number of biotechnology patents has cer‐
tainly increased dramatically over the last decade,
although by itself that does not necessarily imply
greater fragmentation. Walsh et al. (2003) report
from interviews with biotechnology industry IP
practitioners that preliminary freedom to operate
searches can sometimes find hundreds of patents
relevant to a candidate product but that on closer
inspection “there may be, in a complicated case,
about 6‐12 that they have to seriously address, but
that more typically the number was zero.”
Enough anecdotal evidence exists, however, to
suggest that the fragmentation of rights in biotech‐
nology is sometimes a serious concern. One of the
well‐known cases is malaria vaccine development,
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where up to 39 families were found to be potentially
relevant to the development of a vaccine from the
protein antigen MSP‐1 protein (IPR Commission,
2002:127).

Patent pools and transaction costs
In this subsection, we discuss how patent pools may
reduce transaction costs when IP rights are frag‐
mented between several entities. Forming a patent
pool, for example, may lower costs associated with
patent mapping. Firms or other entities that are con‐
sidering whether to develop a product need to iden‐
tify what patents they need to license to get freedom
to operate. They will usually start by searching data‐
bases with keywords, which can yield hundreds of
patents. For each of these, they then need to decide
whether their products would be infringing and, if
so, whether the patent is valid. This is difficult to do
because of the inherent uncertainties over the
breadth and validity of patents.10 In other words,
identifying important patents in a technological area
can cost a lot.
The identification process described above is
very similar to the independent review used by
modern patent pools. In such reviews, an expert
evaluates the essentiality and validity of patents that
pool members want to include in the pool. This is
done not only to show regulatory authorities that the
pool is likely to integrate complementary patent
rights but also for marketing reasons, because “a
license with patents that have not been evaluated by
an outside expert will lack credibility and be difficult
to sell” (Horn, 2003). In short, potential licensees can
more surely presume that patents are valid and im‐
portant if they are included in the pool than other‐
wise, which lowers the cost of patent mapping. This
may offset the cost of the review, especially if the
number of potential licensees is large.
The patent pool also clarifies the patent landscape
by sending a signal to potential licensees that the pat‐
ents are available for licence, in principle at non‐
discriminatory rates.11 That brings us to a second type
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of transactions costs associated with bargaining over
licences and licensing terms.
Patent pools also have the obvious but important
advantage of considerably reducing the number of li‐
cences that need to be negotiated. For instance, sup‐
pose that there are m licensors and n potential licen‐
sees; if each licensee negotiates with each licensor, then
m ⋅ n licences need to be negotiated. However, if each
licensee negotiates with a pool that includes all licen‐
sors that number reduces to n licences.12 Patent pools in
electronics went even further by specifying standard
and non‐discriminatory terms and making them pub‐
licly known. These terms appear to be “take it or leave
it” offers, so not only the number of licences goes down
but the negotiations also become much simpler and
may even disappear. Still, biotechnology patent pools
will likely differ considerably from modern patent
pools—and they might not go as far in specifying li‐
cence terms in advance.

Nevertheless, it is important to realize that if licen‐
sees have lower transaction costs with a patent pool,
this is because much of the hard work has already
taken place in negotiations between pool members. In
particular, they will have agreed on a formula to split
pool revenues, which is a central element of the pool‐
ing arrangement.13 Because patent pools require some
sort of agreement between the patent owners on the
respective value of their inventions, they may encoun‐
ter the same problems (asymmetries of information,
cognitive bias, etc.) that prevent deals from being
reached in other types of technology transactions.
In summary, transaction costs with a patent pool
tend to be incurred upfront and by the licensors. Form‐
ing a pool can therefore be seen as a marketing effort
by patent holders. In addition to this important distri‐
bution effect, patent pools can also reduce total transac‐
tion costs by simplifying patent landscapes and facili‐
tating technology transactions.

The Regulatory Environment
As horizontal agreements between patent owners,
patent pools have long aroused the suspicion of com‐
petition authorities. The early history of patent pools
shows that such suspicion was sometimes war‐
ranted,14 but regulators have come to recognize that
patent pools can be pro‐competitive. An important
step in that direction was the issuance in 1995 of new
IP licensing guidelines in the US. Nevertheless, the
biotechnology industry still believes that patent pools
are a substantial antitrust litigation risk (Seide et al.
2001), a concern strengthened by the few safe har‐
bours contained in regulations for patent pools15
(Beeney, 2002; Janis, 2005) and the lack of relevant
case law. Understanding the extent to which competi‐
tion law limits the prospects for biotechnology patent
pools is important for evaluating their usefulness,16
and so we outline some key aspects of the relevant
regulations in the most important antitrust jurisdic‐
tions, the European Union and the U.S.

Regulatory Requirements in Europe
The main guidance source for applying competition
law to patent pools in Europe is the 2004 guidelines on
the application of article of the EC Treaty to technol‐
ogy transfer agreements (“EC guidelines”). The guide‐
lines recognize that patent pools may restrict competi‐
tion (EC guidelines §213) but they also acknowledge
their pro‐competitive effects, particularly by reducing
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transaction costs and by setting a limit on cumulative
royalties to avoid double marginalization (§214). The
key factor that distinguishes pro‐ and anti‐ competi‐
tive pools is the nature of the pooled technologies:
• As a general rule, the Commission considers the
inclusion of substitute technologies in a pool a
violation of article 81(1)17 (§219).
• Conversely, when the pool is composed only of
technologies that are essential (defined as having
no substitute (§216)), the creation of the pool is
considered pro‐competitive (§220).
• If the pool includes complementary but non‐
essential technologies, the agreement is likely to
be caught by Article 81(1) when the pool has a
significant position on any relevant market (§221).
Although the Guidelines develop a number of factors
for assessing technology pools of non‐essential tech‐
nologies, these apply only when technologies in the
pool become non‐essential after technological devel‐
opments (§222)—not for the formation of new pools.
Finally a number of guidelines on restraints com‐
monly found in pools are specified. For example,
when a pool has a dominant market position, royal‐
ties and other licensing terms should be fair and
non‐discriminatory and licenses should be non‐
exclusive (§226); licensors and licensees must be free
to develop competing products and standards and to
grant licenses outside the pool (§227); grant back
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obligations should be non‐exclusive and limited to
developments important to the use of the pooled
technology (§228).

agreement must not disadvantage competitors in
downstream products markets, and (5) the pool par‐
ticipants must not collude on prices outside the scope
of the pool, e.g., on downstream products.”

Regulatory requirements in the U.S.
The 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of In‐
tellectual Property (“U.S. Guidelines”) are less detailed
than their European counterparts, but a number of
business review letters from the Department of Justice
antitrust division offer additional guidance.18 Accord‐
ing to the U.S. Guidelines, cross‐licensing and pooling
arrangements “may provide procompetitive benefits by
integrating complementary technologies, reducing
transaction costs, clearing blocking positions, and
avoiding costly infringement litigation.” The following
practices were deemed to be anticompetitive: collective
price or output restraints and, in certain cases, grant‐
backs, settlements involving cross‐licensing between
horizontal competitors, and exclusion from a pooling
arrangement.
In the Sony letter and subsequent letters, the De‐
partment of Justice adopted a two‐step procedure for
reviewing proposed patent pools. It sought to deter‐
mine “(i) whether the proposed licensing program is
likely to integrate complementary patent rights and (ii),
if so, whether the resulting competitive benefits are
likely to be outweighed by competitive harm posed by
other aspects of the program” (Sony letter). In all four
business review letters, the Department of Justice
found that the pooled patents were essential (and
therefore complementary) in the sense of having no
substitutes.19 It thus remains to be seen whether and
under what conditions a pool with complementary but
non‐essential patents would be acceptable.
The first three review letters added other re‐
quirements that are summarized in these terms by the
USPTO white paper (2000): “(1) the patents in the
pool must be valid and not expired, (2) no aggrega‐
tion of competitive technologies and setting a single
price for them, (3) an independent expert should be
used to determine whether a patent is essential to
complement technologies in the pool, (4) the pool

Implications for patent pools
As the preceding sub‐sections make clear, the anti‐
trust analysis of patent pools in both Europe and the
United States focuses on the nature of the pooled
patents. Patent pools including substitute technolo‐
gies are deemed anti‐competitive and are subject to
challenges from competition authorities. On the
other hand, patent pools with only essential patents
are pro‐competitive to the extent that they do not
engage in anticompetitive practices with regard to
the dissemination of the technology (.such as down‐
stream price fixing) What is less clear is whether
competition authorities would accept patent pools
that include patents meeting a weaker definition of
complementary or where essentiality is likely but
difficult to prove.
There are two reasons why this matters for bio‐
technology patent pools. First, biotechnology lacks
standards. As several commentators have pointed
out, this poses a problem for patent pools because
essential patents cannot be defined as those that are
necessary to comply with the standard. In the con‐
text of diagnostic generics, Ebersole et al. (2005) have
argued for creating standards to facilitate patent
pooling. Elsewhere, Horn (2003) suggests that with a
defined field of use the absence of standards need
not be of consequence.
Second, in the SARS and avian flu20 cases, and per‐
haps in many biomedical research areas for which pat‐
ent pools would be of most interest, final products
have yet to be developed. But when final products do
not yet exist it seems to be ipso facto especially difficult
to determine which patents are essential. Indeed, the
point behind forming a pool may be to reduce uncer‐
tainty by ensuring that licensees can have access to all
the IP they may need, even if it later turns out that they
do not need a particular piece of IP.

Alternative to Pooling
A strong objection to biotechnology patent pools is
that biotechnology patent owners will not want to
form pools. Unfortunately, the traditional literature
on patent pools is of little guidance here because it
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focuses on the conditions under which pools would
be pro‐competitive and thus agreeable to courts or
competition authorities. The analyses begin with the
assumption that a group of patent owners wants to
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form a pool; this was not something that needed to be
explained or discussed in detail. Indeed a weird re‐
sult of economic models of patent pools (Shapiro
2001; Choi 2002; Lerner and Tirole 2004; Sung‐Hwan
2004; Aoki and Nagaoka 2004; Lerner, Tirole and
Strojwas 2005) is that patent owners almost invaria‐
bly want to pool if they are allowed to, the exception
being that sometimes an essential patent owner can
obtain a stronger bargaining position by waiting to
enter the pool.
To meaningfully discuss whether biotechnology
patent owners will be interested in forming patent
pools, we must consider not only pooling versus non‐
exclusive licensing but also other counterfactuals,
particularly pooling versus cross‐licensing and pool‐
ing versus the aggregation of the relevant rights by
one entity through exclusive licenses.

Aggregation of rights by one entity
through exclusive licenses as an alterna‐
tive to pooling
Economic papers on patent pools have always as‐
sumed that aggregation of rights by one entity
through exclusive licenses was impossible.21 In fact,
doing otherwise might have resulted in only trivial

results, an entirely legitimate assumption in the con‐
text of consumer electronics pools because patent
owners are typically large manufacturing firms. Ex‐
clusive licensing deals between horizontal competi‐
tors with significant market shares are unlikely to
meet antitrust requirements. Even if they could, large
manufacturing firms typically are unwilling to grant
exclusive licenses. Granting exclusive licenses is tan‐
tamount to leaving the market in exchange for roy‐
alty payments, which is usually not the best strategy
for firms with assets and investments that comple‐
ment their patents.
In the biotechnology industry, however, many
important patents are owned by universities or spe‐
cialized research firms that lack full development
capacity—much less production capabilities. Conse‐
quently, they are more than happy to grant exclusive
licenses. Such exclusive licenses, moreover, are
unlikely to be challenged by antitrust authorities be‐
cause they do not suppress competition (as may be
the case between two vertically integrated firms).
Thus, in biotechnology the aggregation of rights by
one entity through exclusive licenses can frequently
be a simpler alternative to pooling. Box 1 illustrates
this point with an example of a patent thicket re‐

Box 1: Consolidation of patent rights in reverse genetics
The Technology: Reverse genetics is a new technique to develop influenza vaccines. One of its great advantages over the con‐
ventional method (via hen’s eggs) is that vaccines can be developed more quickly, which would be essential in the event of a
pandemic. Reverse genetics can also be used to develop interpandemic flu vaccines (which has to be done again every year for
the new flu season), but its advantage fades because manufacturers have more time to develop the vaccine (Fedson, 2005).
Reverse genetics IP rights: Reverse genetics technology was developed and refined by Peter Palese of Mount Sinai School of
Medicine (“Labs rush to cultivate bird flu vaccine. Reverse Genetics allows creation of weakened virus”, 2004). Other refine‐
ments were developed by Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin and by Robert Webster of St. Jude Childrenʹs
Hospital in Memphis (ibid.). The initial technology was licensed by Mount Sinai to Aviron; Medimmune acquired those rights
when it purchased Aviron in 2002 (ibid.).
The IP rights for reverse genetics were thus divided between four portfolios (Fedson 2005, “MedImmune Expands Patent
Estate for Reverse Genetics with New Rights from Mount Sinai School of Medicine” 2005):
• Medimmune Fundamental Reverse Genetics Portfolio (WO 91/03552) [i.e. the initial Mount Sinai technology]
• Mount Sinai School of Medicine Plasmid Rescue Portfolio (WO 01/04333)
• Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation Plasmid Rescue Portfolio (WO 00/60050)
• St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital Dual Promoter Plasmid Rescue Portfolio (WO 01/83794)
Medimmune has recently acquired exclusive licenses from the portfolios of Wisconsin, St. Jude, and Mount Sinai School of
Medicine (“Technology for Faster, Safer Development of Pandemic Flu Vaccine Licensed by Mount School of Medicine” 2005;
“MedImmune Expands Patent Estate for Reverse Genetics with New Rights from Mount Sinai School of Medicine” 2005).
Conclusions: The IP rights situation described above was arguably a classical case of a patent thicket with fragmented IP rights
and uncertainty about technology ownership. The option of a patent pool for this technology was raised (Fedson 04), but in‐
stead the situation was resolved by one patent owner acquiring exclusive licenses from the other ones. Note that Medimmune
is a vertically integrated biotechnology firm and that the other patent owners were academic institutions.
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solved by the aggregation of rights by one patent
owner.

Patent pooling versus cross‐licensing
A key difference between a patent pool and a cross‐
licensing agreement is that in the former the patent
owners agree to license to third parties that do not
themselves contribute patents to the pool. The deci‐
sion to license the aggregated technology to third
parties is very similar to the decision to license a pat‐
ent when patent rights are not fragmented. On the
one hand, licensing to third parties will bring royalty
revenues. On the other hand, it may increase compe‐
tition for products embedding the IP of the licensors.
There are clearly many technologies where the sec‐
ond effect (profit dissipation) outweighs the first
(generation of royalty revenues).
Consider the example of two pharmaceutical
firms possessing a patent on a novel drug but being
unable to produce and commercialize it without in‐
fringing each otherʹs patent.22 The simplest solution to
the blocking positions is a cross‐licence that leads to a

duopoly on the market. However, both firms can do
better by buying or selling an exclusive license to the
other firm; the resulting monopoly will be more prof‐
itable than the combined duopoly rent that divides a
bargaining surplus between the two firms. On the
other hand, a patent pool would be worse than a
cross‐licence because the entry of new firms would
dissipate oligopoly rents faster than the royalty pay‐
ments would rise. Therefore, the most profitable op‐
tion is the aggregation of rights by one firm. If the
aggregation of rights is not possible for antitrust or
other reasons, then the cross‐licence will be preferred
to a pool.
We thus agree with Grassler and Capria (2003)
who argue that for patents covering components of
downstream pharmaceuticals products, pooling is
not attractive for patent holders. It is clear, how‐
ever, that many life science patents are not directed
to the actual therapeutic products but instead cover
research tools that can be used to develop and test
pharmaceutical products. Using patent pools to
aggregate such research tools may be helpful.

Conclusions
Our enquiry first attempted to clarify what a patent
pool is in theory and in practice. Although patent
pools have a common core (an agreement to license to
third parties as a package), the term can cover differ‐
ent practices. We mentioned but did not explore the
possibility that an agreement could be made ex ante
(i.e., before inventions have been made) between
members of a research collaboration or consortium.
Instead, we analyzed the much better known exam‐
ple of the MPEG patent pool, which several others
have imitated. The MPEG patent pool is an institution
intimately linked to a technical standard and de‐
signed to facilitate large‐scale technology licensing.
Although inspired by the examples of MPEG and
DVD, the SARS patent pool and other biotechnology
patent pools will likely be a different type of practice,
particularly with respect to the form of the licensing
terms.
The main reason for the interest in biotechnology
patent pools is that they could be an ex post practical
solution to address the fragmentation of IP rights and
its potential anti‐commons effects. We suggested that
patent pools might lower total transaction costs by
clarifying patent landscapes and reducing the num‐
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ber of necessary transactions. Pooling also modifies
the repartition of transaction costs to the benefit of
licensees, which allows patent owners to make their
technology more attractive.
We then briefly introduced the regulatory (i.e.,
antitrust) environment in which patent pools operate
in Europe and the U.S. The key concern is the rela‐
tionship between the pooled patents. Given the early
development stages of some technologies and the
lack of standards, the requirement that all essential
patents should be included may be difficult for bio‐
technology patent pools. It may also undo part of
their rationale. The future of biotechnology patent
pools will largely depend on whether regulatory au‐
thorities will accept a weaker test than essentiality or
will develop special guidelines for biotechnology
patent pools. For example, it might be possible to
design a safe harbour around a requirement that the
patents in the pool can be licensed independently.
An important point that we developed in the last
section of this paper is that patent pooling and inde‐
pendent licensing are not the only options available to
owners of complementary patent rights. The alterna‐
tives—i.e., cross‐licensing and the aggregation of
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rights by one entity through exclusive licenses—are
particularly relevant in the context of biotechnology.
This is because exclusive use in biotechnology is often
more profitable than licensing. The owners of patent
rights will tend to prefer aggregation of rights by one
entity through exclusive licenses and cross‐licensing.
In addition, universities and specialized research firms
hold important patent portfolios, which facilitate the
aggregation of rights since more patents are available
for exclusive licenses. In other words, the particular
structure of the biotechnology industry and the non‐
alignment of industry interests make aggregation of
rights through exclusive licenses easier and patent
pooling more difficult than in other industries.
Finally, we would like to place our discussion in
the broader context of markets for technology. The
downsides of patents and their exclusionary power
can be largely mitigated by the existence of a well‐
functioning market for technology. In such a mar‐
ket, patent rights can be licensed to multiple entities
and transferred to those best placed to use them.

Unfortunately, it is not clear that markets for tech‐
nology function well. Heller and Eisenberg (1998)
have expressed a predominantly pessimistic view of
markets for technology in biomedical research by
emphasizing the costs of bundling rights, the het‐
erogeneity of patent owners, and cognitive biases.
Other authors are more optimistic about these mar‐
kets (e.g., Arora et al., 2001), but it is to be expected
that information asymmetries and uncertainty over
the value, breadth, and validity of patents are im‐
pediments to transactions between multiple patent
owners. Given these market imperfections, many
mutually beneficial bilateral transactions that
would otherwise be concluded do not happen,
which ultimately thwarts innovation in biomedical
research overall. Thus, there must be value in
mechanisms and institutions that can facilitate
transactions in the market for technology. Patent
pools can provide this value, and so they may have
a role to play in biotechnology despite the current
obstacles to their use.
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Notes
1

WHO (2006:68) concludes, “Patent pools of upstream
technologies may be useful in some circumstances to
promote innovation relevant to developing countries.
WHO and WIPO should consider playing a bigger role in
promoting such arrangements.”

2

Admittedly, this would bear some resemblance to the
well‐known patent pool formed in 1917 to enable the
wartime manufacture of aircraft under the instigation of
U.S. Secretary of Navy Franklin Roosevelt (both attempt‐
ing to address an international crisis).

3

Business review letters are statements by the Department
of Justice on its current antitrust enforcement intentions
with respect to a particular practice.

4

According to the web site of the entity operating the
MPEG patent pool, http://www.mpegla.com accessed
22/04/06.

5

The Bernhardt‐Nocht Institut, the British Columbia Can‐
cer Agency, the Centers for Disease Control and Preven‐
tion, Erasmus Medical Center, and Hong Kong Univer‐
sity

6

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
Health Canada, Coronovative, and Versitech. CDC is a
branch of the U.S. department of Health and Human
Services. Health Canada is Canada’s ministry of health,
Coronovative is a spinoff from Erasmus Rotterdam Uni‐
versity, and Versitech is the technology transfer office
from Hong Kong University.

7

Thus the pool members can hardly be described as profit
maximizers. Another oddity of the SARS patent pool is
that the underlying patents were only patent applica‐
tions when the parties announced their intention to pool.
It remains to be seen if a patent pool can be formed be‐
fore these applications are granted.

8

9

10

That is, sharing know‐how and unpatented information
would be less sensitive because of the resulting joint
ownership of the patents. This point is made in UPSTO
(2000).
SNP stands for Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms, com‐
mon human genetic variations which are of great value
in biomedical research and drug discovery.
In the words of Lemley and Shapiro (2005): “The actual
scope of a patent right, and even whether the right will
withstand litigation at all, are uncertain and contingent
questions. This uncertainty is not an accident or mistake.
Rather, it is an inherent part of our patent system, an ac‐
commodation to the hundreds of thousands of patent
applications filed each year, the inability of third parties
to participate effectively in determining whether a patent
should issue, and the fact that for the vast majority of is‐
sued patents, scope and validity are of little or no com‐
mercial significance.”
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11

This point is made in Simon (2005): “The formation of
such a patent pool would send a powerful signal to puta‐
tive licensees (e.g. vaccine manufacturers) that patent
owners mean to make their IP rights available from stan‐
dard rates.”

11

Clearly the number of potential licensees may change
with a pool; some licensors may also be licensees, and
the pool need not include all licensors, but the point is
clear enough.

13

Compare with Merges (2001) who identifies the two cen‐
tral principles of a pool as (1) consolidate property rights
in a central entity (i.e., the contract); and (2) establish a
valuation mechanism to divide up the royalty stream.

14

Consider for instance the Harrow’s pool that came up in
a case before the U.S. Supreme Court (E. Bement & Sons v.
National Harrow) in 1902. According to Gilbert (2004),
“The pool grew to 22 firms accounting for over 90 per‐
cent of all manufacturing and sales of float spring tooth
harrows in the United States. Each firm was required to
adhere to uniform price schedules for the sale of all
products manufactured under the National Harrow li‐
cense. The pool set uniform license terms that fixed
prices for licensed products, required that the licensee
make or sell only the licensed products, and obligated li‐
censees not to challenge the patents and to defend the
patents if challenged by others.”

15

Safe harbors serve as shortcuts in antitrust analyses to
determine whether a particular agreement is pro‐
competitive.

16

A more comprehensive review would also have to con‐
sider the patent misuse defense in the context of biotech‐
nology patent pools (see Gosh and De Shield, 2005), but
patent misuse and antitrust violations are very closely re‐
lated.

17

Article 81(1) of the EC treaty prohibits agreements that
have as their object or effect the restriction of competi‐
tion.

18

We will refer to these as the MPEG Letter, the Sony Let‐
ter, the Toshiba Letter, and the 3G Letter; see the bibliog‐
raphy for details.

19

Compare: “The Portfolio combines patents that an inde‐
pendent expert has determined to be essential to compli‐
ance with the MPEG‐2 standard; there is no technical al‐
ternative to any of the Portfolio patents within the stan‐
dard” (MPEG letter); “it appears reasonably likely that
the pool will combine only complementary patents for
which there are no substitutes for the purpose of compli‐
ance with the Standard Specifications” (Toshiba letter);
“it appears that the Licensors intend to license through
the pool only complementary patents for which there are
no substitutes” (Sony letter); “the limitations of patents
to those ‘technically’ essential to compliance […] provide

133

reasonable assurance that patents combined in a single
PlatformCo for a 3G radio interface technology will not
be substitutes for one another” (3G letter).
20

See Box.

21

Of course, aggregation of rights can also be made
through non‐exclusive licensing and in certain circum‐
stances that may be the simplest solution. However, if
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the licensed patents are complementary, the price of the
licenses will be higher and the revenues of the licensors
will be lower under independent licensing than under a
pool. Shapiro (2001) first established this.
22

Our hypothetical might be the result of a patent race with
two research groups submitting applications for different
aspects of the same discovery.
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